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Abstract 
This research explores the environmental and economic implications of nitrogen 
discharge abatement from dairy farms. This thesis develops a framework to 
analyse agri-environmental policies using bio economic modelling. A novel 
approach has been developed using farm survey data for catchment scale 
modelling and policy analysis.  
 
Policy analysis is facilitated by various modelling techniques and software. 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are used to convert data from multiple 
sources to a common platform for policy analysis. Whole dairy farm system 
simulations coupled with a Metamodel built on the Overseer software are used to 
establish the relationship between farm economic returns and nitrogen discharges. 
This relationship is used to derive abatement costs and resolve policy 
implementation challenges. Data Envelopment Analysis is used to develop 
Environmental economic efficiency measures. Finally a stylized model is used to 
determine spatially optimal riparian buffer strips.  
 
The results show that the differences in abatement costs and environmental 
efficiency between farming systems are significant. The adverse effects of 
information asymmetry can be effectively minimized by adopting differentiated 
incentives and target monitoring. Riparian buffers are a cost effective abatement 
tool that complement abatement at the intensive margin. Clear understanding of 
farm heterogeneity will help to design effective policies. 
 
Techniques for the measurement of policy impact have been successfully 
developed and add significantly to our knowledge of the underlying relationships. 
The use of simulated data for agri-environmental policy analysis is versatile and is 
expected to have several valuable applications. These methods can be applied to 
other geographic areas and research domains. This thesis provides useful tools for 
policy makers seeking to develop empirically informed agri environmental policy. 
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1. Introduction to thesis 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Declining water quality is widely considered to be one of the most important 
environmental issues facing New Zealand with farming being perceived as a 
major cause.  Waikato region residents reported that water pollution was easily 
their most important environmental concern in each of four attitude surveys 
conducted by Environment Waikato. Technical and regulatory mechanisms to 
reduce water pollution; especially nonpoint source pollution from agriculture are 
the focus of an intensive research effort both in New Zealand and internationally. 
The research described in this thesis should help policy makers and farmers to 
identify the most cost effective options for achieving any given improvement in 
water quality. 
 
Management of water quality is often inherently complex due to the large number 
of agents involved and because of the importance of spatial variability. At the 
same time, both cost and environmental impact must be evaluated simultaneously 
in order to evaluate alternative policies. Given these complexities, the integrated 
analysis and modelling described in this thesis provides a useful contribution to 
policy development. 
 
Nitrogen is a key nutrient for pasture productivity and farm nitrogen discharge is 
the major nonpoint source pollution. Dairy farming  in New Zealand is an 
intensive form of land use, often involving high stocking rates and nitrogen 
fertiliser application rates, which elevate nitrogen concentrations in water 
(Ledgard, Penno, & Sporsen, 1999). Nitrate from cow urine patches is a major 
contributor to the leaching loss in grazed dairy pastures (Di & Cameron, 2002). 
The urine patches and mobile nature of nitrogen compared to other nutrients, 
leads to the potential for significant losses of nitrogen into water. Nitrogen 
contamination can make water undesirable for drinking; affect fisheries and 
reduce the aesthetic and recreational value of water. The Waikato River catchment 
has received much attention in recent years because of rising nitrogen levels with 
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68% of this has being attributed to nitrogen discharges from dairy farms (Figure 
1.1).  
 
According to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (2004), cow 
numbers and nitrogen fertiliser use per hectare have risen by 19 percent and 162  
percent respectively during the decade from 1994 to 2004. Environment Waikato, 
the regional council for the Waikato region, reports that annual nitrogen fertiliser 
use in the region increased by 84 percent over the five year period 1997/98 to 
2002/03 from 68 kilograms to 125 kilograms per farmed hectare. 
 
Dairy farming has been an important component of the Waikato economy for many 
decades and its importance has increased over time with the conversion of additional 
land to dairy production. Warm climate, fertile soils and ample water supply make 
the region ideal for its flourishing dairy industry. Dairying is the dominant sector 
in the Waikato economy with respect to produce value and employment and uses 
32% of total agricultural land. The dairy industry provides 17% of jobs, 24% of 
gross regional product and 35% of national dairy production  (Hughes, 2007).  
 
Figure 1.1 Sources of nitrogen to the Waikato River  
 
 
Source: Environment Waikato (2008)1 
                                                 
1 Based on modelled data provided by the by the National Institute of Water & Atmospheric 
Research. Technical details are provided in Elliot et al. (2005). 
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Pastoral nonpoint pollution has been largely free from regulation in New Zealand. 
But in recent times community pressure for better water quality has emerged 
(Brodnax, 2006) and has become a matter of public and political debate. Water 
quality concerns have triggered scientific research towards managing nitrogen in 
water. Scientific evidence indicates that farms may reduce their nitrogen discharge by 
reducing the intensity of production and changing management strategies. In the 
Waikato, polices for changing farm practices related to water quality have so far 
largely relied on voluntary measures. However Buchan, Meister, & Giera (2006) 
cited New Zealand (Bayfield & Meister, 2005) and overseas (Gunningham, 
Grabosky, & Sinclair, 2004) experience, that shows that voluntary approaches, 
while effective to a degree, are generally not enough to achieve the community’s 
desired rate of progress without strong regulatory underpinning. Therefore in the 
future, dairy farmers are likely to face stricter environmental regulations either under 
standards or incentive based programmes. They are also aware that environmental 
issues will be among the greatest challenges they face in the near future. The dairy 
industry has identified addressing nitrogen losses into water as one of the key 
priority areas and realised the importance of the development of quantitative 
approaches to environmental management (Dairy Environment Review Group, 
2006).  
 
Falling water quality results in part from the failure of the market to allocate the 
socially desirable level of resources to abatement. Given that dairy farms are the 
engine of economic prosperity in the region, any proposed policies should 
minimise the adverse economic impact of achieving environmental goals. 
Understanding and quantifying the responsiveness of farms to alternative policies 
in different economic and geo-physical environments is essential to the 
development of cost effective solutions to nitrogen abatement. Economics can 
play an important role in guiding policies that dairy farms may face in order to 
pursue economic and environmental sustainability. This study developed  
quantitative models to generate information, guide policy development and 
monitoring of outcomes for dairy farms given their economic and environmental 
importance. This is consistent with the interests of the dairy industry and assists 
policy makers such as regional councils in developing cost effective programmes 
to improve water quality. 
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1.2 Research area and hypothesis 
The empirical analysis is carried out in the catchment that includes the middle part 
of the Waikato River catchment from Lake Arapuni to Karapiro dam, plus 
contributing tributaries.  This research area is referred to as the Karapiro 
catchment throughout the thesis. Being an enclosed geographic entity catchments 
have often been considered to be the most appropriate spatial unit for analysis of 
the interaction between agriculture and water quality. Lake Karapiro and Arapuni 
are identified as waters of national importance for tourism by the Ministry of 
Tourism. This catchment has been identified as a high priority areas for nutrient 
management (Environment Waikato, 2005c) and consists of approximately 400 
dairy farms. Nitrogen discharges are the leading cause of water quality 
impairment in Lake Karapiro and its tributaries (Brodnax, 2006; Environment 
Waikato, 2005a). Although water quality is formed at the catchment scale, many 
of the immediate environmental impacts of agriculture occur as a result of 
decisions made at farm level. So this study focuses on economic and 
environmental variables at farm level.  
 
The thesis examines implicit hypotheses that existing regional survey data can 
effectively be used to represent populations of farms in a small geographic area; 
heterogeneity exists among farms in the catchment in terms of economic and 
environmental impact and efficiency; information asymmetry and cost of policy 
implementation can be reduced by effective monitoring and interception 
technology is an effective tool to reduce nitrogen discharges. 
 
1.3 Method of analysis 
Environmental policy issues stem from agricultural production and its interface 
with the environment. Griffin and Bromley (1982) initiated the analysis of agri 
environmental policies based on non-point production functions. Various authors 
provide evidence of the effect of farm heterogeneity on the cost effectiveness of 
environmental policies (Martinez & Albiac, 2006; Newell & Stavins, 2003; 
Wossink, Lansink, & Struik, 2001). Thus designing policies for improving water 
quality is an empirical issue and requires knowledge of the nature of production 
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and the fate of pollution. The complex interrelationships and time lags involved in 
various dimensions of agricultural production systems limit the use of 
experimental field trials in gaining understanding of the nature of these 
relationships. Bio-economic modelling is capable of tackling a component of this 
sort of information problem (Bennett, 2005). It provides useful insights on the 
relationships, which influence the heterogeneous set of farms and environmental 
resources.  
 
However bio-economic models require intensive data on production, 
management, pollution and financial information. In New Zealand there is no 
such comprehensive data source that provides such data with spatial references. 
Therefore this study developed a spatial micro-simulation model was developed to 
generate a virtual population of dairy farms in the catchment. An integrated bio-
economic model was also constructed including a mathematical programming 
model, meta model, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), using both the 
Overseer nutrient budget model and the DairyNZ’s Whole Farm Model and 
virtual population data. Although the Whole Farm Model and Overseer models 
are not specifically designed for evaluating the effect of policies, this study 
demonstrated that these are useful tools with modest data requirements and yet 
sufficiently robust to accurately describe the nature of dairy production and 
associated nitrogen discharges for catchment wide policy analysis. The model 
based estimates are used to analyse various policy issues such as estimation of 
abatement costs, standards and taxes, farm efficiency and riparian buffers at 
catchment scale. 
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1.4 Research objectives 
The overall objective of this research is to gain insight into the environmental and 
economic implications of nitrogen discharge abatement. More specifically, the 
following issues will be addressed.  
 
1. Development of a comprehensive framework for analysing proposed 
policies 
2. Generation of a comprehensive data base to analyse catchment wide 
impacts 
3. Exploring the impact of various policies on different farming systems 
4. Exploring specific challenges of policy implementation including 
monitoring 
5. Defining and measuring  environmental and economic efficiency of farms 
 
1.5 Chapter outline of thesis  
This study consists of 9 chapters including this introductory chapter. The 
remaining parts of the thesis are organized as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the rationale for environmental policy; outlines the economic 
concepts behind environmental pollution; provides an overview of environmental 
policy for water quality improvement and discusses the importance of bio-
economic modelling in capturing policy implications. 
 
Chapter 3 characterises the catchment including the level of nitrogen pollution 
within water ways. This provides a platform for identifying policy challenges and 
analysis of environmental policy. 
 
In chapter 4 a spatial micro-simulation model is developed to combine geo 
referenced data on farms in the catchment with economic variables from the 
annual dairy farm survey to generate comprehensive data for analysis. 
 
 7
Chapter 5 establishes the relationship between profit and pollution using 
optimisation techniques and derives abatement costs for farming systems by 
extending the utility of DairyNZ’s Whole Farm Model. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the issues related to implementing environmental policy from 
a property rights, monitoring and transaction cost perspective. A model for 
effective monitoring to minimise information asymmetry is set up and empirically 
applied.  
 
Chapter 7 defines and measures the environmental and economic performances of 
dairy farms using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Then the variations in 
efficiency are explained based on characteristics that are hypothesised to influence 
environmental efficiency. 
 
Chapter 8 develops a stylised model for optimum implementation of riparian 
fencing, which is followed by an empirical analysis using a virtual population of 
farms and analyses the impacts of potential land use changes. 
 
Finally chapter 9 summarizes the findings and considers implications for policy 
and future research. 
 
1.6 Contribution of thesis  
This thesis contributes to the applied literature on many fronts, both 
methodologically and in relation to the study site. A comprehensive dataset is 
generated to model spatial heterogeneity at the level of individual decision 
making units. An applied analytical framework is developed for evaluating and 
implementing water quality policies on different farming systems. A stylised 
model for policy analysis is constructed. This facilitates precise consideration of 
riparian buffers on New Zealand dairy farms.  
 8
2. Agri-environmental policies for improving water quality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Agri- environmental policies can have a significant influence on farming practices 
and water quality. Nitrogen pollution in water is an important environmental issue in 
the Waikato region, where the majority of manageable nitrogen discharges come 
from the agricultural sector particularly dairy farming. These discharges can be 
characterised as an environmental externality1 associated with agricultural production 
as they contribute to deterioration of water quality. Social emphasis on water quality 
has resulted in the need for more rigorous integration of this externality with 
economic objectives in the management of farming systems. Therefore environmental 
externalities have been analysed with the view to design effective and efficient 
policies, which tend to internalise those externalities.  
 
Griffin and Bromley (1982) initiated the analysis of agricultural pollution as a 
nonpoint externality by developing a theoretical framework, in which production 
externalities are expressed with a continuously differentiable nonpoint production 
function. They showed that under certainty, efficient environmental policies can be 
created based on correctly defined nonpoint production functions. Environmental 
policies can be regulatory, voluntary and market based. In the Waikato, policies for 
changing farm practices related to water quality have so far relied on effluent 
management rules and voluntary adoption of new practices. Policy tools to promote 
voluntary adoption include extension education, technical assistance and costs 
sharing.   
 
This chapter explains the rationale for environmental policy; outlines the economic 
concepts behind environmental pollution;  provides an overview of policy instrument 
                                                 
1 An externality is any action that affects the welfare of an individual or group without direct payment 
or compensation 
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types highlighting generic properties and challenges; discusses the application of 
polices in the presence of  heterogeneity and concludes with a review of future 
directions.  
 
2.2 Rationale for environmental policy 
While modern agriculture is very productive, its negative effects on the environment 
have become increasingly visible. Many of these are the result of practices aimed at 
reducing the per unit costs of production. This has resulted in increased intensity, 
more specialized production, and increased emissions of substances with negative 
effects on surrounding eco-systems. Input use intensity has increased in New Zealand 
agriculture over the years. According to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment (2004), cow numbers and nitrogen fertiliser use per hectare have risen 
by 19% and 162 % respectively during the decade from 1994 to 2004. In the same 
period volume of milk production per hectare has risen by 34%. Intensification of 
production evolves in response to incentives. The New Zealand dairy industry’s focus 
is to drive productivity improvements on dairy farms to maintain and enhance 
competitiveness. Productivity improvement fuelled by intensification, technological 
innovation and improved management systems is seen as imperative, if the industry is 
to remain profitable and sustainable. Severe environmental damage as a result of 
technological advancement is attributed not to bad science but to inadequate policies, 
institutions and  management systems (Zilberman, Khanna, & Lipper, 1997).  
 
In an economy the primary function of the market is to improve the well being of 
society. This occurs through the trading of goods and services. The pricing of these 
goods and services leads to the allocation of resources that best suits the demands, 
and hence satisfaction of society. In reality, however the price of goods and services 
does not always reflect scarcity due to imperfections in the market causing market 
failure. The failure to recognize and apportion the external costs of nitrogen discharge 
as a result of farming is an externality problem. This leads to sub-optimal economic 
outcomes. The key features of nitrogen pollution as an externality are the time lag 
involved between cause and effect and difficulties in identifying the producer (Pretty 
et al., 2000).  
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Inadequately specified property rights are the major cause of market failure (Randall, 
1987). Efficient markets require restrictions on resource use in addition to rights that 
specify ownership. In the absence of such specifications, property rights are said to be 
attenuated. Attenuated property rights ultimately lead to over and under utilisation of 
resources, leaving society less well off than it might be with the existence of non-
attenuated property rights.  
 
When property rights are attenuated the full cost of land use activities are not 
captured. For instance when the environmental cost of nitrogen fertiliser is not 
reflected in its price, it leads to over consumption and consequently an increased level 
of nitrogen in water. Farms which do  not  bear the cost of damage they cause off 
farm can be described as “Free riders”(Legg, 2003). In contrast non attenuated 
property rights would ensure the full costs and benefits of consumption would accrue 
to the purchaser of the goods and services traded. Goods and services over which 
enforceable non-attenuated rights have been specified are said to be excludable and 
rival in consumption (Randall, 1987). Ideally, the role of environmental policy in 
correcting market failure is to specify non-attenuated property rights for all resources 
involved in the production process.  This will lead to trade and result in prices that 
reflect the true price of the resources. Solutions of this nature to correct  market 
failure were first proposed by Coase (1960) in his seminal article “The problem of 
social cost”. The Coase theorem states that under ideal circumstances, when polluters 
and pollutees bargain, the equilibrium level of pollution is independent of the 
allocation of property rights. He argued that provided property rights are well defined 
and transaction costs are low, the efficient level of pollution can be arrived at through 
bargaining between the owner  of an environmental asset and respective users,  
irrespective  of who has the initial property rights. The ideal circumstances infer 
perfect information about costs and benefits and the absence of transactions costs. 
Suppose, for example, that the "pollutee" has all the property rights to the 
environment, in the absence of any negotiation between the polluter and the pollutee, 
the former is not allowed to pollute, to do so would infringe upon the pollutee’s 
property rights. Such efficiency cannot be attained for most environmental problems 
related to agriculture due to the public good nature of the polluted resources, 
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where non exclusiveness or non rivalry in consumption often make it impractical to 
specify property rights.  
 
Even though the efficiency of markets may be improved by better specification of 
property rights, there are costs associated with the implementation and administration 
of the legislation required to specify the new set of rights. In addition, there are costs 
associated with market transactions. Only in cases where the benefits of trade 
outweigh these administration and transaction costs, would markets improve net 
social benefit. The highly variable nature of nitrogen pollution, the high costs of 
collecting data and non rivalry in consumption of the benefits of nitrogen discharge 
reduction makes market transactions unlikely.  
 
When market transactions fail to bring effective solutions, policy instruments may 
play a role in correcting market failure. However in the case of nonpoint pollution, in 
the presence of imperfect knowledge about nitrogen discharge and transportation, 
maximisation of social welfare is hardly ever achieved. In other words it is difficult to 
reach first best solutions. In this circumstance the best that can be achieved through 
policy intervention in the market is to move society from a sub optimal state to a 
better sub optimal state. Thus the role of policy is to influence the behaviour of 
economic agents to improve water quality and thus social welfare. The instruments 
discussed below attempt to internalise negative externalities caused by poorly defined 
property rights over the use of resources.  
 
2.3 Conceptual framework for analysis of environmental policy 
A framework for analysing environmental policy must consider cost and benefits of 
pollution abatement. Pollution abatement costs are defined as the cost of reducing 
nitrogen discharge to a particular level. The abatement cost function maps the 
minimum cost of achieving a given level abatement, where the abatement level is 
measured as the reduction in kilograms of nitrogen discharge below the unconstrained 
level. Figure 2.1graphs the marginal abatement cost (MAC) and marginal benefit of 
pollution abatement. Marginal abatement cost is positively sloped since the cost of 
pollution abatement increases at increasing rate. The reduction in economic values 
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due to ambient pollution levels is referred to as economic damage and is reflected by 
the marginal damage curve. Because of the assimilative capacity of water bodies, at 
low levels of nitrogen discharge the damage is quite small while at higher levels the 
damage is significant. Therefore the marginal damage caused by each unit of nitrogen 
discharge increases with the amount emitted. This results in a negatively sloped 
marginal damage cost curve, which captures the trend that the benefits of pollution 
control increase at a decreasing rate. Economic theory suggests that the socially 
optimal level of pollution abatement is at a point where the marginal abatement cost 
and marginal damage is equal (at point Q*) (Hanley, Shogren, & White, 1997). 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates this conceptual framework. 
 
Figure 2.1 Efficient level of pollution abatement 
 
A common problem in determining the optimal pollution level is that the marginal 
damage cost function and marginal abatement cost are often unknown or contentious, 
so achieving an economically optimal level of pollution is often not practical.  
Given that the damage caused by nitrogen discharges into water is often not well 
known, a socially optimal level of pollution cannot be determined and policy 
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instruments are not able to establish an optimal outcome. In economic analysis, 
therefore, a cost effectiveness framework is often used. Griffin & Bromley (1982) 
proposed cost effective ways of meeting an exogenous target for environmental 
quality. So a social planner can choose the policy instrument that minimises 
abatement and transaction costs. The empirical part of the chapter 5 quantifies and 
compares the relative differences in abatement cost under varying nitrogen discharge 
levels and tax scenarios in different farming systems2.  
 
So exogenous specification of target pollution levels and the cost efficiency of 
achieving this under various policies are graphically illustrated in Figure 2.2.  The 
limit on nitrogen discharges have often been politically or bureaucratically resolved 
based on scientific findings. For example Environment Waikato has proposed 
capping nitrogen levels in the Lake Taupo and reducing manageable discharges in the 
lake’s catchment by 20 percent. Scientists regard this reduction as the minimum 
required in order to maintain the present level of water quality in the lake 
(Environment Waikato, 2005b). But the cost of achieving a given target can vary 
considerably depending on the policy adopted. Exogenous specification of pollution 
levels and the cost efficiency of achieving this under various policies are graphically 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. The total cost of abatement for policy 1 is represented by the 
area encompassed by abe, whereas the cost for policy 3 (abc) is much less. Similarly 
the marginal cost for the last unit   abated is far higher for policy 1 (MC1) than for 
policy 3 (MC3). 
 
The damage cost of water quality is often valued using a number of approaches that 
enable estimation of marginal benefit of abatement. Damage to water quality can be 
valued as a function of demand by individuals, municipalities, or industry based on 
the cost  of water treatment, lack of biodiversity, eutrophication, decrease in 
recreation activities and so on (Bontems, Rotillon, & Turpin, 2005). The greater the 
demand for services such as recreation or industrial use, the greater their value and 
the greater the economic damages if impaired by pollution.  
 
                                                 
2 Transaction costs are not modelled in this study 
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Figure 2.2 Cost effectiveness of policies 
 
*MAC- Marginal abatement cost 
 
2.3.1 Spatial dimension  
The quantity and cost of abatement of nonpoint source water pollution can vary 
considerably depending on spatial variation in soil, topographic, hydrologic and 
landscape features of fields and on the transport path for a pollutant (Qiu & Prato, 
1999). The development of  environmental  policies  for agriculture  is thus 
complicated by spatial, temporal, and technological heterogeneity (Weersink, 
Livernois, Shogren, & Shortle, 1998). For instance, a farm with a low level of 
nitrogen discharge but located next to a water body may impose greater 
environmental damage than a farm with a high discharge level located further from 
the water body. When this occurs, cost effectiveness requires policy instruments to be 
targeted to individual farms. In addition, technological differences among farms may 
alter production levels, pollution potential and marginal abatement costs for  nitrogen 
discharges.   
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Figure 2.3 Spatial variations of agricultural production and pollution 
 
Rygnestad  (2000) illustrated the spatial variation of agricultural production and 
environmental impacts, using figures adapted from Baumol and Oates (1988); see 
Figure 2.3). Curves 1 and 2 describe different farms. He showed that A, B, C and D 
can be efficient solutions for different farms with spatial variation in both agricultural 
production and environmental vulnerability. In a situation where agricultural 
production and pollution potential varies, it is not possible to find a single optimal 
pollution level via a uniform environmental policy. However environmental polices 
are seldom spatially differentiated due to informational and monitoring costs. Instead 
uniform policies are implemented even though ignoring spatial differences in a 
catchment likely to increase the cost of abatement (Qiu & Prato, 1999).  
 
The heterogeneity of farm abatement costs is of fundamental importance in the 
selection of optimal mitigation policy instruments (Newell & Stavins, 2003). Optimal 
environmental policy concentrates  its efforts  on those farms  where abatement costs 
are low (Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo, 2006); thus  farm centric knowledge of 
abatement costs will facilitate selection of the most efficient option for nitrogen 
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management. Chapter 5 considers the existence of spatial variability among farms in 
the catchment in terms of economic and environmental impact. 
 
Figure 2.4 Abatement allocation 
 
 
Source: Sterner (2003) 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the allocation of abatement between two farms. Abatement could 
either be mandated at a target level for each farm or a market based policy instrument 
such as a charge T could be used, giving abatement of a1 and a2 respectively. Under 
the trading scenario, farm 1 with lower abatement costs will voluntarily undertake 
more abatement to create and sell surplus emissions credits or rights to farm 2, which 
finds that it is cheaper to buy these on the market than to incur the costs of abatement. 
Total abatement costs to the farms are the areas under the marginal cost curves (MC1 
and MC2) in Figure 2.4. When reductions in abatement are equal, costs are the sum of 
two triangles (OaY). Under the market based allocation scenario, the farm with the 
 17
lower abatement cost is responsible for most of the abatement, and aggregate costs 
are significantly lower (Oa1X+ Oa2W). In the presence of big differences in the 
abatement costs function of the two farms, an equalisation of the marginal costs of 
abatement can reduce aggregate costs significantly. 
 
2.3.2 Policy impact on farms  
The impact of policy on farms can be examined using the tradeoff between farm 
profitability (net returns) and water quality (Ribaudo, 1999). In Figure 2.5, movement 
along the curve represents changes in inputs at a given technology to achieve 
increasing levels of water quality. For instance, higher levels of water quality 
protection may necessitate a move away from conventional practices to ones using 
less nitrogen fertiliser and fewer cows in on dairy farms (from P1 to P2 ).  
 
Figure 2.5 Farm level tradeoff between net returns and water quality 
 
 
Under conventional technology better levels of water quality can be achieved only 
with a loss of net returns reflecting the fact that pollution control is typically costly. 
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However adoption of Best Management Practices (BMPs) may enable achievement 
of enhanced water quality without much loss of returns (point P3).  
 
2.4 Environmental policy instruments 
A large number of policy instruments for reducing the environmental impacts of 
agricultural production can be identified.  They can be categorized into the following 
groups; regulation, economic instruments, farm management choices, decentralised 
policies such as liability rules, property rights and moral suasion. Table 2.1 
summarizes the key features of such policies and they are discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
2.4.1 Direct regulation 
Direct regulation can be  implemented  through either  design standards regulating  
the way farmers  produce  and  manage  their resources  or performance standards 
regulating the quantity  of observable  pollution  resulting  from production. 
Standards have an advantage over taxes because when standards are implemented, 
farms only bear the whole cost of abatement. Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & 
Shortle (1998) showed that  regulation or the threat of regulations on pollution levels  
can be used as a stick to promote the adoption of BMPs and  uptake of  other 
economic instruments such as tradable emission permits. Regulations depending on 
their design may either encourage or stifle research and development. Subsequent 
sections discuss the merits and application of standards in comparison with other 
policies, in more detail. When standards are implemented in a uniform manner in a 
catchment, they are likely to  have differential effects on farms and so are likely  to be 
opposed by  property rights advocates (Qiu & Prato, 1999). The Waikato regional 
plan rule introduced last year is an example of direct regulation (Environment 
Waikato, 2007c).  It requires any farm applying more than 60 kg of nitrogen fertiliser 
per hectare per year, or applying any fertiliser to the effluent irrigation area to have a 
nutrient management plan  and to apply for a resource consent.  
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Table 2.1  Possible options for addressing nonpoint pollution in agriculture 
Standards/ direct regulation 
 Restrictions on stocking rate, fertiliser application, emission discharge levels 
 Mandatory use of pollution control practices, compulsory adoption of environmental 
management plans 
o Require clearly defined legislation 
 
Charges/ Subsidies/ Tenders 
 Charges on inputs/outputs-   
o Require ability to discriminate charge/subsidy for  polluting  farms in 
affected region on inputs outputs that have a direct relationship with 
pollution levels 
 
 Charges on estimated nitrogen emissions 
o Require accurate relationship between estimated emissions and readily 
observable inputs and site characteristics data 
 
 Ambient charges 
o Readily monitored resource quality affected by a relatively homogeneous 
group of producers within a small area  short time lag between emissions and 
environmental effects 
 Cost-sharing or  other subsidies  for inputs  or practices  that reduce pollution 
 Land retirement/land use change subsidies 
 State grants to competitive discharge reduction practices 
 Contracts involving adoption of  conservation or nutrient management practices 
based on auctions 
 
Tradable Permits 
 Implemented on inputs or estimated emissions 
o Clearly-defined, homogeneous input related to environmental problem and  
sufficient number of polluters to establish market 
Decentralized Policies 
 Liability Rules 
o Applicable to infrequent polluting events with clear cause and effect link 
involving a few parties 
 
 Non-Compliance Fees 
o Homogenous group of polluters with understood links between behaviour 
and environmental damages and  
o Fees related to damage need to be communicated to polluters  ex ante 
 
 Property Rights Definition 
o Privately-owned resource where institutional restrictions 
have prevented markets for environmental amenities  
 
Moral suasion and education 
 Dissemination of knowledge about environmental damages and  code of practice for 
nutrient   management etc 
o Farmers willingness to adopt 
 
 
Collated from  Shortle & Horan (2001), (Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & Shortle (1998)  
and Gunningham & Sinclair (2005). 
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2.4.2 Price based instruments 
 
Emission charges 
Emission charges are fees levied on the nitrogen discharged from individual farms. 
The diffuse nature of nitrogen discharges makes estimating individual farm nitrogen 
discharges difficult and expensive unless modelling approaches are used. But there is 
likely to be political resistance to emission charges unless discharges can be clearly 
established. 
  
Ambient charges 
Segerson (1988) also Xepapadeas (1992) proposed  a  system for non-point pollution 
control based  on the level of aggregate emission into the water body. When the 
targeted emission level is exceeded in the water body all farmers are charged. The 
major advantage of the system is easy monitoring as it does not require monitoring at 
the individual farm level. However, Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & Shortle (1998) 
showed this strategy is  best suited  to environmental problems  in small catchments 
with relatively homogeneous farms with readily monitored water quality and  short 
time lags between polluting activities and pollution delivery. Under ambient, 
emission and input taxes, farms not only  pay the tax but also bear the abatement cost 
(Qiu & Prato, 1999). In theory emission taxes can be made revenue neutral by 
reducing other taxes.  
 
Input taxes 
Griffin & Bromley (1982) and Shortle & Dunn(1986) illustrated  the use of  policy 
instruments based on management such as taxing input use and output produced. In 
contrast to emission based instruments they are easy to implement, but available 
evidence suggests that input taxes tend to generate revenue for the environmental 
authority rather than alter producer behaviour. For instance, Swinton and Clark 
(1994) found enterprise mix was unchanged in the range between a 121% and 780% 
increase in nitrogen input price. Giraldez and Fox (1995) assessed the cost of  
reducing nitrogen inputs in the USA by the same amount either through tax or a 
nitrogen ceiling. While the required level of a nitrogen tax was $49.70, use of a 
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ceiling achieved the same reduction at a fraction of the cost ($1.81). Martinez and 
Albiac (2004) also found that standards outperformed taxes in their study; 1.20 
Euro/kg of nitrogen tax resulted in 21.5 million Euros profit and 990 tons of nitrogen 
leaching. Meanwhile a nitrogen standard resulted in 23.8 million Euros profit and 634 
tons of nitrogen leaching. Wu, Teague, Mapp, & Bernado (1995)  reported  that  
nitrogen use restrictions resulted in a 25 % reduction in nitrogen discharge and 
income loss of 16%, while a nitrogen use tax achieved the same level of reduction 
with 49% of income loss.  
 
The effectiveness of input charges on reducing input use depends on the size of the 
tax and the proportion of total production costs made up by the input. The inelasticity 
of farm input demand implies that high tax levels are required to cause the desired 
reduction in input use. Empirical studies suggest that fertilizer use is very inelastic to 
price changes for example a one hundred percent increase in nitrogen price, reduced  
nitrogen use only by  2% (Johnson, Adams, & Perry, 1991). They found that the 
elasticity of nitrogen losses with respect to nitrogen price was less than 0.1.  While 
higher tax rates would be required to induce dairy farmers to substantially reduce 
nitrogen use, this may not be politically feasible (Hefland & House, 1995). A further 
complication is caused by  the spatial variability of input use on environmental 
impact, which means that the input tax  should in principle  vary with location and 
application method (Zilberman, Khanna, & Lipper, 1997). Also, taxing inputs like 
fertiliser, does not take account of any environmentally oriented farm management 
practices that may limit nutrient runoff. A mere promising approach may be to use 
taxes to create a price differential between conventional fertilisers like urea and other 
environmentally preferred types of chemicals such as nitrification inhibitors.  
 
2.4.3 Incentives 
Rather than imposing a charge on inputs associated with a polluting residual, an 
alternative often used is to offer financial incentives. Financial assistance normally 
takes the form of grants, loans and tax allowances. These subsidies are advocated as a 
means of easing the financial burden on farmers thus increasing the probability of 
adoption of measures for which the social benefits are greater than private abatement 
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costs. Incentives are used to encourage the adoption of better management practices 
and nutrient budgeting in the state of Virginia (OECD, 2007). In New Zealand 
assistance is focussed on fencing of  riparian margins (Ministry for the Environment, 
2003). If a financial assistance programme is targeted to more pollution prone areas, 
social benefits can be increased. Even though discriminatory input taxes are 
infeasible, targeted input subsidies are possible and could be based on a region’s 
effective demand for environmental quality. Incentives can be used as flipside of 
taxes to promote environmentally friendly practices. An obvious problem with 
incentives schemes is that they often face budgetary constraints. 
 
2.4.4 Tenders 
Even though financial incentives to all land holders may be perceived to be equitable, 
such a policy would not be cost effective would be poorly targeted, and would 
probably have high transaction costs (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2005). According to 
Gordon (2003) tenders involve a system of auctioned grants for the voluntary 
improvement of environmental quality. This approach respects the existing allocation 
of property rights and does not seek to impose obligations without compensation. 
Farmers who usually have the best knowledge about their own property, tender on a 
competitive basis, outlining proposed management actions and the payment they 
would require from the regulator to undertake them. The regulator assesses each 
tender in terms of its cost and the anticipated impact on nutrient emission levels and 
using cost minimization as the basis for ranking tenders. This approach can result in 
significant cost savings and economic efficiency gains. These gains enable either 
greater total emissions reduction to be achieved with a limited budget or the freeing 
up of regulator resources for other programme. An example of environmental 
tendering is “EcoTender” implemented in Australia, which aims to achieve 
environmental benefits such as salinity reduction and water quality improvement 
(Eigenraam, Strappazzon, Lansdell, Beverly, & Stoneham, 2007).  
 
2.4.5 Decentralised policies 
Decentralised policies allow farms to resolve environmental problems through 
negotiation or through definition of rights responsibilities under the legal system. 
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Liability rules make polluters liable for the damages they cause. Under strict liability, 
a farm would be held liable for any damage resulting from its production behaviour 
regardless of the care taken to avoid the damage (Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & 
Shortle, 1998). Under a negligence rule, farms are only liable if appropriate actions 
were not taken to prevent the damage. Under liability rules expectation of paying 
damages, motivates changes in farm behaviour. Provided farms have accurate 
expectations of costs and they correspond to actual damage costs, liability rules can 
be an efficient means of obtaining socially desired farm practices. However the 
application of liability rules tends to be limited to situations, in which a small number 
of participants are involved and the incidence of pollution is infrequent. Further the 
polluter needs to be specifically identified and the cause and effect relationship 
between the pollution and damage must be established. In agriculture these conditions 
can only be met for a limited number of localised situations such as accidental 
spillage of dairy farm effluent. Since most environmental problems in agriculture are 
more diffuse, liability rules do not provide a comprehensive solution but can be used 
as a complementary mechanism alongside other instruments.  
 
2.4.6 Moral suasion 
Moral suasion is based on the premise that farmers will voluntarily adopt pollution 
control practices if they are fully informed about the economic and environmental 
consequences of their current practices. The most common instrument of this kind in 
New Zealand to address environment problems in farming is the provision of 
information on environmentally benign farm management practices. For example 
DairyNZ has produced a number of advisory publications to promote nutrient 
management, design of standoff and feed pads and disposal of farm dairy effluent and 
the New Zealand Fertiliser Manufacturers Research Association produced a Code of 
Practice for Nutrient Management. Environment Waikato, through environmental 
education programmes also attempt to raise awareness within the community about 
appropriate land management practices and streamside management that reduces 
nonpoint source discharges. Horizons Regional Council (2007) developed an applied 
resource management strategy for farmers, which aims to enable better understanding 
of the farming operation and its impact on the environment.  
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Despite the increasing emphasis on these voluntary compliance programmes, their 
effectiveness is uncertain. While moral suasion approaches rank extremely highly in 
terms of political acceptability, they are reportedly very low on environmental 
effectiveness (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2005). Adoption is more likely by farmers 
who feel a greater sense of moral responsibility, not necessarily by those contributing 
to environmental problems. Environment Waikato (2005a) also remains concerned 
that  the BMPs being promoted  will not reduce  nutrient loads enough to offset  the 
impact of land intensification. Given current levels of non compliance with the 
resource consent rules of the regional plan for dairy effluent (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2007), voluntary adoption is unlikely when these practices are costly. 
When pollution abatement is costly and does not provide other benefits farms tend 
not to invest  in pollution control technology or abate emissions in the absence of 
regulations (Bontems, 2007). In this circumstance moral suasion should be 
accompanied by cost sharing arrangements and incentives.  
 
2.4.7 Tradable Emission permits 
Tradable emission permits involve establishing marketable property rights for 
discharging nitrogen into the environment. They define the amount of nitrogen that a 
farm is allowed to discharge and the sum of all permits is equal to the total level of 
emission permissible within the region of interest. Farms that exceed their permit 
limits can be subject to non-compliance fines and so have an incentive to purchase 
permits from another farm or firm. Conversely, a farm that finds abatement less 
costly might find selling its permits and reducing its emissions more profitable than 
keeping its permits and polluting. Competitive trading should lead to a cost effective 
allocation of pollution abatement among farms.  
 
Trading provides an incentive to invest in developing abatement oriented BMPs 
because farmers can anticipate revenue through the sale of pollution reduction credits 
(Rousseau, 2001). Mean while trading render an opportunity to those, who can not 
reduce the level of pollution at a lower cost. The attractiveness of tradable emission 
systems is that they shift decisions about the design and location of pollution control 
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from the regulator to the farm. In contrast deciding a tax rate on emissions or inputs 
requires full information on polluters’ response, which is not likely to be known even 
by the polluters themselves in the short run. Another appealing feature of tradable 
emission systems is that they allow for adjustment in the initial allocation and 
subsequent control of supply.  
 
In New Zealand the possibilities of introducing tradable emission permits in the 
catchments of Lake Taupo and Rotorua has been explored (Kerr, Lauder, & Fairman, 
2007 ). However high transaction costs in identifying and exchanging the credits 
between farms makes the system less appealing. However use of existing trading 
platforms for general goods, such as “Trademe” can be explored. Further the method 
of initial permit allocation is contentious. Therefore methods that minimise 
transaction costs need to be developed such as use of  a suite of web-based tools like 
“Nutrient net” to facilitate market-based approaches to improving water quality 
(Greenhalgh & Selman, 2006).  
 
2.5 Appropriate application of policy  
Since a single economic instrument  is unlikely  to be  strictly  preferred  over  all 
policy options  over all conditions, the optimal strategy  for any given  situation will 
probably involve a mix  of instruments (OECD, 2007; Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, 
& Shortle, 1998). Economic instruments could be used in conjunction with other 
environmental policy choices, moral suasion and direct regulation.  
 
Direct regulation can be the most practical way to deal with certain kinds of 
environmental issues like prevention of livestock access to water bodies, which could 
be monitored. The acceptability of regulation can be enhanced through financial 
assistance programmes. Combined tax and subsidy schemes have been used 
elsewhere to improve water quality (Qiu & Prato, 1999). In these schemes, farms 
which adopt abatement measures are given tax rebates.  
 
Mandatory approaches like emission or input use taxes or restrictions have drawbacks 
in terms of inflexibility or high transaction costs. While voluntary approaches 
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designed to entice farmers to adopt BMPs via incentives and moral suasion fail to 
provide adequate environmental protection. Segerson & Wu, (2006) examined  
combining voluntary approaches with a background threat of imposing a retroactive 
ambient tax, when nutrient reduction targets are met voluntarily. This approach 
induces cost minimizing abatement without the need for farm specific information 
about pollution related features. This policy can therefore be both more effective than 
a pure voluntary approach without a threat and involves lower information and 
transaction costs than a pure ambient tax.  
 
2.5.1 Impact of heterogeneity 
The heterogeneity of abatement costs is fundamental in the choice of optimal 
mitigation policy instruments. Three major sources of abatement cost heterogeneity 
can be distinguished based on level of activity, emission factors and flexibility of 
substitution between production activities (De Cara, Houze, & Jayet, 2005).  
In the presence of farm heterogeneity, the policy instrument and level of instrument 
have to be differentiated  to reach first-best solution as the relative slopes of  the 
marginal costs and benefit curves vary across farms (Wu, 2000).  
 
Wu & Babcock (2001) illustrated the factors, which could affect choice of policy 
instrument. They found that taxes are efficient when marginal profits are more 
sensitive to fertiliser use than marginal pollution cost and marginal profits are higher 
than the tax rate. The upper panel of Figure 2.6 shows that when the marginal cost 
function is steeper than the marginal profit functions, a uniform tax results in a larger 
dead weight loss than a uniform standard. The lower panel shows the opposite. The 
negative correlation between marginal profits and marginal costs also favours a tax. 
The intuition behind this result is that under a tax, producers will apply more inputs to 
land with a high marginal profit, when marginal profits and marginal costs are 
positively correlated, land with a higher marginal profit tends to have a high marginal 
pollution costs. On the other hand, when marginal profits and pollution costs are 
negatively correlated, land with a higher marginal profit tends to have lower marginal 
pollution costs. Therefore a tax, which allows more input use on more productive 
land, tends to be a better instrument. Low application efficiency of inputs leads to a 
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high marginal pollution cost, because low efficiency implies that much of the applied 
fertiliser is lost to the environment. Marginal cost curves are steep because the 
environment is likely to receive a larger proportion of the pollution as more is 
applied. Further low input application efficiency causes low and relatively flat 
marginal profits. A combination of flat marginal profit and steep marginal costs 
favours standards. When the marginal cost function is steeper than the marginal profit 
function, a uniform tax results a larger dead weight loss than a uniform standard.  
When the marginal cost function is flatter than the marginal profit function, the 
outcome tends to favour a tax. These authors showed that the positive correlation 
between marginal profits and marginal costs favours standards. Meanwhile a negative 
correlation favours the tax. Therefore geophysical and production factors need to be 
considered in choosing appropriate policies. 
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Figure 2.6 The effect of relative slopes on deadweight losses 
 
 
 
Source: Wu & Babcock (2001) 
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2.6 Role of technology in policy implementation 
Well designed environmental policies can build on valuable synergies with 
technological development. Environmental policies also provide incentives for 
innovation in management practices. While improving management practices can 
contribute to lower abatement costs thus increasing the feasibility of environmental 
policy implementation.  
 
2.6.1 Proxies for nitrogen discharges 
The diffuse nature of nitrogen discharges makes the design of effective environmental 
policy for agriculture difficult. Many farms contribute to pollution making it difficult 
to separate damages caused by individual farms and assign liability. The costs of 
monitoring agricultural pollution are high because of the complexity of production 
and environmental processes, which make it  difficult to directly  infer emissions 
from observable inputs (Braden & Segerson, 1993). The difficulty in measuring 
actual farm nitrogen discharges within a reasonable time and cost has made the 
application of economic instruments to such issues particularly challenging. One 
approach is to use input levels as proxies for nitrogen discharges. However nitrogen 
discharges are inherently stochastic because of geophysical and weather variables. 
Therefore observation of inputs cannot provide a reliable forecast of nitrogen 
discharges. The diffuse nature of agricultural nitrogen pollution and the time lag 
before it appears in the water body, necessitates the use of a simulation model. 
Developments in information technology enhance the ability to estimate nitrogen 
discharges under different climatic and geographic conditions using different 
software applications.  
 
Use of estimated emissions is appealing, because emissions from individual farms  
cannot be monitored  with reasonable timeliness, accuracy and cost (Wu & Babcock, 
1999). Horan, Shortle, Abler, & Ribaudo (2001) cited many studies that showed 
nitrogen emission proxies were more effective than standards or taxes applied to 
nitrogen inputs. They stated that trading programmes for which nonpoint permits are 
defined in terms of estimated emissions are more effective than those  based on input  
use. This is because emissions are a better indicator of environmental pressure than 
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inputs. Reliable proxies enhance the feasibility of certain types of economic 
instruments, like emission charges and lower monitoring cost. In New Zealand, 
Overseer, a farm scale nutrient budget simulation model (Wheeler, Ledgard, DeKlein, 
Monaghan, & Carey, 2003 ) has the potential to contribute to emission based 
environmental policy initiatives (Dake, 2007; Horizons Regional Council, 2007). 
Information derived from nutrient budgeting can readily be incorporated into 
Overseer to estimate the nitrogen discharge of a farm. In principle such estimates 
could be made for the forty percent of Waikato dairy farms that use nutrient 
budgeting (Ministry for the Environment, 2007). However current simulation models 
cannot provide sufficiently accurate estimates of the complex fate and transport of 
most agricultural pollutants to water bodies, so improvements will be necessary, if 
this indirect approach is to withstand legal challenge and gain political legitimacy. 
 
One famous application of nutrient budgeting is the Dutch Mineral Accounting 
System (MINAS). This policy requires a detailed accounting system for farm nutrients 
for farms having more than 2.5 livestock units per hectare. The system requires 
recording and reporting of all inputs used and outputs produced in the farm. Sales of 
output and input purchases are allowed only from accredited firms. Nutrient surpluses 
are differentiated according to soil type and land use. The OECD report on 
Instrument Mixes  for Environmental  Policy (2007) states that this system was 
effective for decreasing nutrient surpluses in dairy farming due to the availability of 
alternative methods of reducing nutrient surpluses.  However high administration 
costs, lengthy judicial procedures due to fraud attempts, frequent changes introduced 
without much planning and failure to provide viable alternatives to handle surplus 
nutrients in intensive farming systems like poultry and swine made the whole system 
less attractive.  
 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and satellite imagery have the potential to 
reduce the cost of monitoring and improve the accuracy of physical simulation 
models by providing accurate information, which could potentially provide a legal 
basis for prediction of nitrogen discharge levels for any given farm from observable 
practices or farm records. 
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2.6.2 Best management practices (BMP) 
Concern with environmental pollution has led to technological developments aimed 
both at remedying and preventing their future occurrence. Technological 
breakthroughs potentially reduce the cost of abatement by reducing the form and 
level of discharge into the environment from farming systems (Bontems, 2007).  
 
Management strategies for reducing  nitrogen discharge can be categorised into two 
major classes, namely source reduction and interception strategies (Ribaudo, 
Heimlich, Claassen, & Peters, 2001). A range of BMPs have been researched in New 
Zealand pastoral farming. A detailed description of these strategies  can be found in 
Ledgard & Menneer (2005). The source reduction strategies adopted to manage 
nitrogen discharges are reduction of  fertiliser application and stocking rate, 
nitrification inhibitors and  restricted grazing during winter (Grazing off). Major 
interception technologies are fencing of riparian margins, creation of wetlands and 
conservation reserves and feed pads and winter/standoff pads. 
 
Leached nitrogen from urine and dung patches and applied fertilizer nitrogen are 
reported to be the major potential sources of nitrogen from cattle grazing systems 
(Ledgard & Menneer, 2005). Nitrate discharge from the plant root zone is seasonal. 
Monaghan et al (2007) found that 60%  of total nitrogen discharge occurs during the 
winter due to low plant nutrient uptake and as well as high drainage.  Best 
management practices like Wintering pads are useful to reduce these seasonal 
nitrogen discharges. Nitrification inhibitors and feed pads are reported to be a 
promising mitigation strategy for nitrogen (Wilcock et al., 2006). A recent research 
report on the  impact of management changes on farm profitability and environmental 
outcomes, also identifies nitrification inhibitors, standoff pads and optimised nutrient 
use as having positive financial impacts on farms (Water Programme of Action, 
2007). Keeping dairy animals on wintering pads during late autumn and winter 
reduces nitrogen leaching by 50-60% (Chadwick, Ledgard, & Brown, 2002). De 
Klein & Monaghan (2005) reported that wintering pad systems reduced nitrogen 
leaching by 14-44% with the largest reductions achieved in South Island catchments. 
Nitrification inhibitors prevent the accumulation of  nitrogen in a movable form and 
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are capable of reducing nitrogen leaching by 60% (Di & Cameron, 2002). In another 
study, Wilcock et al.(2006) reported that combining winter pads with nitrification 
inhibitors has the potential to reduce nitrogen losses by 51%. However the 
effectiveness of nitrification inhibitors is strongly affected by environmental 
conditions especially temperature. Further the effectiveness is based on small scale 
experimental trials and the challenge for the future is to quantify the effects across the 
whole range of soil and climatic conditions existing in New Zealand (Edmeades, 
2004).  
 
Designing policies to encourage adoption of environmentally friendly farming 
practices requires analysis of adoption decisions. Cooper & Keim (1998) used survey 
data to estimate payment levels needed to induce farmers to adopt alternative BMPs.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
There is an extensive range of environmental policy instruments including emissions 
charges, tradable emissions permits, and tenders, subsidies for emissions reductions, 
performance standards and moral suasion. In theory a policy instrument that is 
effective in internalizing externalities, should resemble the social optimum as closely 
as possible. If a policy is the first best solution then it should replicate the social 
optimum exactly. To be the first best, the policy should be differentiated at farm or 
parcel level, because the marginal cost of and benefits of farming and the 
effectiveness of policy differ by geophysical variables as well as by production 
characteristics. However transaction costs involved in information gathering and 
monitoring favour less differentiated policies. So in practice no policies discussed 
here are first-best solutions. However, most empirical studies show that  targeted, 
information intensive  policies for  nonpoint pollution control outperform 
undifferentiated uniform policies (Carpentier, Bosch, & Batie, 1998; Fleming & 
Adams, 1997). Berntsen, Petersen, Jacobsen, Olesen, & Hutchings (2003) used farm 
model to evaluate the environmental and economic consequences of different taxes 
on farm nitrogen use on Danish farming systems. They concluded that efficient 
taxation schemes should differentiate between types of farms.  The choice between 
uniform and differentiated policies depends on the relative slopes of marginal control 
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costs and marginal benefit functions. So that appropriate policy instruments must be 
developed to address water quality issues at the local level.  Optimal environmental 
policy will minimises nitrogen discharge at low abatement cost to producers and will 
have low administrative and monitoring costs for enforcement.  
 
The conceptual framework for environmental policy and subsequent discussions shed 
light on the importance of abatement and damage costs and substituting damage costs 
with exogenous discharge limits. The cost effectiveness of polices depends on the 
level of abatement required (Iho, 2005). The implications of specified limits on the 
level of pollution and farm income need to be evaluated in an ex ante manner. Shortle 
& Horan (2001) reported that effective design of policies requires farm specific 
knowledge of profit and environment.  
 
The appropriate choice of a policy depends not only on its cost efficiency, but also on 
the implementation issues of particular abatement measures. These are often linked to 
transaction costs and political acceptability. Goulder & Parry (2008) reviewed the 
literature on instrument choice and reached a number of general conclusions. They 
found that no single instrument clearly outperform others in all dimensions; there are 
significant trade-offs between degree of fairness in the distribution of impacts (and 
political feasibility) and cost effectiveness. Hybrid instruments which combine the 
best features of different instruments are attractive. For instance Fischer and Newell 
in their paper on climate policy (2008) found that achieving a given emissions 
reduction through one instrument alone involved considerably higher costs than 
employing two instruments. Overall, Goulder and Parry suggest that identification of 
the best policy instrument involves art as well as science. 
 
Legg (2006) stated that “The analysis of the cause effect linkages  between policy 
measures and environmental outcomes is complex and too little is yet known to make 
strong recommendations on appropriate mixes of policy measures and market actions 
or to make definitive  judgments  about good  policy practice”. Developing a policy 
that combines the strengths of regulatory and economic instruments requires 
information on the economic consequences of cause and effect relationship in agri- 
environmental systems. Therefore empirical estimation of the impact of alternative 
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environmental economic policies is important for effective policy development. Bio-
economic modelling is capable of tackling a component of this sort of information 
problem (Bennett, 2005). An economic model based on mathematical programming, 
drawing on estimates of behavioral parameters from econometric studies, simulation 
models and scientific experiment could provide valuable insights into the information 
required. In particular more location specific empirical research is needed, using an 
integrated modelling approach at the catchment scale that captures environmental and 
economic impacts. The research has led to the development of useful tools model the 
policy implications on farm. The reminder of this thesis largely deals with data 
generation, bio-economic modeling and its potential uses for policy analysis. 
However the choice of appropriate policy requires estimates of the marginal benefits 
of policy as well as the marginal costs of implementation.  Non-market valuation is 
typically needed to measure benefits of a proposed policies to restrict nitrogen 
loadings at varying levels in a catchment (MacDonald, Connor, & Morrison, 2004). 
Hence, bio-economic modeling needs to be complemented with farm surveys and non 
market valuation studies.  
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3. Characterisation of the catchment and nitrogen pollution 
of water: A platform for environmental policy analysis 
 
3.1 Spatial dimension 
Agri-environmental policy analysis exploring the interaction between agriculture and 
water quality has included studies at a range of spatial scales including national, 
regional and catchment. In general, a catchment has been considered an appropriate 
spatial unit for  modeling policies to manage diffuse source pollution (Just & Antle, 
1990; Kampas & White, 2003; Novonty, 1999). Schou, Skop, & Jensen (2000) 
justified the appropriateness of using the catchment scale on the basis of its definite 
boundaries and negligible pollutant flow between the catchment and other areas. Its 
importance is evidenced by a growing literature on spatially referenced 
environmental policy at a catchment scale (Berntsen, Petersen, Jacobsen, Olesen, & 
Hutchings, 2003), and many environmental agencies confine their environmental 
policies to catchments (Johansson, Gowda, Mulla, & Dalzell, 2004). Improved spatial 
information may yield large benefits to society because nonpoint pollution is 
heterogeneous and diffuse (Carpentier, Bosch, & Batie, 1998), and this itself has an 
effect on the cost effectiveness of environmental policies (Martinez & Albiac, 2006; 
Wossink, Lansink, & Struik, 2001). Therefore considering spatial heterogeneity at a 
catchment scale is important in modelling nitrogen abatement policies. 
 
Spatial heterogeneity can be attributed to geophysical and production variability.  
Geophysical variables such as proximity to water bodies, soil type, topography and 
distribution of water margins, and production variables such as input use intensity 
and farm size, influence nitrogen discharge into water.  Shortle & Horan (2001) 
showed  that spatially differentiated policies are efficient when there is a considerable 
variation in pollution contribution from farms due to physical and management 
differences.  It is important to establish the variations and levels of nitrogen pollution 
within a catchment, and in the presence of heterogeneity, targeting particular farms or 
areas may pave the way for tailor-made abatement policies. 
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Geographic information systems (GIS) have been widely used (Mapp, Bernado, 
Sabbagh, Geleta, & Watkins, 1994; Munier, Birr-Pedersen, & Schou, 2004; Opaluch 
& Segerson, 1991; Schou, Skop, & Jensen, 2000; Yang & Weersink, 2004) to 
represent the spatial dimension in agri- environmental policy analysis. GIS provides 
the opportunity for greater realism, comprehensiveness and relevance in agri-
environmental policy modelling (Bateman, Ennew, Lovett, & Rayner, 1999). In this 
study the spatial analytic capability of GIS is used to define the catchment boundaries 
and its characteristics.  
 
3.2 Application of Geographic Information System 
This section provides an overview of GIS, which is a computerized information 
management system designed to capture, store, integrate, analyse and display data 
from a geographic perspective.  GIS uses geo referenced data, aligning geographic 
location data to a known coordinate system by latitude and longitude. It enables data 
to be combined from different sources in a consistent manner to derive useful 
information by viewing, querying and analyzing. Richer data sets are able to be 
developed for site specific characteristics.  
 
There are a number of different data formats that can be imported into a GIS. The 
most common form is vector data, which includes point, line, and polygon data. In 
this study farm boundaries are categorised as polygon1 data, flowing rivers are line 
data and water quality monitoring locations are point data. Vector data have attributes 
associated with them, and these can provide information about ownership, polygon 
names, collection dates, sources, special codes, soil type and land use.  The attributes 
are stored in a database file and are linked to the vector information. In a GIS, users 
can access the attributes to perform analyses and query the vector data.  
 
                                                 
1 In a vector-based geographic representation a polygon is a continuous two-dimensional object, which 
may be homogeneous or divided internally into areas with different characteristics. Each polygon is 
encoded in the database as a sequence of locations that define the boundaries of each closed area in a 
specified coordinate system.  
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The catchment has been delineated by using the digital database of river flows known 
as the River Environmental Classification (REC). Catchment characteristics are 
generated by combining layers of different data sources in GIS. Using these facilities, 
joint distributions for attributes such as land use, soil type and topography are 
created.  The details of geo-spatial analysis and data sources are discussed at a greater 
detail in the subsequent chapter on spatial micro-simulation. 
 
3.2.1 Application software 
A software application known as ArcGIS is used for analysis. ArcGIS Desktop 
identifies patterns, relationships, and trends in the data that are not readily apparent in 
databases, spreadsheets, or statistical packages. It was developed by the 
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) in the USA.  
 
ArcGIS Desktop is a suite of integrated applications including ArcMap, ArcCatalog, 
and ArcToolbox (ESRI, 2007). Analysis of data was carried out using these tools in 
an integrated manner. Analysis consists of mapping, area calculations, data editing 
and compilation, data management, visualization, and geo-processing. A typical geo- 
processing operation involves manipulating input data through operations like 
geographic feature overlay, feature selection and analysis.  
 
3.3 The Catchment 
Nutrient discharge into water bodies degrades water quality. Agricultural land use has 
contributed to the increased levels of nitrogen in Waikato water bodies. The 
contribution of pastoral agriculture to the water quality degradation has been well 
recognized (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2004). Nitrogen is a 
significant contaminant in the Waikato River. In recent years nitrogen concentrations 
in the Waikato river tributaries have increased at an average of 2.5 percent per annum 
(Vant & Smith, 2004). 
 
The catchment delineated is situated within the boundaries of the broader catchment 
of the Waikato River, which has been identified as one of the water bodies in the 
region with a high priority for nutrient management (Brodnax, 2006; Environment 
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Waikato, 2005c). The approximate geographic area of the whole catchment is 
436,000 hectares and includes all land that drains into the Waikato River from the 
outflow of Lake Taupo to the Karapiro dam (Environment Waikato, 2007a) .  
 
As a rational compromise between sufficient variability and computational 
convenience, the catchment examined in this study covers only part of the broader 
catchment. It includes the middle part of the Waikato River catchment from the 
Karapiro dam to Lake Arapuni, plus contributing tributaries.  The catchment is 
bisected by the main stem of the Waikato River (Figure 3.1). It comprises 
approximately 151,678 hectares, with an annual average precipitation of 1200-1600 
mm/year. It has considerable spatial variability in terms of physiographic parameters 
such as topography and soil type. The geopolitical boundaries of the catchment fall 
within the local authorities of Waipa, Otorohanga and South Waikato, with the  South 
Waikato covering the largest (78%) portion of the catchment land area. Integrated 
aerial and satellite imagery with a transparent topographical map overlay shows the 
land use, townships and road network within the catchment (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.1 Location of the catchment 
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Figure 3.2 Topographic map of the catchment 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Satellite imagery of the catchment 
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The rate and concentration of water and contaminants entering the water body is 
influenced by catchment specific geology, rainfall, land use and topography.  The 
following sections briefly describe the land use and nitrogen pollution in the 
catchment. 
 
3.3.1 Land use  
Land use in the catchment is predominantly pastoral, with dairying as the major 
pastoral farming activity.  Dairy farming  in New Zealand is an intensive form of land 
use, often involving high stocking rates and fertiliser application rates which generate 
elevated concentrations of nitrogen in water (Ledgard, Penno, & Sporsen, 1999). 
Dairying is considered to contribute considerably to the problem of nitrogen 
discharge to water bodies (Ledgard, De Klein, Crush, & Thorrold, 2000).  Nitrogen 
discharge from average Waikato dairy farm is 36 kgN per ha. It is about three times 
higher than that of an average sheep and beef farm, which is 13 kgN per ha (Ledgard 
& Power, 2006). Meanwhile nitrogen losses from undisturbed plantation forestry is 
around 2 kgN per ha (Davis, 2005). This study, therefore, focuses primarily on dairy 
farming and its nitrogen discharges. Besides dairying there are considerable pine 
forests in the catchment, and these have the potential to be converted to pastoral 
farming (Environment Waikato 2007b).   
 
Environment Waikato is concerned about any increase in the nutrient status of the 
Waikato River and tributaries from existing and anticipated land use changes in the 
catchment between Karapiro Dam and Taupo gates. The catchment is a good area for 
simulating the impact of current as well as future land use changes.  
 
The smallest area unit for which time series data is available is the territorial local 
authority. Stocking rate and average milksolids per cow have increased in all three 
territorial local authorities (Table 3.1 and Figures 3.4 and 3.5), providing an 
indication of the intensification of land use over this time.  
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Table 3.1 Production statistics at territorial local authority level 
 Total 
herds 
Average 
herd 
size per 
farm
Average 
effective 
hectare 
per farm
Average 
cows 
per ha
Average 
milksolids 
per ha 
Average 
milksolids 
per cow 
Waipa       
2000-2001 755 239 82 2.93 911 314 
2001-2002 727 257 89 2.92 904 308 
2002-2003 686 271 96 2.88 935 323 
2003-2004 667 284 94 3.07 991 323 
2004-2005 635 295 97 3.08 956 309 
2005-2006 609 302 99 3.08 1013 329 
2006-2007 596 313 102 3.1 1041 335 
    
Otorohanga    
2000-2001 464 258 90 2.92 897 313 
2001-2002 451 280 99 2.85 857 300 
2002-2003 434 285 104 2.78 862 309 
2003-2004 420 303 102 2.96 933 315 
2004-2005 414 309 105 2.95 909 308 
2005-2006 404 313 107 2.95 940 317 
2006-2007 391 318 110 2.95 975 329 
   
South Waikato   
2000-2001 438 251 87 2.94 909 313 
2001-2002 429 269 95 2.89 892 308 
2002-2003 418 276 101 2.79 920 330 
2003-2004 404 290 100 2.95 983 333 
2004-2005 394 297 103 2.95 951 323 
2005-2006 384 303 104 2.95 1003 338 
2006-2007 377 323 110 2.99 1036 346 
 
Data source: New Zealand Dairy Statistics (2000/01-2006/07)  
 42
Figure 3.4 Average stocking rate in TLA 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Milksolids production per hectare  
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Vant (1999) studied the relationship between nitrogen losses and stocking rate in 
Waikato farms and found a strong correlation. He expressed the relationship as 
follows. 
 
Nitrogen load (kg/ha/y) = 10.28 x dairy cow stocking rate (cows/ha) + 2.241  
 
The correlation between stocking rate and nitrogen yield suggests that the intensity of 
livestock farming in a catchment is a key factor in determining nitrogen discharge 
into surface waters. In addition average farm size has increased over time. This can 
be attributed to the merger of farms, and a reduction in the number of herds in the 
territorial local authorities is consistent with this interpretation. An increase in the 
total extent of dairy farming due to land use conversions, combined with the increase 
in the intensification of farming can contribute to increased nitrogen contamination.  
 
Technological advances may lead to the increased intensification of dairy farming. 
Some of the increase in milksolids production per cow can be attributed to 
improvements in the genetic merit of herds and pasture. However intensification of 
input use has been a key driver of productivity improvements in the short run. 
According to a Waikato based farmlet trial, increases in nitrogen fertilizer from 200N 
per ha to 400N per ha raised  milksolids production per cow by 6 percent (McGrath, 
1998). The Economic Survey of New Zealand Dairy Farmers shows that nitrogen use 
per ha in dairy farming increased more than two fold from 56 kgN per ha to 134 kgN 
per ha in Waikato from 1998 to 2005 (Figure 3.6). This increase in nitrogen fertilizer 
use over the years can be attributed to relatively low prices of nitrogen fertiliser. In 
recent years Nitrogen  use became more affordable as a result of a rise in the ratio of 
milk price to nitrogen cost (Thomas, Ledgard, & Francis, 2005).  
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Figure 3.6 Average nitrogen use on dairy farms 
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Data source:  Dexcel, Economic Survey of New Zealand Dairy Farmers 
   (1998/99-2004/05). 
 
3.4 Nitrogen pollution in the catchment 
 
3.4.1 Level of nitrogen pollution  
Rising nitrogen levels in water have been a growing concern because of their 
potential and actual effect on public health and the environment. High levels of 
nitrate can pose a health risk, and this is reflected in the Drinking Water Standards for 
New Zealand which are set at a Maximum Acceptable Level (MAV) of 0.13 grams 
per cubic meter for nitrate-nitrogen (Ministry of Health, 2000).   
 
The mobile nature of nitrogen (compared to most other nutrients), leads to the 
potential for significant losses of it into the environment from nitrate leaching to 
water. Total nitrogen, defined as a summation of nitrate nitrogen and Total Kjeldhal 
nitrogen, has been used an indicator variable for nitrogen content in water (Atasoy, 
Palmquist, & Phaneuf, 2006). Ideally, total nitrogen levels in water should be less 
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than 0.5 grams per cubic metre to prevent excessive growth of nuisance plants. 
Environment Waikato categorises rivers and streams with total nitrogen levels above 
0.5 grams per cubic metre as undesirably nutrient-enriched, between 0.5 and 0.1 as 
satisfactory and less than 0.1 as excellent (Beard, 2007).  
 
Increased levels of nitrogen in the water induce the growth of algae during hot 
weather. This is known as Eutrophication. It results in lower visual clarity, changes in 
colour of water and dwindling dissolved oxygen. Lower dissolved oxygen level 
causes death of fish species. These changes will have a serious impact on the 
recreational value of the water.  
The quality of water along the Waikato River changes from a near pristine status at 
Lake Taupo to a pale colour when it passes the Karapiro Dam.  The overall water 
quality in the main stem of the river can be attributed to good quality water leaving 
Lake Taupo as this account for the most of the water in this part of the river. Water 
quality deterioration in the catchment can be attributed mainly to the water quality of 
inflowing tributaries (Environment Waikato, 2007b).  We can expect that continuing 
deterioration in the condition of the inflowing tributaries will eventually result in 
deterioration in the main stem of the river.  
The impact of land use changes is not realised immediately as there can be a time lag 
of years between the losses of nitrogen from the land surface until the appearance of 
nitrogen in the surface water. Contaminants that travel primarily via groundwater 
tends to take longer to impact on surface water. Nitrogen is one such contaminant, 
and once it reaches surface water, there is no practical means of limiting its eventual 
impact. Simulation models are therefore used to predict nitrogen levels in water as a 
result of land use changes. Rutherford (2005) modelled  the impact on water quality 
of upstream changes in input and land use along the Waikato River catchment. Figure 
3.7 was produced by compiling the data points within the catchment from 
Rutherford’s model. These data points are from Waipapa/Ngarahu Stream to Little 
Waipa Stream. Reduction of nutrient application reduced the total nitrogen content in 
water by 10 percent. Lowered nitrogen levels are likely to reduce the algal growth 
and have the potential to enhance the clarity of the water because of the lower 
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chlorophyll content. Increase in nutrients is likely to reverse this trend. Upstream land 
conversion of 20,000 ha of pine to dairy could cause a 22% rise in the total nitrogen 
content in the water and a consequent rise in Cholorphyll content. Rutherford predicts 
that a 40,000 ha land conversion to dairy could result in a 44% increase in the total 
nitrogen content of the water.  
 
Figure 3.7 Simulated nitrogen content along the main stem of the river  
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Data source: Rutherford (2005). 
 
3.4.2 Water quality trends 
A time series of nitrogen concentrations in river water was supplied by Environment 
Waikato from their network of monitoring locations. Figure 3.8 shows monitoring 
locations which are derived by intersecting catchment boundaries on the GIS layer of 
Environment Waikato’s Regional Water Quality Monitoring of Streams Programme2. 
The monitoring data consists of total nitrogen level at monthly intervals from 1995 to 
                                                 
2 Environmental data location information sourced from Environment Waikato database and may be 
subject to Privacy regulations.  Copyright Reserved. 
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2006. The Waipapa monitoring point is located on the main stem of the river. Other 
points are located on the tributaries. 
 
Figure 3.8 Water quality monitoring locations3 
 
Total nitrogen concentration in water shows a cyclical pattern over time (Figure 3.9). 
In a year, total nitrogen level peaks during the winter and falls during the summer. 
This annual fluctuation in nitrogen is attributed to lower downward movement of 
nitrate nitrogen from farm lands in summer as Evapotranspiration exceeds 
precipitation.  Plant biomass in the water bodies in summer is at a maximum 
(Ledgard, Sprosen, Brier, Nemaia, & Clark, 1996; Wilcock et al., 1999) and this 
                                                 
3  The catchment includes only  Lakes Karapiro and  Arapuni, the contributing tributaries to the lakes, 
and the section of the Waikato River between these lakes. 
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Lake Karapiro 
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tends to absorb the nitrogen in the water and release it during the decaying process. 
This trend is reportedly common for time series data with predominantly agricultural 
influences (Worrall & Burt, 1999). 
 
Figure 3.9 Annual cycle of nitrogen concentration in water 
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Seasonal KendallTest 
A Seasonal Kendall Test is prescribed to identify time trends for data with seasonal 
cycles, as illustrated in Figure 3.10. The Seasonal Kendall Slope Estimator (SKSE), 
derived from this test, is the median of all possible combinations of slopes for each of 
the months of the year.  Results for all Januarys are compared with one another, but 
they are not compared with those from the other months. The SKSE estimator does 
not require any distributional assumptions. The detailed formulas for the Seasonal 
Kendall test are described in Gilbert (1987). These formulas are estimated using the 
Excel macro developed by Vant & Smith (2004) for empirical estimation. The SKSE 
is estimated using raw data instead of using flow adjusted data, which is not readily 
available for these monitoring locations. However nitrogen discharges from non-point 
sources are not significantly affected by differences in flow rate (Rutherford, 2005).  
Further, the U.S. Geological Survey’s water resources study shows that in general 
nitrogen concentrations in surface water are not related to stream flow (Schnoebelen, 
Becher, Bobier, & Wilton, 1999). 
 49
Positive SKSE slopes result from an overall increase in the values of a water quality 
variable, while negative slopes result from an overall decrease. Slopes are 
conventionally expressed in “water quality units/time”. For example, analysis of a 
record of concentrations in g/m3 gives a slope in units of (g/m3)/year. The trend test 
calculates the probability of getting a trend slope. Smaller P values indicate a 
significant trend. Higher SKSE values indicate less change in land development over 
time.  The P-value is calculated by comparing the total number of increasing monthly 
slopes with the total number of decreasing slopes. If the net result is close to zero, the 
p-value will be large, so the slope can be regarded as being due to chance. 
Conversely, a large difference between the numbers of increasing and decreasing 
slopes produces a low p-value, meaning the slope is unlikely to be due to chance. 
Table 3.2 shows the trend (SKSE Slope) and respective p-values for the data for the 
period 1995 to 2006. 
 
Table 3.2 SKSE test results 
Location SKSE Slope P-Value 
Little Waipa 0.023 0.280 
Pokaiwhenaua 0.023 0.094 
Mangamingi 0.006 2.282 
Waipapa 0.008 0.000 
 
The SKSE results indicate that the trend of total nitrogen concentration is positive. 
The P-value is not significant at location Mangamingi. It can be attributed to the 
dramatic improvements in the quality of waste water from nearby Kinleith pulp and 
paper mill over the last decade (Kim & Smith, 2006). However Mangamingi has the 
highest nitrogen loadings on average. Perhaps improvements in the water quality 
Total nitrogen tends to increase at a greater rate in streams in more developed parts of 
the catchment, reflecting increased leaching losses from areas of pastoral farming 
following intensification. For instance the increase in nitrogen content at Waipapa is 
significant, as indicated by lower and positive SKSE value and significant P-value. 
The time series of the total nitrogen content is presented in Figure 3.10.  
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Figure 3.10 Time series of total nitrogen 
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This graph shows the spatial heterogeneity of nitrogen loadings in water. As 
discussed before in winter nitrogen levels tend to peak. The Waipapa monitoring 
location shows the lowest total nitrogen concentration. This indicates relatively good 
water quality in the main stem of the river. The Mangamingi location shows 
relatively high levels of total nitrogen content, which may be attributed to its pumice 
soil. In all monitoring locations except Waipapa the total nitrogen level exceeds the 
maximum acceptable level for drinking water (0.13 g per cubic meter) and threshold 
level for triggering algal bloom. Therefore Little Waipa, Mangamingi and 
Pokaiwhenaua can be described as hot spots within the catchment. Given that water quality 
monitoring point Waipapa located in the main stem of the river, which largely receive better 
quality water from Lake Taupo and relatively smaller size of the catchment, entire catchment 
should be treated as a hot spot. 
 
Nonpoint source pollution is complex and affected by antecedent soil conditions, 
timing of fertilizer application, land cover, location, duration and intensity of 
precipitation (Becher, Kalkhoff, Schnoebelen, Barnes, & Miller, 2001). Finding 
hydrological reasons for these spatial discrepancies in nitrogen loading is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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If the trend shown by the nitrogen time series can be ascribed to changes in land use,  
this would suggest that the catchment has experienced considerable land use 
intensification throughout this period. Land use intensification over time, as 
confirmed by local authority indicators, may be linked to the rising nitrogen content 
of the water.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Waikato River and its hydro lakes and tributaries have been experiencing 
nitrogen contamination problems from agriculture for some time. Pastoral agriculture, 
particularly dairying, is the major land use in this area. There has also been a trend 
towards increased nitrogen concentrations in the water body over time. This is an 
indication that the catchment is prone to nitrogen contamination, and this may be 
linked to the intensification of dairying.  Nitrogen in the water is likely to increase 
even faster with pine to pasture conversions.  It is clear that actions to mitigate the 
problem are necessary if the water quality is to be maintained or improved.  The 
catchment considered is a good platform to study, design, develop, and apply an 
analytical framework to evaluate the potential economic and environmental effects of 
policies. The catchment land use and geophysical diversity are ideal for creating 
representative hypothetical farms to examine agri-environmental policies. The lessons 
learned from this policy analysis platform can be extended to wider geographic scales 
as well. 
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4. Micro-simulation – a novel approach to using farm 
survey data for catchment scale modeling and policy 
analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The slow evolution of environmental policy has been attributed to lack of data and 
the complexity of ecological and economic systems (Adamowicz, 2007). Policy 
analysis is undertaken at all scales from local to international, but the catchment has 
generally been considered to be the most appropriate spatial unit for analysis of the 
interaction between agriculture and water quality. Modelling of alternative policy 
instruments to control nitrate pollution is often carried out at this scale (Kampas & 
White, 2004) and many environmental protection agencies work  at the catchment 
level acknowledging that water quality  problems can best be solved  at this level 
(Johansson, Gowda, Mulla, & Dalzell, 2004). Catchments also have the advantage of 
definite boundaries and negligible pollutant flow between the catchment and other 
areas (Schou, Skop, & Jensen, 2000). 
 
Accurate estimation of pollution at the catchment level is a fundamental requirement 
for effective modelling of policy implications. While several studies have modelled 
farm nutrient discharges at the catchment scale, the impact of policies on individual 
decision making units and the reactions of those units to these policies have generally 
not been analysed. Instead the entire catchment has been treated as a single decision 
making unit. (Aftab, Hanley, & Kampas, 2007; Borisova, Shortle, Horan, & Abler, 
2005; Chalmers & Crabtree, 1999; Taylor, 1992). However Brady (2003) did 
consider spatial differences within a  catchment at a broader scale.  
 
The catchment approach tends to overlook spatial interactions across decision making 
units. Although water quality is formed at the catchment scale, it is usually farms that 
must take action to improve water quality and it is farms that face the economic 
impact of environmental policies. This provides a strong rationale for a realistic farm 
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centric modelling framework for agri-environmental policy analysis. This argument is 
further supported by Newell and Stavins (2003) who suggest that modelling spatial 
heterogeneity at the level of individual decision making units can be useful for 
designing market based policy instruments and  De Cara, Houze, & Jayet (2005) who 
stress the usefulness of a farm centered approach in abating green house gases. 
However modeling all farms at the catchment level is a data intensive process that 
posses a number of challenges. One difficulty is caused by the fact that farms are 
generally not surveyed at the spatial unit at which ecosystem services function (Lant 
et al., 2005).  
 
The objective of this chapter is to extend the usefulness of existing farm economic 
and geo-physical data to analyse the economic and environmental impact of various 
policies using a spatial micro-simulation. The method involves an early application of 
this technique to combining survey and population units to model environmental 
policy outcomes. The application focuses on a catchment in the Waikato region of 
New Zealand where water quality problems posed by nitrogen from the dairy farming 
sector are a major concern (Environment Waikato, 2005a). The model applies to all 
dairy farms1 within the catchment since they are the major decision making units that 
can respond to policy changes.  
 
Ballas, Clarke, Dorling, Rigby, & Wheeler (2006) define micro-simulation as the 
creation of simulated population micro-data sets for the analysis of policy impacts at 
the micro level. This approach has often been used for regional or local approaches to 
policy analysis (Ballas, Clarke, Dorling, Rigby, & Wheeler, 2006; Ballas, Clarke, & 
Wiemeres, 2006; Lymer, Brown, Payne, & Harding, 2006) and in welfare analysis 
and medical science but the only agricultural application is provided by Vrolijk 
(2004) who combined data from sample farms with the Netherlands agricultural 
census to obtain regional farm production characteristics. It is believed this chapter 
                                                 
1 Ideally, the cumulative effect of all land uses in the catchment would be considered. However in the 
catchment of interest, dairy farming is responsible for a high proportion of nitrogen exports, hence 
only dairy farms are considered in this study.  
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describes the first use of micro-simulation to model virtual population of farms for 
analysing water quality related policies at a catchment scale.  
 
The remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows, with method followed 
by respective results in each section. Section 2 describes the rationale for micro-
simulation approach. Section 3 describes an overview of the modelling process, 
discusses geo-spatial analysis and missing data estimation. Micro-simulation is 
explained in section 4. Later sections briefly discuss application, potential uses and 
limitations.  
 
4.2 Rationale 
Policy analysis in New Zealand is generally carried out at the national and regional 
level and at the level of the farm since this is the main decision making unit in New 
Zealand agriculture. There is a tendency, however for policy analysts to consider the 
impact of proposed policies on ‘typical farms’. Such an approach can provide a 
misleading abstraction from reality in a sector that is far from homogeneous and 
where few ‘typical farms’ exist. In reality farms exhibit considerable heterogeneity in 
all important variables from managerial ability and attitudes to soil type and use of 
inputs, to profitability and risk aversion. It is essential to take account of this farm 
level heterogeneity if the impact of policies is to be effectively modelled. It is also 
highly desirable that these different variables be combined in one data set in order to 
link geographical and management issues in agri-environmental analysis (Fais, Nino, 
& Giampalo, 2005). 
 
Various authors provide evidence of the effect of farm heterogeneity on the cost 
effectiveness of environmental policies (Martinez & Albiac, 2006; Wossink, Lansink, 
& Struik, 2001). Martinez & Albiac (2006) showed that standards were cost efficient 
relative to input taxes in landscapes with low productivity and higher nitrogen 
discharges, because they achieve a high level of abatement of nitrogen emission but 
only cause moderate reductions in farm profit.  
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Farm survey data can enable analysts to take account of heterogeneity among farms, 
for example Muniz & Hurle (2006) coupled farm surveys with mathematical 
programming, to model the actual farm level decision making process. However 
catchment level application of survey data sets is a major challenge since surveys 
usually collect data for geopolitical units. For instance in New Zealand, agricultural 
production statistics such as the Economic Survey of New Zealand Dairy Farms, and  
the Sheep and Beef Farm Survey and Farm Monitoring Reports use farm surveys to 
produce statistics on a national or regional basis while agri-environmental policy 
analysis requires farm level data at the catchment scale. Another problem associated 
with direct use of survey data for catchment analysis is that there may be too few 
survey farms in the catchment of interest and that the exact location of these farms is 
unavailable for privacy reasons.   
 
In New Zealand there is no single data set that provides spatially referenced farm 
management data so the development of a method of extending the usefulness of 
existing survey data is of particular interest especially when collection of additional 
data is difficult due to financial and time constraints. The development of an efficient 
method for linking different data sources should also enable a more comprehensive 
and reliable understanding of catchment level issues. 
 
4.3 Data and methods 
Geographic Information Systems enable the combination of geo-referenced data from 
different sources in a consistent manner to derive information on site specific 
characteristics. The major data sources used in this micro-simulation are illustrated in 
Figure 4.1 and reviewed in this section. Catchment modelling is implemented using 
two software systems, ArcGIS (ESRI, 2005) and Stata (StataCorp, 2005). ArcGIS is 
used for the data handling and spatial analysis functionality, allowing explicit 
representation and analysis of farms’ bio-physical features and map based 
visualization.  Stata is used for identifying predominant geographic attributes within 
each farm, merging of different data sources and for micro-simulation.  
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Figure 4.1 An overview of spatial micro-simulation 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Geo-spatial analysis 
In order to demonstrate the micro-simulation method, a catchment of the Waikato 
river was delineated using the New Zealand River Environment Classification 
(REC)2. The  catchment stretches over 155,303 ha, from Lake Karapiro to Lake 
Arapuni and has been identified as part of  the catchment in the region with highest 
priority for nutrient management (Brodnax, 2006; Environment Waikato, 2005c).  
The main stages of the geospatial analysis are illustrated in the Figure 4.2. 
 
The catchment boundary layer was intersected with Agribase, a spatial land use 
database that includes the boundaries of farm and forestry land parcels and stock 
numbers for each farm property in the catchment. Properties which fall across 
catchment boundaries may create difficulties for administration and enforcement of 
catchment based policies, but leaving such properties out of the catchment would 
                                                 
2 REC organises information about the physical characteristics of New Zealand's rivers by the source 
of flow for the river water, the catchment geology and land cover and maps this information by river 
segment for the New Zealand river network. 
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complicate the achievement of nutrient targets. Therefore these whole properties are 
defined as being within the catchment. The resulting catchment land use layer is 
illustrated in the Figure 4.3. Light green and conical symbol areas are pastoral and 
forest land respectively. Dairy farming and forestry are major land uses accounting 
for 82 percent of land use. The distribution of catchment land uses are described in 
Table 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.2 Stages of Geo-spatial analysis 
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Figure 4.3 Catchment land use 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Major land uses in the catchment 
Land use Number of properties Area (ha) Percent land use 
Dairy 370 52887 34.3
Lifestyle 183 856 0.6
Beef  62 3708 2.4
Dry stock 48 4627 3.0
Grazing 40 1124 0.7
Sheep and Beef 38 8635 5.6
Deer 12 686 0.4
Sheep 11 1654 1.1
Forestry 6 74711 48.4
Native bush 3 2881 1.9
Idle land  1968 1.3
Other 30 696 0.5
 
Lake Karapiro 
Lake Arapuni 
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4.3.2 Classification of soil type and topography 
The potential for nitrogen loss varies with soil physical properties and topography 
(VanDyke, Bosch, & Pease, 1999), for  example steeper slopes and some soils are 
more prone to nitrogen leaching (Judge & Ledgard, 2004; VanDyke, Bosch, & Pease, 
1999). Parker & Litchenberg (2004) showed the effect of  proximity to water bodies, 
soils and topography on nitrogen discharges. Therefore making an accurate 
representation of these factors is important. In the next stage geo-physical 
characteristics from the New Zealand Land Resources Inventory (NZLRI) were 
intersected with catchment land use to derive the distribution of soil and topographic 
classes across farms. NZLRI provides detailed spatial information on land geo-
physical attributes within the catchment broken down into 3393 polygons each of 
which describes a parcel of land in terms rock, soil, slope, erosion and vegetation 
attributes. 
 
Using geo spatial statistical techniques in ArcGIS and Stata the area of each polygon3 
that intersects each farm boundary was calculated to identify predominant soil type 
and the topographic feature of each property. Soil type based on the New Zealand 
Soil Classification (NZSC) described by Hewitt (1998), is an attribute within the 
NZLRI. Details are provided in Appendix 1.1. Each farm consists of numerous soil 
subgroups but these are aggregated into major soil orders and soil groups to meet the 
data requirements of Overseer, a farm scale nutrient budget simulation model which 
accounts for variability in soil type and topography (Wheeler, Ledgard, DeKlein, 
Monaghan, & Carey, 2003 ). Table 4.2 provides classification details for the soils in 
the catchment.  
 
Overseer was used because of the cost and time lag involved in directly measuring 
nutrient discharges from farms. The Overseer model is widely used in New Zealand 
                                                 
3 Polygons are continuous two-dimensional objects, encoded in the database as a sequence of locations 
that define the boundaries of each closed area in a specified coordinate system. The attributes of each 
polygon is stored in the database as well.  
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to estimate farm nitrogen discharges and has been used to design rules regarding 
nitrogen discharges from farms by regional councils (Horizons Regional Council, 
2007). 
 
In NZLRI, topography is categorized into seven different classes (Newsome, Wilde, 
& Willoughby, 2000). The  major topographic categories found in the catchment 
being described in Table 4.3. Details of this categorisation can be found in Appendix 
1.2. The distribution of major soil types and topographic classes across the catchment 
is illustrated in Figure 4.4. ‘Volcanic’ and ‘pumice’ are the predominant soil types 
with ‘easy’ and ‘rolling’ being the major topographic classes. 
 
Table 4.2 Classification of major soil types in the catchment 
Soil group (Overseer) Soil order Soil sub group 
Sedimentary Brown BOT 
Gley GOT 
GRO 
 
Volcanic Allophanic LOT 
LOT-GOT 
LOV 
 
Pumice Pumice MIW 
MOI 
 
Peat Organic OHM 
 
Recent Recent RFM 
ROM 
RST 
RTT 
 
Sands Raw WX 
 
Podozols Podzols ZOH 
ZOT 
Source: Hewitt (1998) 
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Table 4.3 Major Topographic classes in the catchment 
Topography Slope (Degrees) Slope categories 
Flat 0-7 A---B 
Rolling 8-15 C 
Easy hill 16-25 D---E 
Steep hill >25 F---G 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Soil type and topography 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Production variables 
The major production variable on New Zealand dairy farms is milksolids production 
representing the combined weight of milk fat and milk protein (Dexcel, 2006). 
Milksolids production is a major determinant of dairy farm income in New Zealand 
where farms are paid according to the quantity of milksolids produced. About 92% of 
the gross farm revenue of Waikato dairy farms is derived from milksolids  (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, 2005a). Data on milksolids collected from Fonterra’s 
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milk collection points within the catchment for three consecutive years from 2003 to 
2006 was made available for this study under stringent privacy conditions. Fonterra is 
the dominant processor of raw milk in New Zealand and collects around 96 percent of 
milk produced in New Zealand (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2005b). The 
milk collection points are georeferenced4 using Global Positioning System (GPS) co-
ordinates to create a vector layer of milk collection points5. The vector layer consists 
of 346 collection points. Milksolids production data for each point was stored in the 
attribute table of the vector layer. 
 
The milksolids vector layer was spatially joined with the farm boundaries data using 
the spatial join function in ArcGIS. Spatial join constructs a table in which fields 
from one layer's attribute table are appended to another layer's attribute table based on 
the relative locations of the features in the two layers. When more than one milk 
collection point falls in a single farm polygon these points are aggregated within the 
polygon in order to generate milksolids production per farm. As a result of the spatial 
join 317 dairy farms were joined with milk collection points. This accounts for 87% 
of farms in the catchment. The remaining 47 (12%) out of 364 farms lacked 
milksolids production data. One obvious reason for this is the lack of geo referencing 
for 31 milk collection points. Another possible reason may be the existence of dairy 
farms not supplying milk to Fonterra.  
 
Discarding farms lacking milksolids production could lead to loss of substantial 
information on catchment-wide nitrogen discharges since nitrogen discharges are 
largely a function of farmed area, farming intensity and the location of farm relative 
to water bodies in the catchment (Johnes, 1996; Vant & Smith, 2004). Since finding 
missing data directly is likely to be difficult and expensive, an estimation method is 
used as detailed below. 
                                                 
4 Geo referencing is the process of aligning geographic location data to a known coordinate system by 
latitude and longitude to create an image file of points and polygons. 
 
5 Point data specifies a location by a coordinate pair of XY values.  
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4.3.4 Missing data estimation 
Missing data can be estimated using various techniques such as mean imputation, 
regression and multiple imputation. Mean imputation typically uses the mean of 
complete case observations to impute missing data (Allison, 2002) but  tends to 
reduce the variation in the population.  
 
In another approach the data set is used to regress variables and create a regression 
model with missing values being imputed from predicted values. The relationship 
between the dependent variable milksolids and independent variables namely farm 
size and number of cows are explored to select variables and the appropriate 
functional form. In this case the linear functional form was found to be the most 
appropriate as follows (equation 1): 
 
EXXY  22110       (1) 
Y Milksolids per ha 
X1  Stocking rate (number of cows per ha) 
X2  Farm size (ha)  
β0 ,  β1 &  β2 are intercept and slope parameters. E –Error term with N(0, δ) 
 
The intercept term accounts for other factors which influence farm production.  The 
regression parameters are estimated by least squares applied to complete farm records 
for stocking rate,  farm size and milksolids per ha. A similar approach was used to 
estimate missing values  for a continuous variable by Penn (2007). Parameter 
estimates and t statistics of the regression are given in equation 2. Given the cross 
sectional nature of the data the model has a good fit (Adjusted R2 of 0.52 good for a 
cross sectional regression). Replacements for the missing values were generated from 
the fitted model (Figure 4.5 a).  
 
Y= 166.95 +  38.05 X1- 0.16 X2     (2)  
  (3.11) (17.57)    (3.11) 
*Figures in parenthesise are t statistics. 
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According to the p –values of the intercept term (0.002), slope parameters farm size  
(0.27) and stocking rate (0.000), the stocking rate has significant influence in 
determining the milksolids production per ha. This is consistent with production 
theory. The weak and negative relationship between farm size and productivity 
suggests that milksolids production per hectare falls  as farm size increases. This is 
consistent with existing findings for New Zealand dairy farming (Glassey, 2001). The 
next section outlines another method of estimating missing data known as multiple 
imputation.  
 
Multiple imputation 
Multiple imputation produces better outcomes than regression based on single 
imputation when more than 5% of data is missing (Schafer, 1999) and so is used to 
replace missing milksolids data. Multiple imputation is mainly used to deal with non 
responses in surveys  (Rubin, 1987) but has been broadly applied to a variety of 
missing data settings. Lokupitiya, et al (2006) used multiple imputation to estimate 
missing values for crop yield data in the United States census of agriculture and 
agricultural statistical surveys.  
 
Several computational methods have been developed for multiple imputation. The 
univariate imputation algorithm defined by Van Buuren, Boshuizen, & Knook (1999) 
is most appropriate for missing data where only dependent variable observations are 
missing. It provides a procedure for imputation of missing values for a single 
dependent variable (milksolids per hectare) given a complete set of independent 
variables (stocking rate and farm size). Missing values for continuous variables are 
estimated using linear regression. In the first step a vector of beta coefficients and 
residual variance are estimated by regressing the non-missing values of dependent 
variable on the current completed (original) version of independent variables. 
Thereafter a random value is drawn from the posterior distribution of the residual 
standard deviation to account for uncertainties in beta coefficients. These uncertainty 
accounted beta coefficients are used to predict missing values using independent 
variables. This process is repeated m times. This process assumes the dependent 
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variable is normally distributed and there is no systematic difference between 
complete and incomplete records. A skewed dependent variable tends to produce 
implausible imputations. This is one of the reasons for choosing Milksolids 
production per ha as a dependent variable rather than milksolids production per farm 
which is highly skewed. Technical details of the algorithm for creating multiple 
imputations are detailed in pages 689-691 of Van Buuren et al (1999).  
 
A computational algorithm, UVIS (Univariate Imputation Systems) has been 
developed for this procedure by Royston (2005). In this process OLS is used to 
predict continuous variables and the functional form detailed in [1] above is retained 
for prediction. In our case data is missing for 12 percent of the population so 
imputations are executed five times based on Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1999). 
Rubin demonstrated the relative efficiency of an estimate based on m imputations and 
the percentage of missing data. For instance if 10% of data is missing, imputing 5 
times achieves 98% efficiency. Missing values imputed using multiple imputations 
are illustrated in the Figure 4.5 b.  
 
Milksolids production is largely determined by stocking rate and management 
practices, but the effects of inherent soil fertility and topography on pasture 
production are also important (O'Connor, 1982; Roberts & Morton, 2004). These 
factors are not captured in the multiple imputation process adopted here due to the 
low number of observations in some soil and topography classes. While multiple 
imputations cannot substitute for quality primary data collection the method adopted 
here provides a pragmatic and cost effective solution that enables catchment scale 
modelling.
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Figure 4.5 Missing data imputation 
 
 
4.3.5 Riparian margins and location of farms 
In addition to the soil and topographic features and production variables described 
above, farm location relative to streams and waterways influences nitrogen discharges 
to surface water. For example, N deliveries have been found to be higher for fields 
located closer to streams and with steeper slopes (Peng & Bosch, 2001).  
 
In this section the stream length within each farm is estimated by intersecting the 
REC data base with farm boundaries (Figure 4.6). The stream length attribute is then 
aggregated within each farm6 and multiplied by two to get the length of riparian 
margin in each farm. The minimum distance between each farm and the main stem of 
                                                 
6 Dissolve function in ArcGIS is used for aggregation 
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
M
ilk
so
lid
s 
pe
r h
a
1 2 3 4 5
Stocking rate
Observed Regression
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
M
ilk
so
lid
s 
pe
r 
ha
1 2 3 4 5
Stock ing rate
Observed Imputed
 a. Regression imputation b. Multiple imputation 
 67
the river is calculated by estimating the distance between the Centeroid7 of each farm 
polygon and the main stem8 of the water body.  
 
The length of stream on each farm averages 1.59 kms or 3.18 kms of riparian margin 
per farm, see Table 4.4. The distance to river values and the length of riparian margin 
can be used with appropriate transmission coefficients to estimate nitrogen discharge 
from farms into the river and to enable analysis of the impact of interception 
technologies on nitrogen abatement.  
 
Figure 4.6 Distribution of streams 
 
 
                                                 
7 A Centeroid is a polygon’s mean centre which is based on the weighted average of it’s x and y 
geographic coordinates. 
8 The centre line of the lake and river polygon on the topographic map. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of farm riparian margin and distance to river 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Distance to river(km) 6.46 5.20 0.20 18.38 
Riparian margin 
length(km) 3.18 2.44 0.00 13.40 
 
4.4 Micro-simulation 
Micro-simulation models enable analysis of the spatial implications of policy changes 
at the micro level. The technique is new and is increasingly used for merging 
population and survey data to synthesize micro data for a virtual population. This 
micro data may then be used to analyse the effect of alternative policies both on 
individual units and on the population as a whole.  
 
In the micro-simulation procedure adopted for the Karapiro catchment, the geo 
referenced farm population is supplemented with additional microeconomic 
information from farm surveys using a statistical matching technique. This procedure 
will now be described in detail. 
 
4.4.1 Catchment farm population and farm survey data 
The data available for farms in the catchment are limited to milksolids production 
from Fonterra, farm size and stock (cow) numbers from Agribase and soil and 
topographic attributes from NZLRI. Stock numbers reported in Agribase are not 
broken down by age class so it is assumed that the number of milking cows in each 
farm is 80 percent of the total number of cattle. This is based on the typical 
replacement herd size (20 percent of stock) on Waikato dairy farms (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2005a).  
 
The Economic Survey of Dairy Farmers is the major micro economic data source for 
dairy farming in New Zealand. This nationwide survey was conducted annually by 
DairyNZ, which is the principal research and extension arm of New Zealand's dairy 
industry. The Economic Survey covers detailed physical inputs, financial variables 
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and capital structure. Farm level survey data for years 2003/04 and 2004/05  for the 
Waikato region was provided by DairyNZ for the purpose this study, covering an 
average of 150 farms in each year. 
 
Owner operators comprise the largest group of dairy farms, accounting for 65% of the 
New Zealand total (Livestock Improvement Co-operation, 2008). Around 60% of 
survey farms are owner operated most of the remainder being operated under 
sharemilking arrangements. Following Neal (2004), sharemilker farms were removed 
from the data set in order to avoid inconsistencies resulting from reporting of variable 
shares of costs and revenues as sharemilker farms’ operating structures vary from less 
than 20% share to over 50%. The farm economic survey data set thus consisted of 
data for 175 owner operator farms for the years 2003/04 and 2004/05. The data set 
includes 120 attributes for each farm covering physical input use and financial 
variables, All financial variables were adjusted to 2004/05 prices using Consumer 
Price Indices (CPI).  Since the dedicated data collection from catchment farms is 
constrained by time, cost and infrastructure, there is an advantage for acquiring 
additional information about the farms in the catchment using the strength of the 
Economic Farm Survey.  
 
4.4.2 Method of micro-simulation 
Economic Farm Survey data is used to simulate variables for farms in the catchment 
as follows. For each farm in the population9, a farm in the survey sample is selected 
which resembles the population farm as closely as possible, based on certain 
variables. These auxiliary variables are variables must be known for all farms in the 
survey and the population. In this study milksolids, number of milking cows and farm 
size are known for both survey and population farms. Survey farms are matched to 
population farms based on the minimum difference between selected auxiliary 
variables known as imputation variables. 
 
 
                                                 
9 all dairy farms in the catchment 
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Selection of variables 
The selection of imputation variables is of crucial importance to the quality of the 
simulated end result. Simkin, Verwaart, & Vrolijk (2005) used a genetic algorithm to 
select imputation variables but stressed the importance of human expertise in the 
selection of the imputation variable. The imputation technique assumes that if a farm 
is similar based on imputation variables, then it is likely that other variables are also 
similar. For this to be true there must be a logical relationship between imputation 
variables and other variables. The key variables, which are important in the analysis 
of economic and production aspects of dairy farming have been identified from the 
literature.  
 
In New Zealand, milksolids, farm size, stocking rate, variable costs, labour, feed 
supplements, dairy farm operating profit10 , total revenue, net operating assets, and 
fertilisers applied are most commonly used in economic studies (Jaforullah & 
Premachandra, 2003; Jaforullah & Whiteman, 1999; Kompas & Che, 2006; Neal, 
2004; Reinhard, Lovell, & Thijssen, 1999). Milksolids, farm size and number of 
milking cows are good indicators for production, intensity of land use and enterprise 
size and strongly influence input use, capital requirements and pollution potential in 
agricultural production systems.  
 
Vrolijk (2004) suggests that analysis of the correlation between auxiliary variables 
and variables which are only known for survey farms may be useful in selecting 
imputation variables. Therefore the strength of the relationship between the auxiliary 
variables and other key variables in the Economic Farm Survey is examined by 
analysing correlation coefficients. Analysis reveals strong correlation between the 
hypothesised auxiliary variables and other key variables (Table 4.5) so all three 
auxiliary variables were selected as imputation variables.  The lower correlation 
between brought in feed and farm size may reflect the ability of larger farms to 
                                                 
10 Dairy farm operating profit is a measure of dairy farm profitability indicating dairy operating return 
after an allowance for the value of change in dairy livestock numbers, non-paid labour and 
management, supplementary feed inventory change, owned run-off adjustment and depreciation 
(DairyNZ, 2008). 
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produce more feed on farm. In the presence of many common variables, selection of 
variables and allocation of relative weights to the variables can be implemented using 
stepwise regression (Decoster, Standaert, Standaert, Valenduc, & Van Camp, 1998.).  
 
Table 4.5 Correlation between auxiliary and other important variables  
Variables  Milksolids 
(kg) 
Farm size (ha) Number of 
cows 
Nitrogen fertilizer applied per farm (kg/ha) 0.74 0.79 0.71 
Feed brought in (dry matter) 0.54 0.46 0.63 
Economic farm surplus ($) 0.67 0.64 0.70 
Feed costs ($) 0.59 0.50 0.72 
Labour costs($) 0.82 0.76 0.80 
Net operating assets 0.80 0.78 0.79 
  
 
Distance function 
Once imputation variables are selected, an appropriate distance function must be 
specified to calculate the distance between imputation variables in the population and 
in the survey. Euclidean distance is generally used to measure the linear distance 
between two points in geometry, when all variables are measured in the same unit. 
However Euclidean distance is extremely sensitive to the scales of the variables 
involved. Since the scales of imputation variables involved in this study vary, it is 
inappropriate to use the generic form of the Euclidean distance function, particularly 
when applying weights to differentiate the importance of imputation variables. 
Because of this scale effect, some variables would be penalised more than others, 
purely due to the scale of the variable and not its importance in the matching process.  
 
In this circumstance, normalisation is often used so that some attributes do not 
arbitrarily get more weight than others (Lymer, Brown, Payne, & Harding, 2006; 
Vrolijk, 2004; Yoshizoe & Araki, 1999). The normalised Euclidean distance accounts 
for the scale differences among imputation variables.  
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The distance function is defined following Decoster & Van Camp (2000) as follows: 
 



Mi ij
ikij
ijk X
XX
WD
)(       (3) 
 
M  is a set of auxiliary variables used in the matching process 
Xij  the value of the auxiliary variable i for the population unit  j 
Xik  the value of auxiliary variable i for the survey unit k 
Wi   Weight of auxiliary variable i in the distance function 
)( ijX  Standard deviation of the auxiliary variable i in the population unit  j 
 
The Euclidean distance between the population and survey imputation variables is 
normalised when divided by the standard deviation of the respective population 
variables. The survey farm which most resembles the population farm is then defined 
as the farm which has the minimum sum of normalised Euclidean distance. This farm 
is considered to be representative of the population farm.  For each farm in the 
population, the three most similar farms are selected from the survey sample.  
 
Imputation was implemented by a series of tailor made algorithms developed using 
the programming option of Stata statistical software with equal weight being assigned 
to each imputation variable. In the matching process, which is illustrated in Figure 
4.7, farms in both the population and survey data are identified using unique 
identifiers (FarmID). The population consists of 364 farms while the survey covers 
175 farms. The distance between each imputation variable is calculated for every 
population farm against all sample farms giving 191,625 distances. Distances for 
each farm are summed and ranked, the farm with the shortest distance being defined 
as the first best survey farm. After ranking two different types of matches are carried 
out. Firstly, each farm in the population is represented by the most similar survey 
farm (first best survey farm), described as a single match. Some survey farms are 
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matched to more than one population farms. This results from the high degree of 
homogeneity among farms in the catchment.  
 
As an alternative to a single match, multiple matching was also carried out. In 
multiple matching a set of 100 farms are created using random combinations of the 
three best matching farms. Then the variable values for each 100 farms are averaged 
to create a new matched farm for each member of the population. Multiple matching 
avoids the issue of identical matched farms. However multiple matching 
compromises the accuracy of the matching as it tends to tradeoff first best matches 
for second and third matches. Further multiple matching will not handle discrete 
variables for instance type of milking shed. Therefore choice of the matching method 
depends on the proposed analysis and the nature of the data on survey farms.  
 
Figure 4.7 Matching process between population and survey farms  
 
 
In Table 4.6 the descriptive statistics of the imputation results is presented along with 
the real farm population data. The values estimated by the imputation procedure are 
similar to the real values and there are no significant differences between the means 
and standard deviations of real and virtual populations. The accuracy of the 
imputation process was also examined by mapping each farm imputed value with real 
WP02117 
WA01236 
WA00337 
WP02093 
OT00150 
WA00102 
WA00386 
WP02020 
WP00080 
WA00168 
WA01798 
Farmid 
Population 
3626 
3624 
3618 
3570 
3563 
3548 
3543 
Farmid 
Survey 
3929 3993 3768 WP02590 
3621 3993 3677 WP02117 
4275 3812 3928 WA01236 
4019 3929 3928 WA00337 
3812 3677 3747 WP02093 
4377 4019 3929 OT00150 
4298 3928 4275 WA00102 
3921 3421 3957 WA00386 
3749 4275 3928 WP02020 
3687 3929 4019 WP00080 
3929 4231 4512 WA00168 
3921 4275 3928 WA01798 
Match3 Match2 Match1 FarmID 
Survey Farms   Populatio
 
 
Population 
 
Virtual population Survey 
Farm size 
Milksolids 
Cow  
Imputation 
Variables 
Matching
 74
values where the degree of overlap of the real and imputed values indicates the 
accuracy of the matching process, see Figure 4.8. 
 
Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics of imputation results and farm population 
Variables Real Single match Multiple match 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Milksolids (000 kg) 100.73 63.94 95.14 52.04 93.96 48.05 
Farm area (ha) 113.88 71.53 106.62 60.15 103.56 56.21 
Milking cows 252.68 151.75 273.14 161.50 272.28 154.13 
 
These distributions indicate an excellent match between real and virtual farms, using 
either single or multiple matching, except for the smallest and largest farms 
accounting for 3 percent of the population. The differences between the real and 
simulated variable catchment totals are compared in Table 4.7 where it can be seen 
that estimated milksolids production and total farm area are 5 to 6 percent lower than 
the real population totals. The estimated total number of milking cows is around 8 
percent higher than the real value, this may be due to inconsistencies in the age 
structure of animals on Agribase.     
 
Potential problems which could arise in circumstances like estimation of catchment 
wide nitrogen discharges from farms due to the difference in total farm area, could be 
alleviated by extrapolating per ha estimates of the discharge to real farm area.  
 
Table 4.7 Comparison of estimated and real variables for the catchment 
Variables Real Single matching Multiple matching 
Milksolids ('000 kg) 36500 34400 34000 
Farm area (ha) 41226 38598 37490 
Milking cows 91470 98877 98564 
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Figure 4.8 Comparison of real and simulated values of variables 
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4.5 Application 
In order to demonstrate the potential use of the virtual population, a simple 
application has been performed using single matched farms in which we map dairy 
nitrogen discharges and farm returns across the virtual farms in the catchment. 
 
Nitrogen discharges are estimated by the Metamodel11 built on the Overseer 
estimates. In this exercise farms in the catchment were assumed to be one of two 
predominant soil types and topographic classes, Pumice- Rolling and Volcanic- 
Easy12. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 indicate a large variability in nitrogen discharges per ha 
and dairy farm returns.  
 
Figure 4.9 Simulated dairy farm nitrogen discharges per hectare 
 
                                                 
11As direct application of the Overseer over hundreds of production systems is time consuming a 
metalmodel is used. Details of the meta model are discussed in chapter 5. 
12 Pumice and volcanic soil types account for around 50 per cent of dairying land area  
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Figure 4.10 Simulated dairy farm returns per hectare 
 
 
 
The nitrogen discharge information generated would allow estimation of overall 
discharges into the main stem of the river, when accompanied by appropriate distance 
based transport coefficients. Since individual farm nitrogen discharges and returns are 
commercially and socially sensitive, synthetic farm data may be regarded as a 
pragmatic compromise between reality and privacy for analysing policy. 
 
4.6 Potential uses 
One of the major advantages of micro-simulation models is scale flexibility since data 
can be aggregated or disaggregated to the preferred scale (Hynes, Morrissey, & 
O'Donoghue, 2006). For instance synthetic micro-data can be used to create 
catchment specific representative farming systems. Mathematical programming 
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models can then be applied to these farming systems to simulate responses to policy 
then these responses can be extrapolated to the entire catchment. This was the 
approach taken by Payraudeau & van der Werf (2005) in extrapolating farm 
emissions from a linear programming model to a whole region. 
 
Integration of more virtual data into simulation models can produce more attribute 
rich farm data that would enrich our knowledge of farming systems and its responses 
to policy shocks. For instance the simulated data can be fed into DairyNZ’s whole 
farm model to predict responses to policy changes and into the nutrient budget model 
Overseer to quantify the impact of adopting best management practices such as 
winter pads, herd homes and effluent disposal systems and nitrification inhibitors.  
 
Virtual data may also provide a useful source of information for simulating nitrogen 
trading using multi agent simulation models such as CORMAS (Bousquet, Bakam, 
Proton, & Le Page, 1998). Nitrogen discharge data may also be used to estimate the 
environmental and economic efficiency of farms based on nonparametric and 
parametric methods as reported in Coelli, Lauwers, & Van Huylenbroeck (2007) and 
Reinhard, Lovell, & Thijssen,(2000). 
 
4.7 Limitations  
The matching process was not effective for farms at the ends of size spectrum e.g 
extremely smaller or larger farms. Perhaps collecting data directly from such farms 
may be a pragmatic solution. Variables describing farm size and stock numbers, 
which often change in the short to medium time period may not be represented 
accurately, since frequent update of Agribase is expensive and time consuming. 
However enhanced use of remote sensing and satellite imagery could help to alleviate 
this problem.  
 
Lack of validation for all variables is a disadvantage of virtual data. Given that the 
rational for creating virtual catchment data is that it does not currently exist, lack of 
validation may be justified.  
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Survey farms do not contain information on land quality. If survey farms were geo 
referenced it would have enabled identification of geographic attributes of the farms 
thus more effective matches could have been made with population farms considering 
geophysical attributes. However it can be justified that matching based on production 
potential, stock numbers and farm size sufficiently represent soil quality. 
 
The model assumes that each farm has homogeneous soil and topography for 
computational convenience. However considering intra farm heterogeneity may be 
unrealistic due to the difficulties in restricting mobility of animals within certain soil 
and topography.  Further it makes policy implementation difficult. 
 
The model developed does however omit factors such as individual farmers’ attitude, 
intrinsic knowledge base and experience and risk aversion etc. These are important 
influences on decision making which we recognise and fully aware as a limitation of 
the model. Direct data collection from the farms is clearly optimal given no cost, time 
and effort constraint. However, given such constraints the approach taken 
substantially overcomes data limitations.  
 
4.8 Conclusion  
The method developed with a modest amount of information can be employed to 
analyse environmental policy in a spatial context. The model integrated attributes of 
geo referenced farm population with Economic Farm Survey for dairy farmers. The 
Economic Farm Survey until now has mainly been used for production economic 
analysis. This approach shows the potential use of the survey data for spatial 
environmental policy analysis. Synthetic data would provide better understanding of 
catchment farms for policy analysis. It can be extremely valuable to regional councils 
and other policy making organisations that want to minimise the economic impact of 
environmental policies.  
 
Using the Economic Farm Survey data for catchment level modelling saves time and 
resources for dedicated data collection. In addition the Economic Farm Survey is 
more reliable as DairyNZ (Dexcel) has greater resources and better access to dairy 
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farms and annually produces farm statistics with national and regional scope. This is 
especially so with the recent changes introduced to data collection and management 
with the establishment of Dairy Base Economic Survey as a substitute to the 
Economic Farm Survey, which intends to target more farms with more specific 
details such as feeding regime and best management practices. There is a potential for 
extending the method to build a spatial dynamic micro-simulation model given the 
availability of time tagged population variables and panel survey data.  
 
The virtual population results in this chapter has been used to derive marginal 
abatement costs of different farming systems in chapter 5; model cost effective policy 
implementation in chapter 6; measure environmental and economic efficiency in 
chapter 7 and model optimum riparian buffers in chapter 8. 
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5. An integrated simulation model to assess economic and 
environmental impacts of dairy farm systems  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an integrated simulation model to assess economic and 
environmental impacts of dairy farm systems with a focus on the nitrogen pollution in 
the catchment as described in Chapter 3. Alternative methods for abatement of 
nutrient discharges can be broken down into changes at the  intensive or the extensive 
margin of production (Xabadia, Goetz, & Zilberman, 2006; Yiridoe & Weersink, 
1998). Changes at the extensive margin involve retiring farmland or changing the size 
of the effective farm area by establishing riparian margins and wetlands, or by 
changing the use of production units. At the intensive margin, abatement can be 
realised by a reduction in the level of nitrogen input per unit of land. In dairy farming 
this would involve adjustments to the level of nitrogen fertiliser application and to the 
stocking rate. Limiting stock numbers has been proposed as a method of reducing 
nitrogen discharges into water in ecologically sensitive water bodies in New Zealand 
(MacDonald, Connor, & Morrison, 2004). The modeling approach described in this 
chapter focuses on changes at the intensive margin. 
  
Just & Antle (1990) emphasize the importance of modelling agri-environmental 
policies at a disaggregated level to capture the heterogeneous nature of the physical 
environment and economic behaviour among farms.  For instance nitrogen loss 
potential increases with the rise of soil slope and higher on soils more prone to 
leaching (VanDyke, Bosch, & Pease, 1999). Establishing the cost of nitrogen 
discharge reduction at farm level is essential for making informed policy decisions, 
and solutions to pollution control problems require a knowledge of farm specific 
abatement cost (Yiridoe & Weersink, 1998). Since farm heterogeneity plays an 
important role in abatement cost variations, a farm level approach is particularly 
useful in determining optimal environmental policy instruments. Aggregate 
approaches, which rely on national or regional aggregated models, tend to 
underestimate this  variability (De Cara, Houze, & Jayet, 2005). Optimal 
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environmental policy concentrates  its efforts  on those farms  where abatement costs 
are low (Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo, 2006); thus  farm centric knowledge of 
abatement costs will facilitate selection of the most efficient option for nitrogen 
management. De Cara, Houze, & Jayet (2005) classified heterogeneity into the 
following three categories; activity related,  emission-factor, and flexibility of 
substitution of production activities. In this chapter heterogeneity of farming systems 
is represented by production structure, soil and topography, which are important 
variables in determining the production and pollution potential of farms.  
 
There is a complex relationship between changes in farming practice and results in 
terms of nitrogen discharge reduction.  Moreover, results are observable only over a 
long time frame, and farmers lack the necessary knowledge to determine the changes 
that must be achieved. In this situation simulation models can be effectively used to 
evaluate changes in farming practices under different policies.  Models for 
assessment of new policies need to incorporate both environmental and economic 
effects. Such models can help policy makers assess the trade-offs between economic 
and environmental objectives and thereby facilitate informed policy choices. 
Modeling dairy farms is a challenge because of the complex interaction of cows, 
management, paddocks and climate. For this reason, use has been made of the Whole 
Farm Model has been used to simulate policies (Cabrera, Breuer, Hildebrand, & 
Letson, 2005). 
 
This study extends the value of the DairyNZ Whole Farm Model (WFM)(Beukes et 
al., 2005)  by building and integrating a nitrogen discharge function using a meta 
modelling technique. Then a hybrid model was created by merging the merits of 
differential evolution and mathematical programming systems to overcome the 
inherent disadvantages of individual approaches.  
 
The modeling framework developed in this analysis includes three components: a 
meta model, the WFM and mathematical programming. Firstly meta models for 
nitrogen discharges for specific soil types and topography were estimated using the 
simulated nitrogen discharges of the Overseer nutrient budget model. Second, the 
Meta models were incorporated into the WFM. Then WFM was calibrated to the farm 
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systems derived from cluster analysis of catchment farms. Profits and respective 
nitrogen discharges obtained from the differential evolution-based optimization 
process of WFM were assembled to form a profit-pollution frontier. This frontier was 
subject to constrainted optimisation based on a non linear mathematical programming 
model, which predicts producer responses to alternative pollution control policies.  
Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the modeling framework. The model components are 
discussed in detail later. 
 
The main focus of this study is to simulate responses to environmental policies aimed 
at intensive margin changes in different farming systems.  A range of different farm 
types is represented in order to allow for biophysical and economic variations.  
 
Figure 5.1 Overview of the modelling framework  
 
 
 
5.2 Model setup 
An ex-ante evaluation of the cost effectiveness of the measures requires an 
understanding of the abatement cost function of the farms involved. Abatement costs 
associated with the different farming systems were derived by gradually tightening 
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the constraint on nitrogen discharge. It is assumed that farmers are perfectly 
competitive and risk neutral. Dairy farm profit per unit area is assumed to be a 
function of nitrogen discharges as a result of chosen input use intensities. It is 
represented by the profit-pollution function ƒ(x, ) where x is nitrogen discharge.   
is geo-phyiscal factors of the farm. The function is assumed to be concave, with a 
negative second derivative at all points (f`>0, f``<0). Farm land differs in the 
environmental consequences of production. Let the private per hectare optimum of 
the profit maximizing farmer with farm type   be as follows (Equation 1). 
 
Max 221),( xxxf         (1) 
Subject to Rxx   
xR   is the  level of restriction of nitrogen discharge. 
 
Given this production and pollution relationship, the management problem for the 
individual farm can be summarized by the following Lagrangian (Equation 2) 
 
)(),( 221
Rxxxxx        (2) 
 
The Lagrange multiplier  indicates the rate of change of the maximum value of the 
objective function with respect to the parametric changes in the value of constraint. In 
other words the value of an extra nitrogen discharge to the producer. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for this simple problem with constant returns production 
technology show that, in the absence of environmental policies, the producer will 
tend to apply inputs in order to maximize returns and this will result in higher levels 
of nitrogen discharge into water. 
 
Three different policy scenarios are simulated. In the first scenario farm systems are 
subject to nitrogen discharge restrictions. In the second, a tax on nitrogen discharges 
is applied. In the third scenario a joint policy instrument is evaluated, in which a tax 
is imposed on nitrogen discharge that exceeds the amount allowed under nitrogen 
discharge restrictions. For the purposes of this study it is assumed that the size of the 
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farming operation would not change as a result of the tax regime, although in practice 
this could happen. The following stylized forms illustrate the three policy scenarios. 
 
Scenario 1  Max ƒ(x) subject to Rxx   
 
Scenario 2  Max )()( xxf   
 
Scenario 3  Max )()( Rxxxf   subject to Rxx   
 
5.3 Study area and data 
The catchment in this study covers part of the Waikato River, including Lakes 
Arapuni and Karapiro. Analysis here is restricted to dairy farming which is the 
predominant agricultural land use in the catchment, occupying 72 percent of total 
agricultural land. There are 370 dairy farms, covering 52,877 ha.  Assessment of 
nonpoint pollution abatement costs at farm level poses a challenge due to data 
limitations (Helin, Laukkanen, & Koikkalainen, 2006).  Farm data therefore has been 
obtained from a virtual population of catchment farms derived in the chapter 4. 
  
Each farm has its own specific soil and topographic characteristics and production 
structure which require different solutions, so modeling at the individual farm level is 
computationally demanding. In addition to this, implementation of perfectly 
differentiated emission policies at the individual farm level imposes an informational 
burden and implementation difficulties on the social planner. Unless this problem can 
be overcome, it is useful to bring farms with similar characteristics together into 
homogeneous groups, so that a series of common recommendations can be made.  
Grouping farms using statistical clustering techniques is a recommended practice 
(Hazell & Norton, 1986) for obtaining a reasonable representation of a range of farm 
production structures and bio-physical variables.  Three distinctive farming systems 
in terms of production structure, soil and topography have been identified, based on 
latent class cluster analysis (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005).  The farming systems are 
classified as intensive, moderate and extensive based on input use intensity and 
production. Table 5.1 describes the key variables of each farming system.  The 
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intensive farming system applies higher levels of nitrogen fertiliser to produce more 
grass and uses a greater amount of brought in feed to feed a higher number of better 
performing cows in order to produce more milk out of per unit of land area. In the 
extensive farming system a lower number of animals are kept per unit of land area 
and those animals are mostly fed with a limited amount of farm grown pasture and a 
lesser amount of brought in feed. The moderate farming system stands between these 
two extremes. The level of intensification is affected by geo-physical features of the 
farm, level of management skills, capital availability, risk preferences and life style 
choices. 
 
The effect of relative distances of farms to the main stem of the river has not been 
taken into consideration in this study, as nitrogen is considered a uniformly mixed 
assimilative pollutant i.e the damage caused by the pollutant depends only on the 
amount discharged into the medium and is relatively insensitive to where the 
emissions enter the medium, or how long  it takes to reach the medium (Tietenberg, 
2006b).   
 
Table 5.1  Descriptive statistics of the farming systems 
Variables Moderate Extensive Intensive
Farm size (ha) 106 136 92
Stocking rate(Milking cows/ha) 2.7 2.2 3.3
Annual Pasture requirement (kg/ha ) 12975 9756 13950
Brought in feed (tons per cow) 0.5 0.6 2.12
Milksolids (Kg/ha) 919 788 1910
Soil type Volcanic Pumice Volcanic
Topography Easy Rolling Easy
 
5.4 Meta model for nitrogen discharge 
The diffuse nature of agricultural nitrogen pollution and the time lag before it appears 
in a water body necessitates the use of a simulation model to derive quantifiable 
measures of the fate of nitrogen discharges in water. Overseer®  is an nutrient budget 
model for decision support (Wheeler, Ledgard, DeKlein, Monaghan, & Carey, 2003 ). 
It simulates annual farm nitrogen discharges into water and has already been 
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calibrated for New Zealand farming systems (Thomas, Ledgard, & Francis, 2005).  
Information on nutrient leaching derived from recent work on the central North Island 
lake catchments of New Zealand has been incorporated into Overseer (Clark, 2007). 
 
Direct use of Overseer, however, is inefficient and impractical when a large number 
of unique combinations of farms are simulated in the optimisation process.   
Therefore a simplified approach called Metamodelling has been adopted here.  A 
Metamodel is a statistical response function that approximates the outcomes of 
complex simulation models (Wu & Babcock, 1999).  Metamodelling has been widely 
used to create nutrient discharge functions for policy analysis (Goetz, Schmidt, & 
Lehmann, 2006; Hefland & House, 1995; Martinez & Albiac, 2006). Metamodels 
were built by regressing the nitrogen discharges that resulted from simulating 100 
randomly selected farms (taken from DairyNZ’s Economic Farm Survey for Waikato 
in 2004/2005). Separate simulations were carried out for soil and topography  
combinations of the farming systems. In accordance with the guidelines for dairy 
farm effluent application (Dexcel, 2007b), it was assumed that 20 percent of each 
farm was subject to effluent application. The supplementary feed policy was kept on 
a par with the supplementary feed policy of the WFM. 
 
5.4.1 Empirical specification for the Metamodel 
In order to obtain useful predictions it is important to choose the right combination of 
inputs and the proper functional form for a Metamodel.  According to the literature 
many functional forms are used to estimate Metamodels for nutrient discharge. For 
instance Martinez & Albiac (2006) built a quadratic Metamodel based on the Erosion 
and Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC). Yiridoe & Weersink (1998) used a simple 
quadratic functional form in terms of nitrogen fertiliser use to predict nitrogen 
discharges based on CENTURY biophysical model simulations. Hefland & House 
(1995) used a square root function to fit a Metamodel of nitrate effluent from crop 
production using EPIC. Dake, Mackay, & Manderson (2005)  fitted a full second 
order polynomial model in terms of stocking rate for dry stock farming using 
Overseer.  
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In cattle grazing systems nitrogen discharged from urine and dung patches, and 
applied fertiliser are the major sources of nitrogen (Ledgard & Menneer, 2005; 
Ledgard, Penno, & Sporsen, 1999)1. Monaghan et al,. (2007) show that even though 
nitrogen excreted by animals is the primary source of nitrogen leaching and run off, 
use of nitrogen fertiliser indirectly contributes to nitrogen leaching by boosting 
pasture production and therefore stocking rate.  Stocking rate and nitrogen fertiliser 
application were selected therefore as variables for estimating the Metamodel. In 
reality there are of course other sources contributing to nitrogen discharge, including 
brought in feed resources (Ledgard & Thorrold, 2003). These were excluded from the 
Metamodel to avoid complexity, as feed resources are categorised into 7 major 
groups and many sub groups in WFM, resulting in 60 categories. Instead, feed 
resources are capped in the WFM simulations.  
 
Various functional forms were fitted, including quadratic, exponential and square root 
functions. The exponential functional form (Equation 3) statistically out performed 
other functional forms, and this is consistent with the functional form fitted for 
experimentally measured nitrogen discharges against total nitrogen input by Ledgard 
and Menneer (2005). 
 
SRNY 210)ln(          (3) 
 
Y = Nitrogen discharge KgN ha per year 
N = Nitrogen applied to paddocks in kg ha per year 
SR = Number of animals per ha. 
 
The parameters of the nitrogen discharge function were estimated using ordinary least 
squares regression. Table 5.2 presents the parameters of estimated nitrogen discharge 
functions by soil and topographic categories. All coefficients are highly significant. 
Goodness of fit of the discharge function was very good, as indicated by the adjusted 
coefficients of determination. The assumption for homoscedastic errors could not be 
rejected on the basis of the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
                                                 
1 Experimental evidences are provided in Appendix 2.1 and 2.2 
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heteroskedasticity, since the chi-squared test statistic is above the critical value of 
0.0654. Colinearity between variables is tested using the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) (Baum, 2006).  The rule of thumb states that there is evidence of colinearity if 
the largest VIF is greater than 10.  We can rely here on the conditioning of the model 
as the maximum VIF (1.08) is far smaller than 10 for functions in both 
soil/topography classes.  The empirical form of the Metamodel can be interpreted as a 
percentage change in the dependent variable as a result of unit change in the 
independent variable. For instance if β2 is 0.26 then a 1 unit increase in SR will 
produce a 26 percent (approx.) increase in E(Y). The estimated discharge function is 
graphically presented in Figure 5.2. We can see from this, that the effect of stocking 
rate on nitrogen discharge is greater than that of nitrogen fertiliser. Also, both have a 
large combined effect. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Nitrogen discharge function  
 
Stocking rate 
(Cows/ha) Nitrogen applied (Kg/ha) 
Nitrogen discharge  
(Kg/Ha) 
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Table 5.2 Parameters of Metamodel 
 Volcanic/ Easy Pumice /Rolling 
 coefficient t stat P value coefficient t stat P value 
Intercept 2.42 66.21 0.000 2.52 90.72 0.000 
Nitrogen 2.81*10-2 34.29 0.000 2.86*10-2 45.82 0.000 
Stocking rate 0.26 20.71 0.000 0.27 27.56 0.000 
Adj R2 0.98 0.98 
 
5.5 Dairy NZ’s Whole Farm Model (WFM) 
The Whole Farm Model (WFM), developed by Dairy NZ, was used to ascertain 
possible farm responses to environmental policies.  The WFM is a computer model 
that simulates New Zealand dairy farms. The model framework is explicitly designed 
to facilitate incorporation of existing and future sub models by using an object 
oriented framework implemented in Visual Works Smalltalk language. WFM 
components consist of  climate, management, cow, paddock and economics sub 
models (Beukes et al., 2005).  These sub models simulate complex interactions of 
climate and pasture growth, cow metabolism and management regimes and resultant 
economic output. An overview of the WFM structure used for this study is illustrated 
in Figure 5.3. 
 
The pasture model used is the McCall Pasture Model, based on the work of McCall & 
Bishop-Hurley (2003).  The cow sub model used is Molly, a dynamic model 
consisting of differential equations describing the nutrient metabolism of  cows under 
New Zealand conditions (Palliser, Bright, Macdonald, Penno, & Wastney, 2001). The 
economics component is similar to that specified in the Economic Farm Survey of 
New Zealand Dairy Farmers. Dairy farm operating profits are calculated using the 
economic module of the WFM. The revenue of the farm is primarily derived from the 
sale of milksolids.  The details of the economic component can be found in Neal, 
Drynana et al.(2005). The WFM simulates optimum farm responses to different 
policies and calculates the dairy farm profit by executing differential evolution (DE)-
based farm optimisation. The process of WFM optimisation is discussed in the 
following sections.  
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The WFM is calibrated to represent each farming system, with outputs and inputs 
being verified with data for individual systems.  The feed policy of the model is fixed 
for each farming system. The pasture production potential of paddocks is calibrated 
using the Pslope (α ) parameter in the pasture model (McCall & Bishop-Hurley, 
2003). Pslope is used as a proxy for inherent soil fertility and represents the efficiency 
of solar radiation. Cow production potential in terms of milksolids production per ha 
per year under different systems is calibrated by manipulating the lactation period, 
live weight and PV milk. PV milk is a measure of a cow’s genetic production 
potential and was developed by the Livestock Improvement Corporation (Beukes et 
al., 2006). 
 
Figure 5.3 Overview of the Whole Farm Model analysis 
 
 
 
An understanding of nitrogen response is important if the production potential of 
farms is to be realised, as soil heterogeneity, climate variability and time of 
application can have major implications for nitrogen fertiliser use. The nitrogen 
fertiliser response of the pasture is modelled using a decision tree model for pasture 
growth developed by Zhang & Tillman (2007). This is an empirical model based on 
Economic 
Cow 
Nitrogen  
discharge 
 
Farm profit 
 
Optimiser 
Climate 
Simulation 
 Paddock 
 Management 
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data collected from experimental trials in New Zealand. To estimate the nitrogen 
response, the model considers the time and amount of nitrogen applied, climate, 
topography, phosphorus fertility and land slope. In this application only the amount 
of nitrogen fertiliser applied varied between farming systems.  Variability in inherent 
soil fertility is represented by the farm system specific Pslope (α) parameter as 
discussed previously.  
 
5.5.1 Optimisation using Differential Evolution (DE) 
Optimisation of the WFM has been performed with a specific evolutionary algorithm, 
known as differential evolution, a variant of a more common genetic algorithm 
developed by  Storn & Price (1997). DE has been applied in a few agricultural bio-
economic studies (Alfrod, Cacho, & Griffth, 2006; Mayer, Kinghorn, & Archer, 
2005; Neal et al., 2005), and is implemented in the WFM in a similar way to Mayer, 
Kinghorn, & Archer. In the WFM the key feature of differential evolution is to 
generate a population of farms using features of biological evolution, such as 
reproduction, selection, mutation and recombination. The vector of individual farm 
characters is referred to as the genotype. Each parameter of the vector is described as 
an allele, and each allele in the genotype is represented by a real number. In the 
empirical application, alleles of the genotype are decision variables such as input use 
and management. A population of genotypes is randomly generated, with each 
genotype being characterised by its level of fitness, defined in terms objective 
function value dairy farm profit. Higher dairy farm profit indicates better fitness. 
Here the each genotype is simulated through the WFM to generate dairy farm profit. 
The process of differential evolution involves the iterative improvement of a set of 
solutions or genotypes based on a fitness function. The steps of differential evolution 
are illustrated in Figure 5.4. The details of the process based on Price, Storn, & 
Lampinen (2005) are described below. 
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Figure 5.4 Process of optimisation  
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Price, Storn, & Lampinen (2005) 
 
Initialization  
The population is initialized by specifying upper and lower boundaries on parameter 
values of interest. In empirical application, parameter values of interest are stocking 
rate (number of cows per ha) and fertiliser applied. Once initialization bounds have 
been specified, a random number generator assigns each parameter of every genotype 
a value from within the prescribed range (Equation 4).  
LjLjUjjji bbbrandx ,,,0,, )).(1,0(      (4)  
Xi –Genotype, J- a parameter vector of interest  
 
Once the initial population is established new population members are created by 
randomly selecting three members of the original population and subjecting them to a 
process of mutation and cross over. The 3 randomly chosen genotypes are labeled as 
x1, x2 and x3.   
ƒ(N)- Nitrogen discharge 
F.(x1-x2) 
V=x3+F.(x1-x2) 
ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N)
X1 X3X2Xp 
ƒ(N) 
Xp 
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ƒ(N) 
U  Trial vector/ Child
ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N) ƒ(N)
X1 X3X2Xp 
Selection 
New Population 
Random selection of population members 
Initial population 
*Selection of farms, which fulfil constraints and maximise profit 
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Mutation 
Mutated genotypes vi are created by adding the scaled vector of differences between 
two genotypes with the third genotype. Equation 5 shows how to combine three 
different, randomly chosen genotypes to create a mutated genotype. 
 
).( 213 xxFxvi          (5) 
 
The scale vector F is a positive real number between 0 and 1 which controls the rate 
at which the population evolves.  F can be specified by the user.  
 
Cross over 
Crossing over of mutated genotype vi with another member of the initial population 
xp, known as the target genotype, creates a child genotype u. The cross over 
probability, CR, is a user defined value range 10  CR  that controls the fraction of 
parameter values that are copied from the mutated genotype. To determine which 
source contributes a given parameter, CR is compared with the output of a random 
number generator, rand j (0,1). If the random number is less than or equal to CR, the 
child parameter is inherited from the mutant, v, otherwise the parameter is copied 
from the vector of genotype xp. In addition to this, another operation of recombination 
is carried out by randomly selecting a parameter from the mutant vector into the child 
vector. This is to ensure that the child vector does not duplicate the parents. The 
process of crossing over is illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
 
jijii vuu   if (randj (0,1)≤CR or j=jrand )     (6) 
Otherwise 
jijii xuu   
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Figure 5.5 Crossing over 
 
Selection 
Selection is based on the value of the objective function known as fitness. In case of 
maximization problems, the child vector (u) replaces the target vector xp, provided 
that the child vector has an equal or higher objective value than that of its target 
vector.  Otherwise the target vector retains its place at least for one more generation. 
The above mentioned procedures are repeated until the optimum is located or until 
pre-specified termination criteria (number of generations) are satisfied.  
 
Constraints 
Constraints are introduced to restrict the nitrogen discharge per ha from farms. It 
require a solution to contain parameter values that satisfy the constraint. Most often, 
constraints are implemented as penalty functions (Price, Storn, & Lampinen, 2005) 
which decrease the objective function value when constraints are violated. Constraint 
violation is incorporated into the optimisation task by deducting the penalties for the 
constraint p(x) from the objective function.  
 
)()()(' xpxfxf          (7) 
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 96
The penalty is integrated into the objective value (Equation 7); individuals 
performing well will have a higher fitness and thus a greater chance of survival. The 
penalty is specified by attaching price tags to estimated nitrogen discharges. This 
penalty is then deducted from the objective function. The trade-offs between nitrogen 
discharges and economic farm surplus are derived from the results of optimisation, 
which yields a large range of alternatives. In this approach multiple constraints can be 
incorporated by introducing weights. In our previous work (Ramilan, Scrimgeour, 
Levy, & Romera, 2007) tax scenarios were implemented using penalty functions, but 
these have a number of draw backs (Price, Storn, & Lampinen, 2005):  they require 
specification of appropriate weights to constraints in the presence of multiple 
constraint handling; inappropriate specification of weights leads to convergence in 
infeasible regions; there are issues around premature convergence and local minima. 
An additional problem associated with using the penalty function approach is the 
excessive time required to generate solutions. These drawbacks can all be avoided by 
adopting direct constraint handling. 
 
Direct constraint handling 
In direct constraint handling, each population vector or genotype is assigned a 
nitrogen discharge, estimated using the Metamodel. Trial vectors which fulfil the 
constraints are selected. If the objective function is unconstrained then the objective 
function values are simply compared in the same way as the differential evolution 
selection criteria.  When neither vector is feasible the objective function values are 
not compared. Selection drives vectors in the direction of constraint violation 
decrease. Optimum farm responses for different nitrogen discharge levels are tailored 
by gradually tightening the constraints on nitrogen discharge.  
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5.6 Empirical analysis 
 
5.6.1 Profit pollution frontier 
In the WFM simulation, lower and upper bounds on the parameters of the decision 
variables (stocking rate and nitrogen application) are specified to initiate populations 
of farms or genotypes. Maximising Dairy farm profit is set as an optimisation target. 
The mutation rate is set at 0.4 and cross over rate is set at 0.5. These rates have been 
used in other differential evolution applications (Alfrod, Cacho, & Griffth, 2006; 
Neal, 2004). The initial population was set at 25 genotypes which were simulated 
through 40 generations, creating 1000 genotypes of various combinations of 
parameter vectors in each scenario. This process resulted in a matrix of thousands of 
farm activities in each farming system. The results are summarized in Table 5.3, 
which shows the maximum farm profit achieved at different levels of nitrogen 
discharge constraint.  
 
Optimisation through the DE algorithm took approximately 40 hours for scenarios in 
each farming system, using a Pentium IV computer with 3.2 GHz speed and 2048 
MB RAM. Thus three farming system scenarios consumed a total of 120 hours of 
computation time. This high computational time is a problem in using DE, when it is 
needed  to simulate many scenarios for different input and output prices and nitrogen 
discharge levels. In contrast, production function oriented activity analysis based on 
mathematical programming optimisation can produce results in a fraction of the time. 
However, the accuracy of the results from this approach depends on the functional 
form of the complicated multivariate equation and on the availability of accurate data. 
When policies are evaluated ex ante, the data on farm responses are not available.  A 
further complication is that mathematical programming tends to find the local 
optimum rather than the global optimum.  Compared with this, WFM’s differential 
evolution approach does not require any complicated functional forms and is capable 
of evolving scenarios under varying constraints, but in activity analysis the optimum 
is selected from among the pre existing activities. For these reasons this study uses a 
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simple and innovative hybrid solution that combines the merits of both DE and 
mathematical programming.   
 
Table 5.3 WFM optimisation results 
Economic 
Farm 
Surplus 
($/ha) 
Stocking 
Rate 
Pasture 
Production
(Kg/ha)
Milksolids 
Production 
(Kg MS/Ha)
Nitrogen 
Applied 
(Kg /ha) 
Nitrogen 
Discharged 
(Kg/ha) 
Per Ha
Moderate 
1429 2.7 12592 909 120 32
1418 2.4 12506 846 117 30
1406 2.3 12577 814 118 29
1348 2.1 12535 756 116 27
1315 1.9 12360 705 112 25
1250 1.9 12068 695 90 24
1197 1.7 12006 644 81 22
Intensive   
2905 3.5 14993 1641 270 61
2843 3.2 14896 1512 258 53
2779 3.1 14644 1488 225 48
2671 2.8 14525 1350 210 42
2554 2.4 14380 1175 193 36
2409 2.5 13810 1194 121 30
2146 2.1 13167 1008 81 24
Extensive 
880 2.3 9040 714 60 27
850 2.1 9131 671 60 26
837 1.7 9130 571 60 24
826 1.6 9184 553 60 23
796 1.5 9148 497 58 22
724 1.4 8823 476 42 21
653 1.2 8860 417 34 19
 
In the hybrid method, the matrix (results) generated in the DE optimisation for each 
farming system was used to build a profit pollution frontier. The profit pollution 
frontier for each farming system is illustrated in Figure 5.6 using R. R is an open 
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source language and environment for statistical computing and graphics (R 
Development Core Team, 2007).  
 
Figure 5.6 Profit-pollution frontiers 
 
The profit pollution frontier portrays the relationship between nitrogen discharges and 
level of farm profit given constant technology. It is driven through subsequent 
reduction in stocking rate and nitrogen fertiliser application. This frontier was used to 
build econometrically specified non linear production functions for farming systems 
in terms of farm profit and nitrogen discharges. Production function have been 
specified by many functional forms, none of which is unanimously considered to be 
superior to the others (Goetz, Schmidt, & Lehmann, 2006). The polynomial 
formulations, in particular quadratic specifications, are generally used to specify 
agricultural production functions because of their suitable properties and ease of 
estimation. Quadratic forms  are the most  commonly used  functional forms in 
empirical estimation of production and pollution functions (Wu & Babcock, 2001) 
and used in many studies to model yield responses to changes in nitrogen fertiliser 
Nitrogen discharge (Kg/ha) 
Profit ($/ha) 
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use (Brady, 2003; Yiridoe & Weersink, 1998). Therefore the production function has 
been specified here as a quadratic function (Equation 8). A quadratic function tends 
to produce a concave surface similar to the visualised graphical patterns in Figure 5.6. 
The parameters of the functions are estimated using least squares regression. 
Estimated parameters are presented in Table 5.4. All the coefficients are highly 
significant with p values at 0.000.   is dairy farm operating profit and q nitrogen 
discharge per ha. 
 
2
210)( qqq           (8) 
 
Table 5.4 Parameter estimates of production function 
Farming system Moderate Intensive Extensive
Constant  -906.36 (32.37) 835.92 (154.96) -3008.08 (82.35)
β1 140.91 (65.14) 65.55 (237.2) 310.58 (94.15)
Β2 -2.16 (-52.26) -0.54 (160.12) -6.30( 85.28)
Adj R2 0.89 0.98 0.83
t statistics are given in the parenthesis 
 
The profit- pollution frontier can be a useful tool from a policy implementation 
perspective as it establishes the relationship between production and pollution The 
implementation of environmental policies like emission charges is likely to meet with 
political resistance unless a clear relationship is established between the estimated 
nitrogen discharge and some other visible variable. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
surplus phosphorus from manure is charged in conjunction with individual farm 
quotas on livestock numbers. The indirect estimates of phosphorus surplus are based 
on the nutrient accounting system MINAS, introduced by the Dutch government in 
1998.  It taxes every farmer individually, based on nutrient surpluses of each farm 
(Ondersteijn, Beldman, Daatselaar, Giesen, & Huirne, 2002). Citing the Netherlands 
experience on mineral accounting, Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & Shortle (1998) 
show that establishing a direct relationship between observable variables and 
estimated pollution discharge is imperative for the success of policies like emission 
charges. Further empirical simulations by Peterson & Boisvert (2004) suggest that 
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monitoring corn yields could be substituted for potentially costly and intrusive 
monitoring of fertiliser use. Overall, a production function in terms of nitrogen 
emission for different farming systems can provide the information necessary for 
implementing environmental policies.  
 
5.6.2 Trade-off analysis 
The Profit-pollution function is subject to non linear optimisation under various 
policies to evaluate the trade off between farm profit and nitrogen discharges. 
Abatement costs associated with the various farming systems were derived through 
parametrically varying the nitrogen discharge constraint and repeatedly solving the 
optimisation problem. The optimstion model was written using the General Algebraic 
Modelling System (GAMS) (McCarl et al., 2007) and solved using the MINOS solver  
(GAMS/MINOS, 2001), recommended for problems with non linear objective 
function and linear constraints (McCarl & Spreen, 2004). The model was first solved 
without the nitrogen discharge constraint as a baseline. The baseline discharge level 
was then gradually decreased by 2 to 60 percent resulted in 30 discharge levels for 
each farming system. Abatement cost is the shadow price for water quality 
improvement. The abatement costs for different abatement levels are illustrated in 
Figure 5.7. The cost of abatement is much lower in the intensive farming systems. 
The abatement cost function , which shows  the rise in abatement cost by increasing 
the discharge constraint by one unit, has been interpolated on resulting points on the 
abatement cost generated by the non linear optimisation, using the ordinary least 
squares regression (Figure 5.8). The functional form used is 2)( NNi AAC   . Ci is the 
cost of abatement and AN  is the nitrogen discharge. Estimated β coefficients for 
intensive, moderate and extensive farming systems are 0.54, 2.16, and 6.30 
respectively. The abatement costs rise at an increasing rate with higher abatement 
levels. The curves are convex and positively sloping with the level of discharge 
reduction. It is comparatively cheap to abate initial amounts of discharge, but 
additional reductions require expensive forms of abatement. Reducing nitrogen 
discharges on intensive farms seems to be relatively cheaper than on extensive or 
moderate farms. Average cost of abatement for initial 10 kg of nitrogen is illustrated 
in Figure 5.9.  
 102
 
Figure 5.7 Abatement costs from optimisation 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Interpolated abatement costs 
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Figure 5.9 Average cost of abatement  
 
 
Figure 5.10 Economic impact of nitrogen discharge tax 
 
 
Restricting nitrogen discharges may face strong political resistance, since standards 
are likely to be viewed as an infringement of the property rights of the farmers 
involved. Therefore, as an alternative, a tax regime on nitrogen discharges is 
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simulated across the farming systems in the second scenario. In this scenario a unit of 
nitrogen discharge is taxed and deducted from the farm profit in the optimisation 
process.  
 
Table 5.5 Cost of reducing nitrogen discharge in the taxation scenario 
 Base $3 $6 $9 $12
Moderate 
Profit 1391.75 1294.93 1200.20 1107.56 1017.00
Nitrogen discharge 32.62 31.92 31.23 30.54 29.84
Abatement cost($)  96.81 191.54 284.19 374.75
Abatement(kg N)  0.69 1.39 2.08 2.78
Abatement Cost($)-Standard 1.03 4.17 9.35 16.69
Intensive 
Profit 2825.18 2647.26 2477.68 2316.43 2163.51
Nitrogen discharge 60.69 57.92 55.14 52.36 49.58
Abatement cost($)  177.92 347.50 508.75 661.67
Abatement(kg N)  2.78 5.56 8.33 11.11
Abatement Cost($)-Standard  4.17 16.69 37.47 66.66
Extensive 
Profit 819.70 746.11 673.23 601.07 529.62
Nitrogen discharge 24.65 24.41 24.17 23.94 23.70
Abatement cost($) 73.59 146.47 218.63 290.08
Abatement(kg N) 0.24 0.48 0.71 0.95
Abatement Cost($)-Standard 0.36 1.45 3.18 5.69
 
The results shown in Table 5.5 indicate that the impact of farm incomes under 
varying taxes is much higher than under nitrogen restriction standards.  The cost of a 
discharge tax to an intensive farm, for instance, is estimated to be $178, compared 
with just $4 for the same amount of reduction using a nitrogen restriction approach. A 
standard for nitrogen discharges results in more significant pollution reduction at 
much lower costs to farms. These results are consistent with the findings of other 
studies (Giraldez & Fox, 1995; Martinez & Albiac, 2006; Wu, Teague, Mapp, & 
Bernado, 1995). Relatively high tax rates would be required to induce farms to 
substantially reduce nitrogen discharge. The optimal level of tax increases with the 
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marginal pollution costs of nitrogen discharge (Wu & Babcock, 2001). Extensive 
farming systems with higher cost of abatement would therefore require high levels of 
tax, but a higher level of tax is likely to threaten the economic viability of a farming 
operation. Doubts have also been cast over the political feasibility of introducing 
higher taxes (Hefland & House (1995).  However, despite the risk, the social planner 
may wish to apply a tax on nitrogen discharges as it overcomes the political problems 
associated with setting limits on the discharges.  Income losses could be lessened if 
mechanisms are devised to pay back the tax remittance to the farm in some other 
form. The comparative performance of tax and standards depends on relative slopes 
and correlations between marginal damage and abatement costs (Wu & Babcock, 
2001). This study has not considered the damage costs of nitrogen discharges and 
transaction costs involved in policy implementation. This is an area that needs further 
exploration. Figure 5.10 shows that taxes are effective in reducing nitrogen 
discharges only on intensive farming systems. Thus farms with lower abatement costs 
are more sensitive to taxes. 
 
In the third scenario a joint policy instrument is evaluated. A tax is charged on any 
nitrogen discharge surpluses over the nitrogen discharge restrictions and deducted 
from the farm profit in the optimisation process and the level of tax required to bring 
down the nitrogen discharges by 20% from the status quo is determined iteratively. 
The results demonstrate that the joint policy instrument is more cost efficient than the 
solo emission charges even though rate of taxes are higher (Table 5.6). For instance 
in a moderate farm system a 20 percent reduction of nitrogen discharge resulted in an 
approx. 7 percent loss in farm profit, when compared  to 57 percent profit loss under 
scenario 2. 
 
Higher abatement costs of extensive farming systems can be attributed to their 
already low levels of discharge, and efficient policy schemes for the reduction of 
nitrogen discharge should differentiate between farm types rather than using uniform 
measures. The effectiveness of targeted tax policies on farm nutrient discharge 
management is noted in other studies as well (Hopkins, Schnitkey, & Tweeten, 1996; 
Mapp, Bernado, Sabbagh, Geleta, & Watkins, 1994; Zilberman, Khanna, & Lipper, 
1997). Targeting farms with high levels of nitrate emissions within the catchment has 
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a greater potential for cost effective reduction of nitrogen discharges. However there 
is a trade-off between implementation difficulties associated with differentiated 
policies and the cost effectiveness achieved. This trade-off needs to be taken into 
consideration when designing policies.  
 
Table 5.6 Results of joint policy instrument 
 Moderate Intensive Extensive 
Tax $28 $13 $62 $31
Profit ($/ha) 1299.70 2745.67 666.62 780.05
Nitrogen discharge(Kg/ha) 26.09 48.66 19.73 22.19
Abatement (kg) 6.53 12.04 4.92 2.46
Cost of abatement ($) 92.05 79.51 153.07 39.65
Reduction in profit (%) 6.61 2.81 18.67 4.84
Reduction in nitrogen discharge (%) 20.01 19.83 19.96 9.98
 
 
As indicated in the two joint policy scenarios for extensive farms, the social planner 
could design contracts of different types such as higher tax and lower percentage 
reduction of discharge or vice versa. This would have the effect of making farms self 
select a suitable policy, so intensive farms, for instance, would be likely to choose 
low tax and high abatement targets.   
 
The differences in abatement costs between farming systems are significant. This can 
be attributed to variations such as input use intensity, and to geophysical factors such 
as differences in soil type and topography which influence nitrogen discharge. 
Abatement cost differences are likely to act as a spur for  the trading of nitrogen 
discharge permits (Kampas & White, 2003), with low abatement cost farms opting to 
abate more and sell some of their permits, while high abatement cost farms may 
prefer to buy more permits and maintain their emission levels. Abatement costs help 
to readily identify the net buyers and net sellers, thus potentially reducing the 
transaction cost of environmental policy implementation.  
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Where taxing or restricting emissions is estimated on stocking rate and nitrogen 
fertiliser application there is a tendency to reduce use of those inputs but encourage 
the use of substitutes.  For instance reduction of nitrogen fertiliser tends to boost the 
use of feed that is brought in. However, since stocking rate and feed brought in are 
likely to be highly correlated, a policy targeting the stocking rate tends to overcome 
this input substitution problem (nitrogen discharge coefficients of stocking rate are 
much higher than that of nitrogen fertiliser, see Figure 5.3). 
 
Since the cost of abatement varies, a uniform policy has the effect of encouraging less 
efficient farms with higher marginal abatement costs to shut down or shift to 
alternative land uses, while intensive farms are forced to reduce their level of activity.  
Land use conversions in extensive farms could possibly be a good option for reducing 
problem nitrogen discharges from the social planner’s perspective, but evaluating the 
effectiveness of policies on changes at the extensive margin is beyond the scope of 
this study.  Nevertheless it is important to note that designing optimal input policies 
that affect only the intensive margin should not be done in isolation.  Regulating the 
intensive margin has to be complemented by regulation of the extensive margin also 
(Goetz, Schmidt, & Lehmann, 2006).  
 
5.7 Conclusion and implications for future research 
This chapter has developed and applied an analytical framework for evaluating 
different water quality policies, in the presence of spatial production and pollution 
heterogeneity.  The framework integrates the WFM, Metamodelling and 
mathematical programming. The WFM is used to simulate farm responses under 
different nitrogen discharge restrictions to build profit –pollution frontiers, which are 
used in a mathematical programming model.  It is used to analyse the responses of 
different farming systems to alternative policies. The Metamodel for nitrogen 
discharge built and integrated with the WFM allowed the greatest possible flexibility 
in evaluating the effects of different policies, as it was not necessary to coordinate 
exogenously the nitrogen discharges from simulated farms. The model saved 
resources and time.  
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Information about abatement cost heterogeneity between catchment farm systems is 
valuable to implement environmental policies as it helps to identify low cost farms. A 
key factor affecting relative aggregate costs under alternative policy instruments is 
farm heterogeneity. It can be attributed to differences in production systems, soil type 
and topography. Targeted policies for taxing or restricting nitrogen discharges on 
certain production systems may be cost effective.  
 
Compensating farms which do undertake measures to abate nitrogen discharges is 
supported by an increasing number of both farmers and environmentalists. According 
to section 3.9 of the Waikato Regional Plan, Environment Waikato would consider 
providing financial support to projects that contribute significantly to minimising the 
impacts of land use activities on water bodies (Environment Waikato, 2007c). The 
abatement cost information generated by the modelling framework would be useful in 
determining an appropriate level of compensation.  The model is particularly relevant 
for cost sharing initiatives between farms and environmental agencies as it enables an 
agency to base any incentive packages to farms on accurate information about the 
abatement costs associated with a specific farming system (Yiridoe & Weersink, 
1998). 
 
The present study could be extended in a number of ways, but assessing the impact of 
price variations would be the highest priority, particularly in view of the recent 
upsurge in world dairy product prices. In the empirical analysis it is assumed that 
farmers can respond to nitrogen discharge restrictions or taxes only by changing the 
level of activity at intensive margins.  However farmers do have several other options 
and environmental policies may provide incentives for farmers to adopt best 
management practices for reducing nitrogen discharges or land use changes. It may 
be of interest to extend this framework by incorporating best management practices.  
 
The analysis is exploratory rather than a comprehensive assessment of a particular 
policy. The range of tax policies and standards chosen here are indicative of the range 
of instruments that can be evaluated in this way. This study considers general policy 
implications across a range of farming systems, but the results should be considered 
as preliminary. Given the heterogeneity of farms in the catchment a comprehensive 
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policy analysis would require further work.  The model proposed can be further 
refined by accommodating additional farm types. Abatement cost information derived 
from profit pollution frontier in this chapter is useful to design and implement 
effective policies. The usefulness of profit pollution frontier generated in policy 
implementation has been demonstrated in chapter 6.
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6. Challenges of environmental policy implementation  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Managing nonpoint pollution is a complex issue requiring appropriate institutions, 
sufficient information and incentives as it involves numerous agents (farms). To date, 
pastoral nonpoint sources have largely been free from regulation in New Zealand, 
however there is now increasing community pressure for better water quality 
(Brodnax, 2006). Water quality concerns have triggered scientific research and as a 
result, basic data is now available for environmental management and the 
development of best management practices. Best management practices convey the 
property rights in a specific manner (Stephenson, Norris, & Shabman, 1998). Bio-
economic modelling is already playing a role in the design and development of 
environmental policies (Ramilan & Scrimgeour, 2006). However, barriers to 
implementation, high enforcement costs and imperfect compliance due to 
inappropriate institutions and imperfect information are likely to reduce the 
effectiveness of policies. Imperfect information affects compliance monitoring. Lack 
of compliance monitoring and enforcement are said to be causes of deteriorating 
water quality (Cullen, Hughey, & Kerr, 2006).  Therefore it is important to reconsider 
existing institutions. Institutions in the environmental policy context mainly refer to 
the establishment and enforcement of property rights.  
 
In New Zealand local authorities are empowered through the Resource Management 
Act (RMA) to monitor resource consents and complaints about environmental issues. 
Local authorities are generally referred to as the social planner in the literature - see 
Westra, Easter, & Olson (2002). This chapter views environmental policy 
implementation as a complex interaction between the evolution of property rights, 
transaction costs, monitoring and contract design, involving the social planner and 
farms (Figure 6.1).  For instance in the presence of well defined property rights and a 
few numbers of farms it is easier to design and implement policies like contracts, thus 
incurring lower level of monitoring and transaction costs. It draws contributions from 
existing theoretical and empirical literature on economics and environmental law to 
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analyse institutions, design of contracts, monitoring and transaction costs relevant to 
environmental policy implementation in the Karapiro catchment. Accompanying 
empirical analyses show how transaction costs and problems associated with 
imperfect information can be minimised.   
 
Figure 6.1 Interaction of rights, transaction costs and contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2 of this chapter analyses environmental property rights and their present 
status in New Zealand. Section 3 discusses transaction costs. Section 4 analyses the 
implications of information asymmetry, monitoring and contract design. Section 5 
outlines the way in which the conceptual framework is adapted to encompass non 
compliance and monitoring in policy implementation. Section 6 provides an 
empirical analysis, mainly using the results of the simulations performed in the 
previous chapter. Section 7 consists of discussion based on the analysis.  
 
6.2 Property rights and its challenges 
Demetz (1967) defined property rights as the capacity to use or to control the use of 
an asset or resource, while Allen & Lueck (2002) defined them as the ability to freely 
exercise choices over the asset in question. Comprehensively, property rights are 
described as a bundle of entitlements defining an owner’s rights and privileges 
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relating to the use of resources, and the limitations on that use. Property rights include 
the customs, law and regulations governing the right of individuals and farms to have 
access to and use the environment, and the obligations that go with this. 
 
Environmental problems basically arise when property rights are ill defined 
(Tietenberg, 2006). Property rights evolve through common law courts, legislatures, 
voluntary associations and government institutions (Anderson, 2004). Efficient 
solutions to environmental problems can involve private negotiation, judicial 
remedies and regulation by the legislative and executive branches of government. 
According to Stiglitz (2000), internalising the cost of pollution is accompanied by a 
number of problems.  The dispersed nature of nonpoint pollution and the difficulties 
in measuring it increase the transaction costs of internalising externality through 
voluntary negotiations among individuals.  Achieving a solution through the judicial 
system is far from ideal as the individual contribution of one farm to the pollution is 
small compared to the cost of the judicial process, and uncertainties associated with 
quantifying the impact of pollution may lead to unwarranted outcome through a 
litigation process.  Adequately defined property rights are useful in establishing clear 
lines of responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of policies. 
Experiences drawn from elsewhere on the issue of property rights and pollution are 
also worth noting. Cole & Grossman (2002) cited a court ruling in which the 
defendants claimed a “right to pollute” groundwater partly by virtue of the fact that 
they had been doing so for a long time without penalty. The court ruled that 
regardless of when the polluting acts occurred, and regardless of society's changing 
views on the propriety of polluting the environment, the defendants had never had a 
right to pollute the groundwater. The overall benefits of applying this or similar 
rulings in the Waikato context would need to be carefully weighed as dairy farming is 
a major economic activity and is linked to many other industries.  
 
Nonpoint pollution control in the Waikato region at present depends largely on moral 
suasion and on voluntary measures such as the establishment of riparian margins.  A 
lack of property rights and an absence of scientific evidence on the impact of farm 
nitrogen discharges have meant that other available policy measures have not been 
implemented. Farms have enjoyed an historical right to affect water quality and have 
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taken advantage of this privilege, as it is clearly easier for a farm to discharge 
nutrients than to improve water quality by controlling discharge.  This practice has 
not been perceived as infringing the rights of others, and farmers have not seen 
themselves as polluters. Under the present property rights regime farms are not 
required to pay the full social cost of the nitrogen pollution they generate. In the 
absence of explicitly presented environmental and human health costs, farms have no 
incentive to take these costs into consideration in the decision making process. 
Ignorance of the impact of external damage leads farms to select management 
practices that result in greater than the socially optimal levels of nitrogen discharge. 
This violation of exclusiveness is referred to as externality, and it leads to divergence 
between the private cost and the social cost of damage caused by pollution. 
 
There is now a clear public desire for improved water quality and an associated 
questioning of any implicit farm property rights that allow discharge of pollutants.  
So the desire for improved water quality is in direct conflict with any right to 
discharge nitrogen. Conflicting interests on nonpoint discharges into water have led 
to the presentation of contentious evidence from various members of the community 
to the Environment Court1. Evidence presented with regard to the proposed Waikato 
Regional Plan rules for nonpoint discharges and livestock access to water bodies, 
show the size of the problem. Draft rules for the Regional Plan proposed by 
environmental groups were opposed by various land use groups, especially forestry 
owners, as the rules impose significant costs on their current and future operations. 
There is also a debate on the spatial dimension of policy implementation such as 
identifying nutrient sensitive zones for implementing policies2. 
Recognising the need to ensure environmental sustainability, the dairy industry has 
recently taken the initiative of mapping out a strategy for sustainable environmental 
management (Dairy Environment Review Group, 2006). The industry, along with 
                                                 
1 In June 2005, the Environment Court convened to hear appeals on provisions in the Waikato 
Regional Plan dealing with water pollution. .  
2  Identification of sensitive water bodies to have approved farm plans to address nutrient discharges.  
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Environment Waikato and DairyNZ, has been undertaking an education campaign 
about the rules relating to dairy effluent. Under the Dairying and Clean Streams 
Accord some voluntary measures have been taken to exclude livestock from 
waterways by establishing riparian margins and to practice proper effluent disposal 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2003).  In the Waikato many farmers have adopted 
land based effluent management systems despite the high capital cost.  Incentives 
have been limited to savings on consent application fees and reduced fertilizer input 
(Parminter, 1999). 
 
If property rights are well defined, the majority of environmental problems are 
resolved by markets. Ronald Coase claims that if property rights are adequately 
defined and the cost of using the market to reallocate property rights is minimal, the 
allocation of resources will be independent of the initial distribution of rights. This 
statement is known as the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960).  In addition, Coase is 
skeptical about the value of using regulations to tax polluters as this ignores the 
reciprocity of the problem. Demsetz (1967) maintains that clearly defined and 
enforced property rights are required for any form of human co-operation to be 
workable, especially a form involving agreement.  However, it is often difficult to 
define property rights adequately in the context of a nonpoint source.  According to 
Depres, Grolleau, & Mzoughi (2007) government  can play a positive  role by 
reducing the cost of defining, enforcing and trading property rights. Economic and 
legal institutions are important when transaction costs are not zero and property rights 
are not well defined (Allen & Lueck, 1999a). The options available according to 
Coase (1974) are to do nothing, to force farms to change their practices through legal 
means, to buy all the sensitive land in the catchment, or to come to a contractual 
arrangement with farms. Most of these alternatives would be hard to implement. 
Regulating farms through enforcement of existing laws is difficult due to the problem 
of proving liability, and dairy farms in the catchment are very productive so any 
purchase price is likely to be prohibitive.  However, in the case of Lake Taupo, there 
is a proposal that land be bought from willing land owners in the catchment and 
either retired, or on-sold with a nitrogen covenant attached (so it could be used in a 
less nitrogen-leaching way) (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2005b). 
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Rules are being proposed to control nitrogen discharges in terms of stocking 
standards and best management practices and the Regional Council is exploring the 
feasibility of controlling the nutrient problem through tradable emission permits 
(Environment Waikato, 2005b).  This approach privatises the right to access the 
resource to a pre-specified level, imposing limits on nitrogen discharge to achieve 
water quality targets. Establishing a market for nitrogen emissions requires the 
establishment and allocation of rights to discharge. All current privileges would need 
to be surrendered, and the rights to nitrogen emissions would then be allocated.  Ill-
defined property rights, together with transaction costs are reported to be the major 
barriers to the smooth functioning of  a tradable permit market in nonpoint sources 
(Collentine, 2006). 
 
In redefining property rights, it is important to know the level of improvement that is 
needed and the changes that are necessary.  Physically measuring and monitoring 
diffuse discharges is impractical and expensive, so deriving technically perfect 
property rules based on real measurement is not a realistic option.   The relationship 
between changes of farming practice in terms of nitrogen reduction, and economic 
effects is complex and likely to be nonlinear. Moreover, results are observable only 
over a long time span. Even farmers lack the necessary knowledge to determine the 
changes that must be achieved and the implications of these changes. However 
estimating nitrogen discharges and its trade-off with farm income are a basic 
requirement to design and implement any environmental policy. Therefore nitrogen 
discharges and associated costs involved in restricting them need to be estimated as 
an interdependent surrogates for property rule formulation. This necessitates the use 
of simulation models, which can express nitrogen discharges as a function of 
production, profit, input use, management practices and location specific 
environmental attributes.  The estimates from simulation models show clearly the 
impact of various environmental policies.  They do need, however, to be precise and 
reliable if they are to stand up to legal challenge and gain political legitimacy, as legal 
action would adversely affect the use of these models for emission based policy 
enforcement purposes.  The legal validity of using simulated discharges has been 
questioned, with arguments centring around the accuracy of the estimates due to 
stochastic influences outside the farmer’s control (Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & 
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Shortle, 1998).  Nitrogen discharges, for instance, can increase with precipitation 
intensity. Since the model results are generally not acceptable as evidence, they can 
be challenged through the legal system, leading to costly litigation. Model-based 
nitrogen discharges must be scientifically robust if they are to be included in contracts 
where signatories agree to waive their right to challenge model results through the 
court system (Romstad, 2002).  To help ensure legal validation, it is important to 
carry out monitoring and measurement of stream water quality and to verify that the 
model estimates closely match the results taken from the real world.  Grouping rights 
into subsets can improve the efficiency of transactions, as it gives agents the ability to 
contract on necessary rights only (Depres, Grolleau, & Mzoughi, 2007).  
 
6.2.1 Legislative structure for the environment  
Environmental legislation in New Zealand centres on the Resource Management Act 
of 1991 (RMA) which promotes voluntary and regulatory approaches to control non-
point source pollution. Most of the policies and rules that influence diffuse source 
pollution are managed by regional or local governing bodies.  The Act confers 
primary powers on local authorities and the Environment Court3, a specialist 
institution within the New Zealand court system. In general, policies are decided 
locally and are interpreted by the Court. 
 
Section 32 of the RMA states that local authorities must consider alternatives; assess 
the benefits and costs of objectives, policies, rules and other methods for 
environmental improvement. The other methods mean the provision of information, 
services or incentives, levying charges including rates. However the act by itself has 
reportedly not empowered the councils to implement environmental policies (Denne, 
2006).  The RMA does not provide clear tools for managing the environment.  Even 
though section 24 gives the Minister for the Environment a role in investigating the 
use of economic instruments including charges levies, and other fiscal measures and 
incentives in order to achieve the purposes of the Resource Management Act, this is 
not accompanied by specific powers that would enable the Ministry to use such 
                                                 
3 Further details about Environment court is available at 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/environment/home.asp. 
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economic instruments. The amended version of Section 32 removes the explicit 
reference to charges and incentives, and states only that local government should 
consider whether any specific objective is the most appropriate way of achieving the 
purposes of the Act. Sections 9 and 15 of the RMA give regional councils statutory 
responsibility for preventing, remedying and mitigating adverse effects on water 
quality in their regions.  Requirements for water quality enhancement could be more 
specific in the RMA. For instance in Oregon, legislation enables the development and 
application of best management practices to protect water quality (Boyd, 2000). 
 
6.2.2 Role of the environmental agency as social planner  
Given current challenges there has been increasing reliance on public remedies to 
redefine property rights, and it can be argued that government intervention is required 
to regulate nutrient discharge into water.  This could be either in the form of 
redesigning the current property rights structure to allow for a private market 
solution, or in implementing policy instruments that will convey the desired property 
rights structure. Solutions to the pollution problem through public initiative are 
broadly categorised into direct regulation and market based solutions. 
  
Provided the adequate legal authority, the environmental agency can play a 
significant role in defining and assigning property rights to facilitate bargaining 
solutions. In the absence of well defined property rights, the regulator can play a vital 
role in assigning initial entitlements (Richards, 2000) and set environmental quality 
targets, choose instruments to accomplish goals, monitor compliance, and initiate 
actions to enforce rules. These actions are likely to reduce the transaction costs. 
Gangadharan (2000) suggests that regulator designed programmes could facilitate the 
evolution of markets that encourage participation.  
 
Ruhl et al (2003) offers a model institutional structure for a catchment management 
act. They argue legislation must empower the local agency with the authority and 
responsibility for managing surface and ground water quality and quantity issues, and 
the relevant agency must be capable of establishing a democratically based legitimacy 
at regional and local levels. The institutional structure must have the capacity to carry 
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out scientific, economic and social analysis, as well as having responsibility for 
making policy and regulatory decisions through public, transparent procedures based 
on best available evidence.  The authors also stress the need for local authorities to 
play a stronger partnership role, with a shift from acting as regulator/ advisor to being 
facilitator/partner. 
  
6.3 Transaction costs 
Costs involved in defining property rights and implementing policies are referred to 
as transaction costs. Coase (1937) first described the concept of transaction costs in 
his article on the nature of the firm. Williamson (1985) defined transaction costs as 
the cost of organizing and transacting exchanges - including search and information 
costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs.  It has also been 
defined as the cost of information gathering, contracting and enforcing property rights 
(Allen, 1991; Allen & Lueck, 1999a; Bromley, 1989). McCann, Colby, Easter, 
Kasterine, & Kuperan (2005) defined it as the resources used to define, establish, 
maintain, and transfer property rights. 
 
The size of transaction costs involved in eliminating externalities is affected by the 
number and range of agents, by technology, policy under consideration, level of 
uncertainty, asset specificity, institutional environment and the cost of abatement or 
amount of abatement  (McCann & Easter, 2000). In addition the diffuse nature of 
nitrogen discharges and the difficulties associated with measuring them, the intensity 
or level of monitoring, and the choice of policy instruments tend to influence the  
transaction costs. Carefully designed contracts can minimise the transaction costs 
(Depres, Grolleau, & Mzoughi, 2007). Defining property rights based on surrogate 
measures minimise transaction costs (Griffin, 1991). 
 
In the presence of transaction costs, the assignment of property rights plays a crucial 
role in identifying efficient solutions.  Incorporating transaction costs in policy 
analysis leads to the design of policies and institutional arrangements with lower 
transaction costs (McCann & Easter (1999). The authors also state that including 
transaction costs in environmental policy analysis would lead to lower levels of 
 119
optimal abatement because the total cost of achieving a given level of abatement is 
much higher.  
 
Figure 6.2 Increasing, constant and decreasing transaction costs 
 
Source: Adapted from McCann & Easter (1999) 
 
The relationship between the transaction costs of various policies and the level of 
abatement is illustrated in Figure 6.2.  MC stands for marginal cost of abatement. TC 
is transaction cost. In the absence of a marginal damage function, the optimal policy 
will differ depending on the politically determined target level of abatement. If the 
target is set at A, the optimal policy is 1. This could, for instance, represent a situation 
where persuasive argument or a perceived threat of further restriction could achieve a 
small amount of abatement. However the cost of achieving further abatement is 
significantly higher or ineffective by adopting these measures. If the target level is B 
then a mixture of policies 1 and 2 is optimal. Policy 2 could be taxes or standards. 
The choice of optimal strategy at level C depends on the total cost of abatement, since 
each policy incurs high initial transaction costs. Policy 3 could be tradable emission 
permits, where the initial transaction costs are higher. If the marginal abatement costs 
are constant for these policies, the policy with the lowest marginal cost will always be 
optimal regardless of the level of abatement.  
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6.3.1 Components of transaction cost 
Transaction costs generally include information, contracting and enforcement costs. 
Information costs are the cost of targeting farms, and finding the links between the 
discharges and farming practices. Contracting costs are the administrative and 
staffing costs involved in designing and finalising contracts with targeted farms. 
Enforcement costs are the costs of monitoring to audit the adoption of nitrogen 
discharge measures, estimating discharge levels and administering incentives.  
 
McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, & Kuperan (2005)  and (McCann & Easter, 1999) 
describe transaction costs involved with an environmental policy as the sum of a 
range of costs involved in research information gathering and analysis associated with 
defining the problem:   
- enactment of enabling legislation, including lobbying and the cost of 
public participation, or alternatively, the cost of changing the law 
through the courts or modifying existing regulations  
- design and implementation of policy, which may include costs of 
regulatory delay;  
- support and administration of the ongoing programme;  
- contracting costs, which may include additional information costs, 
bargaining costs, and decision costs, which involve when markets are 
established  for pollution;  
- monitoring and detection, which may include both the monitoring of 
the environmental outcomes or level of compliance with the 
regulation, tax subsidy scheme, or private contract, as well as the 
development of monitoring  technologies;  
-  prosecution/ inducement/ conflict resolution costs incurred in cases of 
non-compliance.  
 
In the case of nonpoint pollution, transaction costs are mainly incurred by the social 
planner. Farms too, have to spend time in adopting some policy options such as 
preparation of nutrient budgets, operating effluent irrigators and talking to 
environmental authorities. There have been few empirical studies of who bears the 
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different shares of transaction costs. Table 6.1 presents one set of possibilities, 
adapted from the work of McCann et al. 
 
Table 6.1 Composition of transaction costs 
Type of transaction cost Incurred by 
 Legislature/ Courts Agencies Farms 
Research and information + ++ + 
Enactment or litigation ++ + ++ 
Design and implementation  ++ + 
Support and administration  ++ + 
Contracting  + ++ 
Monitoring and  Detection  ++ + 
Prosecution and  enforcement + ++ + 
 
In selecting policy, abatement costs and transaction costs need to be considered 
together. McCann et al (2005) and Kampas & White (2004) state that a policy should 
not be rejected on the grounds of high transaction costs alone, since there may be a 
tradeoff between transaction costs and other types of costs. Some policies with high 
transaction costs are likely to have low abatement costs. The components of a policy 
can vary depending on the policy itself, and existing institutions. Implementation of 
tradable emission permits, for instance, requires changes in the institutional 
environment and legal system to define and establish pollution rights. A government 
or environmental agency has to be involved in the allocation of property rights (in 
this case discharge allowances among various land use groups). Further on, the 
environmental agency has to record, monitor and enforce the trading of permits.  
Detailed analysis of transaction costs associated with the various environmental 
policy instruments is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
6.3.2 Measurement of transaction cost 
Choice of least cost policy requires ex ante evaluation of transaction costs. One 
option to quantify transaction costs is to find similar programmes that have been 
implemented elsewhere and examine the costs of these programmes. However this 
approach has the following problems (McCann & Easter, 1999); the programmes may 
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not be representative of institutions involved in the local case; similar programmes 
may have not been implemented before and there is likely to be a piece meal 
approach when values are pulled from different programmes. As an alternative they 
suggested ex ante evaluation of transaction costs. This involves in-depth interviews 
with selected key individuals of environmental agency using measurement techniques 
developed for nonmarket valuation. For instance the Contingent Valuation Method 
(CVM)4 was used to derive informed opinions for a Minnesota River pollution 
problem in the USA. This strategy has also been adopted by Fang, Easter, & 
Brezonik (2005). McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, & Kuperan (2005) suggested the 
use of Choice Modelling to separate out the various  components of transaction costs 
at measurement. They also suggested that collecting and reporting transaction cost 
data should become a routine part of environmental agency activities.  
  
6.4 Information asymmetry 
In economics, information asymmetry occurs in transactions where one party has 
more or better information than the other. Most commonly, information asymmetries 
are studied in the context of principal-agent frame work in pollution problems  
(Moxey, White, & Ozanne, 1999; Ozanne & White, 2007). 
 
Once property rights are defined, successful implementation of policies depends on 
information acquisition. Catchment based approaches for water quality improvement 
requires much more information about nitrogen discharges. Farm nitrogen discharge 
is a complex problem involving multiple polluters, spatial factors, complex fate and 
transport processes, time lag and stochastic environmental factors, which affects 
assigning pollution to particular entity difficult. As a result farms tend to have more 
information than a social planner, who implements policies. In discussing optimal 
environmental policy, the traditional approach has been to assume simply that 
polluters comply with policy. However, compliance by farms cannot be guaranteed in 
any situation where information asymmetry is present.   
 
                                                 
4 CVM is a non market valuation strategy 
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Information asymmetry between farms and the social planner in environmental 
contracts is classified into two types: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection occurs ex ante to a farm’s decision to enter an environmental scheme, where 
the social planner is unable to accurately quantify the nitrogen discharges and 
farming profit losses incurred by participating farms. Moral hazard arises ex post to a 
farm’s decision to enter an environmental scheme, where the social planner cannot 
verify perfectly and without cost that all farms are fully compliant with their 
obligations. This provides farms with an incentive to renege on their obligation, if 
they can avoid detection by the social planner. In the presence of information 
asymmetry, therefore, it may not be possible to achieve the optimal level of 
abatement.  
 
Differences in farm abatement cost contribute to information asymmetry (Hart & 
Latacz-Lohmann, 2005). Farms with high compliance costs are likely to violate the 
policy requirements as their pay off to cheating (abatement cost saved) is larger than 
that of other farmers. Farms may mislead the social planner by reporting lower than 
actual levels of discharge. This provides them with an incentive to ignore policy 
regulations or avoid penalties. This situation becomes possible when monitoring is 
imperfect, costly and where there are difficulties in observing some activities related 
to discharge. Therefore carefully designed contracts and effective monitoring are 
imperative in alleviating any information asymmetry.  
 
6.4.1 Contract design  
Contracts between the social planner and farmers can be used to incorporate changes 
and extensions to property rights and act as a vehicle for implementing environmental 
policies. In designing environmental contracts, the wealth of experience drawn from 
agricultural production contracts could be used to design environmental contracts. 
Principle agent models played an important role in designing agricultural production 
contracts to address information asymmetry (Allen & Lueck, 2002). For instance, in 
an environmental context they have been used to address the problem of adverse 
selection (Moxey, White, & Ozanne, 1999).  
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Effective policy implementation is facilitated by having as many dispute free 
contracts as possible. The Vittel case (Depres, Grolleau, & Mzoughi, 2007) showed 
the value of using a competent research team to define what actions are to be 
permitted or forbidden in order to achieve the desired standard of water quality. The 
research team can also play a mediating role in ensuring a mutual understanding of 
the varying interests of the social planner and the farmer. Šauer, Dvořák, Lisa, & 
Fiala (2003) suggest that a special institution could be created  to negotiate and act as 
a mediator in negotiations over surface water pollution.  In the Waikato, DairyNZ 
could play this research team role since it is seen by farmers in a positive light as 
helping them to keep the environment clean (Tagg, 2007). In contrast,  Environment 
Waikato, the social planner for the region, has sometimes been perceived as 
bureaucratic, imposing rules and limits on dairy farming (Stringleman, 2007). Having 
a good research team as a mediator can help to resolve disagreements over technical 
and environmental questions and therefore facilitate the implementation of policies. 
 
Information asymmetry is intensified when policies are based on surrogate measures 
such as estimated nitrogen discharges. Social planners do not possess perfect 
information regarding the practices of the farms with whom they enter into a contract.  
There are two forms of information advantage that farms may enjoy over the social 
planner. When signing a contract to reduce nitrogen discharge, the farm always has 
an incentive to declare an inflated discharge level, enabling it to minimize the 
subsequent actions it needs to take.  In addition to this, after signing a contract there 
is an incentive for farmers to renege on contracts if they can do so and avoid 
detection by the regulator. In order to minimize this sort of cheating, contracts should 
include clauses enabling free access to farm accounts and visual inspection of farms.  
Contracts may specify input levels and best management practices to control nitrogen 
discharge levels, or they can place a quota on the amount of nitrogen discharge on a 
farm. Violating the contract could be subject to penalties. The challenge is to devise 
contracts that function effectively in the presence of information asymmetry. The 
empirical analysis section of this chapter shows potential solutions to this problem. 
 
Restriction of nitrogen discharges is a particularly sensitive issue, as nitrogen is one 
of the most important factors determining agricultural farm production.  The 
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proposed environmental policies have the potential to curtail pre existing property 
rights of farms, and may even threaten their viability (Hardaker, Humie, Anderson, & 
Lien, 2004). Contracts that include compensation in exchange for restriction on 
nitrogen discharges are useful in overcoming information asymmetry. For instance 
Moxey, White, & Ozanne (1999) developed an optimal truth-revealing mechanism 
for environmental policies by using transfer payments coupled with input quotas. 
Therefore, if appropriate, contracts need to include provisions to compensate farmers 
for the profit they forgo by adhering to the contract.  Information asymmetries can be 
minimised by assigning a higher discharge quota to a farm on productive land, in 
conjunction with reduced compensation to reflect the lower profits forgone. This has 
the effect of removing the incentive for the farm to select as inappropriate contract.  
How to source the funds to pay compensation is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
However according to section 3.9 of the Waikato Regional Plan, Environment 
Waikato would consider financial support of projects which minimize the impacts of 
land use activities on water bodies (Environment Waikato, 2007c). But using public 
funds to reduce discharges has been criticised on the grounds that it is a victim-pays 
regime (Environmental Defence Society, 2007). This society stresses that the social 
planner should take the view that land owners were not authorized to pollute the 
water and did not have a presumptive right. Burrows (1979) stated that “polluter 
subsidy perversely moves industry output (pollution) away from the Pareto optimum 
even though individual firms respond by cutting their output (below ) the pareto 
optimum level”. Palmquist (1990) also stated that subsidies could result in a 
substantial pollution in the long run as a result of increasing number of operators. As 
an alternative Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo (2006) suggest non monetary 
penalties such as publicising anti-social behaviour or even imprisonment. 
 
 The ratchet effect should also be taken into consideration when designing contracts.  
It occurs when the principal (social planner) and agent (farm) engage in a series of 
contracts over time and it shows as an increase in nitrogen discharge standards in the 
light of past performance (Allen & Lueck, 1999b). If the principal does not commit to 
constant contractual terms, it will use information collected on past performance to 
set new standards of agent behaviour in order to improve water quality.  This problem 
may be solved by signing long term contracts. However when there is an ex ante 
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uncertainty around the environmental impact of a policy and the damage function is 
not fully understood, property rights established on surrogate measures may need to 
be updated or revised. The time frame for contracts, therefore, has to be carefully 
designed considering the lifespan of machinery or technology adopted currently.  
 
The efficient working of environmental contracts is affected where there is a large 
number of heterogeneous participants (Depres, Grolleau, & Mzoughi, 2007). 
Targeting farms with lower abatement costs tends to reduce the moral hazard problem 
as they have a smaller payoff for violating a contract.  This is likely to reduce 
monitoring efforts required.  Farms with lower abatement costs can also be assisted to 
install best management practices with a greater degree of detail.  Targeting these 
farms will incur higher selection costs but may improve subsequent policy 
performance (Moxey, White, & Ozanne(1999). 
  
6.4.2 Monitoring 
Compliance monitoring is important for agri- environmental policy as policy 
effectiveness depends largely on the ability of the social planner to monitor and 
enforce any contract (Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & Shortle, 1998). The diffuse 
nature of nitrogen discharges from agricultural sources poses serious challenges for 
monitoring and enforcement.  Since farms have more information than the social 
planner about their emissions, effective methods need to be devised to ensure that 
monitoring is efficient. Moral hazard tends to rise when the cost of monitoring 
depends largely on monitoring effort (larger variable cost component to fixed costs) 
(Ozanne, Hogan, & Colman, 2001). The problem of moral hazard can be minimised 
by increasing the level of monitoring, and thus the probability of detection. 
 
Monitoring and adoption of best management practices at the extensive margin are 
relatively easy to achieve, when compared to monitoring changes at the intensive 
margin. For instance, monitoring adoption of riparian margins is straight-forward and 
because it does not require repeated effort, it costs less.  Monitoring nitrogen 
discharges as a result of changes in the intensive margin, however, is difficult and 
costly. Nitrogen discharge can be reduced to a certain extent by adopting best 
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management practices, but the rest of the reduction has to come from management of 
nitrogen fertilizer, stocking rate and supplementary feeding.  
 
Animal density (stocking rate) is increasingly being used as a monitoring indicator 
and standard for nutrient management policies (Ribaudo et al., 2003) as it provides a 
straightforward, relatively easy-to-calculate indicator of a farm’s nitrogen discharge 
potential. However, application of this approach in dairy farming systems is fraught 
with its assumption on feeding practices and fertiliser application and geophysical 
farm variations. It may be possible to increase non compliance, keeping the stocking 
rate constant. A study based on Waikato dairy farm trials shows the impact of varying 
the level of nitrogen fertiliser application while keeping the stocking rate constant 
(Table 6.2). It indicates that there is an incentive to increase the level of nitrogen 
fertiliser. Woodford (2006) also notes that constraints on nitrogen fertiliser 
application, particularly on dairy farms, are likely to be environmental rather than 
economic.  In addition, the impact of animals on nitrogen discharge depends on the 
type of animal and such characteristics as body weight and geo spatial factors such as 
soil type, topography and hydrological flows.   
 
Table 6.2 Nitrogen fertiliser and stocking rate 
Variables Trial 1 Trial 2 
Stocking rate ((Cows/ha) 3.34 3.34 
Nitrogen fertilizer application (Kg/ha) 0 200 
Profit ($/ha) 1957 2244 
Nitrogen discharged (Kg/ha) 30 65 
Source: Ledgard & Thorrold (2003) 
 
However biophysical simulation models developed are capable of capturing the 
above factors, when estimating nitrogen discharges. The use of a calibrated and 
validated catchment specific simulation model enhances the transparency of 
estimation. Given political acceptability and legal validity, these estimates can play a 
role in defining a relevant subset of rights that need to be considered in implementing 
specific policies.   
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In the Netherlands, nutrient discharges from farming are calculated using a nutrient 
(or mineral) accounting system introduced by the government in 1998 (Ondersteijn, 
Beldman, Daatselaar, Giesen, & Huirne, 2002).  This system requires farmers to self 
report estimated pollution as well as production, and additional information is 
acquired from off-farm sources.  Feed and fertilizer suppliers, for instance, are 
required to supply farm-specific sales details to the social planner. A New Zealand 
example of such a model used for nitrogen discharge is the Overseer nutrient budget 
model (Ledgard & Power, 2006). Nitrogen discharge estimates from the Overseer 
model have been validated using direct measurements across New Zealand 
(Appendix 4.1). 
 
Since it is difficult to monitor inputs with pollution potential such as fertiliser and 
supplementary feeds, it may be useful therefore to devise methods which enable 
output-based monitoring and shifting the focus from monitoring input to output is 
likely reduce the monitoring burden. Weersink, Livernois, Shogren, & Shortle (1998) 
showed that establishing a direct relationship between an observable variable and 
estimated pollution discharge is essential  for the success of policies like those 
covering emission charges.  In this respect the profit pollution frontier produced in 
chapter 5 has immense value. Peterson & Boisvert (2004)  show that monitoring corn 
yields could be substituted for the potentially costly and intrusive monitoring of 
fertiliser use. Bontems, Rotillon, & Turpin (2005) also use the relationship between 
the pollution and production of a particular farm type to design incentive-based 
environmental policy. However, output-based monitoring needs to be carefully 
planned and be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the impact of weather and 
productivity growth. 
 
The periodic use of complex models on a farm may be demanding, particularly in 
terms of data collection and specification. So Geographic Information System (GIS) 
can be used to provide the information needed to design environmental policy (Cook 
& Norman, 1996; Horst, 2005), including farm size, stocking rate, pattern of 
production and pollution-related geophysical attributes.  These spatial tools can then 
be used to define the most relevant geographical target areas for policy intervention. 
Once farm information such as dairy cows, fertiliser application, adoption of best 
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management practices and milksolids production is established in GIS,  the internet 
can be used by the social planner to access farm related information.  Since most 
farmers have internet access this approach enhances transparency and reduces the 
transaction cost of overall policy procedures. Gleeson & Carruthers (2006) also 
showed that web-based software tools hold substantial and largely untapped potential 
for developing cost effective farm-based environmental management.  
 
Since the measurement of water quality is costly in spatial and temporal terms, 
researchers can employ remote sensing techniques to retrieve required information. 
Boyd (2000) describes monitoring strategies that include proposals for remote-
sensing via satellite to check compliance with such land management and 
construction requirements as buffers and cover crops. Remote sensing techniques are 
currently used for lake water quality information retrieval (Sudheer, Chaubey, & 
Garg 2006), showing that precision of monitoring will increase with the development 
of technology. Choe & Frase (1999) also revealed that mean monitoring cost can be 
reduced by effective use of appropriate technology (Choe & Fraser, 1999).  
 
6.5 Model setup  
This section develops a conceptual model for monitoring a farm which is subject to 
an agri-environmental policy that requires an income-reducing action on the part of 
the farm. It proposes a penalty and incentive scheme to alleviate information 
asymmetry and to reduce transaction costs. There is a social planner (regulator) and n 
agents (farms) in the catchment. The model is based on a number of assumptions. 
Farms in the catchment are heterogeneous5 in terms of abatement costs. 
Heterogeneity of farms is denoted by i, i . The social planner knows of the 
existence of different types of farms, their compliance costs and the proportion of 
each type in the catchment. However, the social planner cannot exactly tell which 
type each farm is.  
 
                                                 
5 Causes of heterogeneity are soil type, land slope, distance from the main stem of the river, input use 
etc. 
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The production and pollution relationship is denoted as a function of nitrogen 
discharge as follows: 
 
)( ni
i xfy          (1) 
   
yi -yield per ha for a farm, xn nitrogen discharge per ha. This function is assumed to 
be a twice differentiable and concave in terms of nitrogen discharge. Nitrogen 
discharge indirectly represents the input use and management choice of farm. 
 
In the absence of contractual arrangements between farms and the social planner, 
farms always tend to discharge nitrogen that maximises profit i*0 . gi is farm profit:  
 
)( *0 inii xg         (2)   
 
The optimal discharge level inx
*  is determined solving the first order condition.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, when farms are contracted under a joint 
environmental policy instrument they tend to maximise the profit as follows:  
 
)()( Rnni
R
i xxxg         (3)  
Rxx   
 
The abatement cost, C, is defined as the difference between the unrestricted 
maximum level of profit i*0  and the restricted level of profit iR* . Therefore expected 
farm profit can be modelled as  
 
R
i
iC   *0        (4) 
       
The abatement cost function can be defined as follows: farm i can produce an 
abatement AN with a cost of abatement Ci  
 
2)( NNi AAC  .       (5) 
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The social planner objective function ( s ) is to maximise the welfare by minimising 
cost of abatement and monitoring to achieve the exogenous environmental target of 
reducing nitrogen discharges to a certain level (z).  i  is the percentage of farm land  
belonging  to each farm type. ri is the  level of total nitrogen discharge reduction from 
each farm type.  
 
))(( emMax Ri
s         (6) 
ii rz   
 
m (e) -monitoring cost of the social planner. Monitoring costs depend on the level of 
monitoring effort employed (e). The level of effort may be represented, for instance, 
by labour hours or the frequency of visits and effort put into scrutinizing farm 
activities.  
The specification for monitoring cost is based on Falconer & Whiteby (Falconer & 
Whiteby, 1999), who suggest that the monitoring process comprises both fixed and  
variable cost components. 
 
2
321)( ememmeM           (7) 
m1 is the fixed cost include contracting and updating costs. 2m , 3m  are variable cost 
parameters depending on the level of effort.  
 
In the absence of perfect observation of nitrogen discharges, the monitoring strategy 
of the social planner and reporting strategy of the farm become strategic decisions. 
Level of monitoring a farm can be denoted as α depends on the level of 
effort )(ef . Level monitoring is measured in terms of time spent to monitor a 
farm. The probability of detection depends on the level of monitoring. The following 
equation captures the relationship between the level of monitoring and probability of 
detection. 
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)(fP                (8) 
P is the probability of detection, α is the level of monitoring. In the following model 
setup probability of detection is, for the sake of simplicity, treated as equal to the 
level of monitoring. i.e P . 
 
A farm may choose to report q rather than the true emission level xn  but a farm never 
reports a higher level of emission than its true level (q xn).  If a farm is caught 
reporting discharge levels below the true level, then a penalty is imposed on the farm, 
in addition to the evaded tax.  This penalty takes a form of function )( qxn  . It can 
be an increasing function of violation (vi). qxv ni  . Violations are penalised 
according to a quadratic penalty function6: 
 
2/)( 2iii vvvf           (9) 
where ø and ó are >0. In empirical application, the constant marginal penalty 
schedule is implemented where ó is set to 0. 
 
0,0)(,0)(,0)0( '''  xvv   
 
Under the strategic behaviour a farm’s expected income sI  is  
)()()()(),,( qxqxxqxgqxEI nn
R
nin
R
is    (10) 
 
sI can be equal or less than the unregulated profit 
i*
0   
 
If the optimum amount a farm should discharge and report to maximise income 
depends on level of monitoring, then penalty and rate of tax can be denoted by 
following first order conditions given interior solutions. 
 
0)()( '' 
 qxxg
X
E
nni
n
R
i       (11) 
                                                 
6 The functional form for the penalty function is adopted from Stranlund (2007) 
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0)(' 
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i        (12) 
 
Profit if not caught  
)()(),,( Rnin
R
is xqxgqxI        (13) 
 
Profit if caught 
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Profit  for truthful behaviour is tI  
)()( Rnni
R
it xxxgI          (15) 
  
The degree of violation depends on two factors, the first being the relative merits of It 
and Is. When the difference is larger, then the likelihood of strategic behaviour is 
higher. Second is the abatement cost: when C is larger, then payoff for strategic 
behaviour is higher. If the abatement costs of farming systems are known to the social 
planner, targeting farms with the lower C, will reduce the level of strategic behaviour. 
Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo (2006) also show that when there is a wide range of 
farm types and responses, it is sensible to focus on farms that place a lower value on 
reducing pollution. While targeting and taxing farms specifically can be politically 
unpalatable, it may be possible if the tax is replaced with transfer payments and 
coupled with penalties. In this case there is a trade off  between the cost of monitoring 
and the cost of incentive payments (Choe & Fraser, 1999).  Providing increased 
incentives and appropriate targeting of farms tends to reduce the cost of monitoring.  
Targeting farms also has the effect of concentrating monitoring effort, so that there is 
a smaller difference between true income and the income that would be expected 
from behaving strategically.  
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6.5.1 Selective/Target monitoring  
Targeting involves separating farms into larger non-target and smaller targeted 
groups, and increasing the probability of detection of those in the target group.  
This should have the effect of reducing the abatement and monitoring costs. Spatial 
targeting lowers the cost of administering contracts when implementing 
environmental policy (Wu & Babcock, 2001).  Monitoring resources are used more 
efficiently and the moral hazard problem is reduced (Fraser, 2004) because with 
fewer farms being  monitored, the level of monitoring on those farms is increased. 
Targeting the farms reportedly increases information efficiency while lessening the 
data collection effort (Farzin & Kaplan, 2004). Spatial targeting farms reduced 
transactions costs by 75% in reducing  runoff from dairy farms in the US (Carpentier, 
Bosch, & Batie, 1998).  
 
Fraser (2004) used a monitoring/penalty system to target farms.  He classified 
targeting into three types:  “Resource neutral”, “Non resource neutral” and “Resource 
neutrality”. In selective monitoring a sub group of farms with lower abatement costs 
is targeted implying higher probability of detection than farms outside the sub group.  
 
Resource neutral  
Monitoring resources are not changed with the introduction of targeting, so the 
probability of being detected increases for one group but decreases for the other 
groups.  The higher level of detection (αh ) is achieved for the target group by shifting 
monitoring resources away from those in the non target group, where the level of 
being detected is low (αl ) . Under this scheme the expected farm income is:   
 
Targeted group  
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Non-targeted group 
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hl    
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Even though this option is likely to minimise strategic behaviour in the targeted 
group, it is also likely to encourage the non target group to violate the policy more as 
the advantages of violating reflected in the level of relative differences of income that 
result from strategic behaviour and truthful behaviour. 
 
Non-resource neutral  
In the “non resource neutral” option the chance of one farm group being detected 
increases without affecting the detection level of the other groups because additional 
resources are provided to monitor the target group.  The detection level in the non 
target group (αl=α) is unchanged.   Under this scheme the expected farm income is: .  
 
Targeted group 
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In this scheme strategic behaviour will be reduced, but farms in the non target group 
still have an incentive to violate.  In addition, the social planner has to dedicate more 
resources to monitoring, increasing the m (e).  In selecting an appropriate targeting 
level there is a trade off between minimising strategic behaviour, and the cost of 
monitoring.   
 
Resource neutrality  
The third option, “resource neutrality”,    adjusts the level of monitoring, the tax rate, 
and the size of the penalty. Farm groups are differentiated in terms of level of 
monitoring and penalty parameters. The objective here is to minimise strategic 
behaviour without increasing the level of monitoring. Non target group farmers are 
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subject to a higher level of penalty ө. Increased monitoring levels for the target group 
are resourced by decreasing the level of monitoring in the non target group. The 
expected income resulting from strategic behaviour is minimised in the target group 
by increasing the chance of being detected. In the non target group, it has been 
achieved by increasing the penalty. Under this scheme expected income of farms is:  
 
Targeted group  
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Non-targeted group 
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These schemes could be used in the environmentally sensitive sub regions of the 
catchment.  However, monitoring schemes themselves can never completely 
eliminate strategic behaviour, and information asymmetry may still remain. 
Logically, by increasing the penalty to colossal levels, strategic behaviour could be 
reduced with less monitoring effort, but this approach does not reflect judicial reality, 
which will not permit high higher levels of penalty (Ozanne, Hogan, & Colman, 
2001).  
 
6.6 Empirical application and discussion  
Data for the empirical application of equations described in the model setup in section 
6.5, particularly farm types and their responses to parametric nitrogen discharge 
reductions, are taken from the results of the work reported in the chapter 5.  
 
Monitoring 
In establishing a relationship between production variables and nitrogen discharge the 
Whole Farm Model simulation results for a moderate farming system from the 
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previous chapter is subject multivariate exploratory data analysis, using scatter plot 
matrices (Figure 6.3). Scatter plot matrices are generated using the Lattice package 
(Sarkar, 2008) in an R programming environment (R Development Core Team, 
2007). 
.  
Figure 6.3 shows a clear relationship between the key variables: milksolids 
production and nitrogen discharges; pasture production and nitrogen fertiliser applied;   
stocking rate and milksolids production. These relationships are useful for monitoring 
purposes as they provide a priori notions about the relationship between nitrogen 
discharges and other observable variables. 
 
A farm is required to declare only the level of production, estimated level of 
emission, input use and farm size. The social planner can confine monitoring effort to 
those farms which report conflicting patterns. An unusually low level of reported 
emissions, for instance, would be a good reason for putting monitoring processes in 
place.  Pasture production can be useful as an indicator of intensification, and pasture 
growth and cover can be monitored with a high degree of accuracy using satellite 
technology (DairyInsight, 2006).  The accuracy of model simulations can be 
improved by combining satellite data with the simulation model to reflect spatial 
variability in pasture growth at a farm scale (Hill, Donald, Vickery, Moore, & 
Donnelly, 1999).  All this reduces information cost while minimising the sort of 
inadequate monitoring which would allow farms to behave strategically on 
agreements. 
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Figure 6.3 Scatter plot matrix 
 
 
a- Stocking rate (Cows/ha) 
b- Pasture production (000’kg /ha) 
c- Milksolids production (kg/ha) 
d- Nitrogen fertiliser applied (Kg/ha) 
e- Nitrogen discharge (kg/ha) 
 
Once these relationships are established for different types of farms, and contracts are 
signed on required level of nitrogen discharge reduction, the social planner has to 
monitor compliance with contractual obligations. 
a
b
c 
d 
e 
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Table 6.3 Simulated farm responses to nitrogen level restriction  
 Baseline 10% 20% 30% 40% 
Moderate      
Profit($/ha) 1429.00 1406.00 1315.00 1197.00 985.00
Stocking rate(Cows/ha) 2.68 2.29 1.91 1.74 1.40
Pasture (Kg/ha) 12592.09 12576.85 12360.04 12006.31 11878.32
Milksoilds (K/ha) 908.74 813.76 705.47 644.03 522.12
N-fertiliser(Kg/ha) 120.00 118.00 112.00 81.00 60.00
N- discharge (Kg/ha) 31.94 28.61 25.47 22.31 19.24
Intensive   
Profit($/ha) 2825.18 2843.00 2775.00 2663.00 2536.00
Stocking rate(Cows/ha) 3.53 3.19 3.21 2.91 2.40
Pasture (Kg/ha) 14993.24 14896.15 14566.26 14415.38 14281.77
Milksoilds (K/ha) 1640.91 1512.08 1514.47 1388.65 1177.88
N-fertiliser(Kg/ha) 270.00 258.00 220.00 199.00 189.00
N- discharge (Kg/ha) 60.79 53.75 48.58 42.27 35.93
Extensive  
Profit($/ha) 880.00 829.00 788.00 651.00 461.00
Stocking rate(Cows/ha) 2.27 1.81 1.46 1.20 0.95
Pasture (Kg/ha) 9039.52 9120.00 9288.73 8961.44 8349.27
Milksoilds (K/ha) 714.32 601.33 495.53 413.74 329.93
N-fertiliser(Kg/ha) 60.00 60.00 58.00 36.00 4.00
N- discharge (Kg/ha) 27.41 24.19 21.87 19.16 16.36
 
In order to find discrete quantities of output, input and nitrogen discharge for various 
levels of nitrogen discharge reduction, selective activities from the WFM simulation 
results reported in table 5.3 are used to form a simple model using linear 
programming. Farm level linear programming models have been used in many 
studies to model environmental and economic policy (Bartolini, Gallerani, Raggi, & 
Viaggi, 2007; Taylor, 1992). The linear programming model is solved using Premium 
Solver Platform Version 8 (Frontline Systems, 2007). This is a spreadsheet Solver, an 
extension of that bundled with Microsoft Excel. The results are tabulated in Table 
6.3. Scatter plot matrices and linear programming output are helpful to trace the 
relationship between variables to reduce information asymmetry. Farms may be asked 
to complete an online form and the information given in these can be useful in 
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confirming farm type. Farm abatement cost curves similar to those derived in the 
Chapter 5, can be used to target farms which place less value on reducing pollution.  
Abatement cost information generated by the modelling framework is also useful in 
making decisions on the size of transfer payments.  It is particularly relevant for cost 
sharing initiatives between farms and the social planner as it enables the social 
planner to base any incentive packages to farms on accurate information about the 
marginal abatement costs associated with a specific farming system (Yiridoe & 
Weersink, 1998). If the social planner is unable to observe the farm type, there is an 
incentive for the low abatement cost farm to declare itself as high abatement cost 
farm, or vice versa, depending on the policy instrument. Having more information 
about farm types reduces the cost of negotiation in environmental contracts (Moxey, 
White, & Ozanne, 1999). However given the heterogeneity of farms and the 
complexity of input transformation into a final product, this kind of relationship 
should be treated only as a rough guide. Further these relationships need to be altered 
to accommodate best management practices and productivity growth by adopting 
innovative eco-friendly technologies. Variations in the production and potential 
nitrogen discharges due to weather can be accommodated by adjusting the functional 
relationship based on annual yield data derived from surveys and the regional 
monitoring farms.   
 
Imperfect compliance  
There are few empirical analyses of imperfect compliance in the literature.  A simple 
two farm model is presented here, with some assumptions regarding functional 
specifications and parameter values. Farms are considered to be profit maximisers 
and risk neutral. The abatement cost function (derived in the Chapter 5) of each farm 
type is known to the social planner. Farm types are denoted as j. j=(1,2), where 1 is 
intensive in production  and 2 is moderate in production. Since locally estimated 
transaction/monitoring cost values are not available, values relating to transaction 
costs were obtained from elsewhere. In practice, very few studies have attempted to 
quantify transaction costs. Establishing farm nitrogen standards initially involved 
information costs such as determining farm physical and production characteristics. 
Simulation models for nitrogen discharges were calibrated at 72 hours per farm, and 
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annual monitoring and updating was estimated at 12 hours per farm (Carpentier, 
Bosch, & Batie, 1998).   Travel costs were also included, as were the different hourly 
rates for professionals such as technicians, an agronomic expert and a lawyer. Given 
the availability of GIS databases, mobile computers, online communication and 
simulation models with guided user interfaces, it is reasonable to assume that the 
hours required per farm could be less than those estimated by Carpentier at al (1998). 
Initial information acquisition and preparation of contracts would cost 40 hrs per 
farm, and this represents the fixed component of the monitoring cost (m1). Variable 
components include hours spent on periodic monitoring. The total monitoring 
function is considered as linear (m1+m2 (e)). Effort (e) is assumed to be 5 hours per 
farm on average. This assumption is reasonable, given the complex nature of input-
output relationships, and the 2.5 -4.0  hours 7 that is required for compliance 
monitoring of dairy farm effluent disposal. A monotonic relationship is assumed 
between the level of effort and the probability of detection. i.e 1 hour of monitoring 
results in a 0.1 probability of detection.  Monitoring effort is independent of intensity 
and farm size, and the cost of monitoring is calculated at $80 per hour. This is on a 
par with the estimated values for monitoring dairy farms by the Tasman District 
Council. The parameter values and functional forms chosen are presented in Table 
6.4. These are merely illustrative as the purpose is to show relative non compliance 
rather than absolute magnitudes. Choosing appropriate tax and penalty rates to reach 
the targeted discharge level are not addressed here.  
 
The simulation problem is set up in a spreadsheet. An abatement cost function is used 
to derive the cost of reducing nitrogen discharge from the baseline to 20%. Tax on 
excess nitrogen discharges above the target is based on a figure of $5 per kg.  The 
true discharge levels and discharge levels for reporting under strategic behaviour are 
found under different policies using Excel Solver. Results are presented in Table 6.5. 
                                                 
7 Tasman District Council (http://www.tdc.govt.nz/)  
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Table 6.4 Simulation parameters for monitoring 
Variables Intensive system Moderate system 
Baseline Scenario   
Profit($/ha) 2825.00 1392.00
Nitrogen discharges 60.00 33.00
   
Policy Scenario   
Required level of reduction (Kg/ha) 12 6.6
Abatement cost  function($/ha)  0.54 * A2 2.16 * A2
Penalty function ( ) iv  
Monitoring cost function m1+m2(e) 
Tax on excess discharge ( ) 5.00  ($/kg) 
Probability of monitoring )(  0.4 -0.6 
Level of penalty for false reporting ( ) 5.00-8.00 ($/kg) 
 Abatement cost coefficients are estimated in the Chapter 5. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Simulation results for monitoring 
      Expected 
income 
Nitrogen discharge (Kg/ha) Cost of 
monitoring 
($/farm) 
True Reported 
Intensive system 
0.4 5 5 2,791 55 48 3,520 
0.6 5 5 2,777 55 55 3,680 
0.4 5 8 2,777 55 55 3,520 
Moderate system 
0.4 5 5 1,367 32 26 3,520 
0.6 5 5 1,362 32 32 3,680 
0.4 5 8 1,362 32 32 3,520 
 
The results show that the effectiveness of policy performance depends on compliance 
monitoring, reporting and penalties for rule violations (Table 6.5).  Farms can be 
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urged to report truthfully.  Achieving equality between true and reported discharge 
levels has been possible by adjusting the penalty, level of monitoring and tax on 
excess discharges. However, in practice level of reporting can be smaller than that of 
simulated reporting levels. This can be attributed to monitoring limitations (Ozanne, 
Hogan, & Colman, 2001) 
 
Determining which type of target is appropriate is dependent on the social planner’s 
monitoring budget, and their ability to use different levels of penalty for different 
farming systems. However, targeting intensive farms is cost effective in terms of 
abatement cost and there is a higher expectation of truthful behaviour. Macho-Stadler 
& Perez-Castrillo (2006) also suggest that it is optimal to devote resources to those 
farms that place a smaller value on reducing discharges.  McCann & Easter (2000) 
also provide empirical evidence of a positive relationship between abatement cost 
(AC) and transaction cost (TC).  Their estimated relationship is Ln TC= 0.010 + 
1.464AC. The intercept term indicates the fixed component of the transaction costs. 
Targeting farms with lower abatement costs is likely to reduce the cost of 
transactions.  
 
Even though the level of monitoring is assumed to be exogenous to the farm’s 
decision in the empirical analysis, in reality the perceived probability is influenced by 
the farm’s own actions. It would be reasonable to think that the probability of 
monitoring is negatively related to degree of truthful reporting. Thus it is likely that 
frequent inspections would diminish with the history of truthful behavior. 
 
In fact the impact of targeted monitoring on non compliance can be larger at a 
catchment scale where many more farms are involved. The empirical analysis that 
focused on two types of farms can be extended to a greater number of farm types. It is 
likely that farms with similar geo physical characteristics and proximity to water 
body are geographically clustered together, and targeting them as a group can save 
time and monitoring costs.    
 
The existence of different attitudes to risk should not be ignored when designing 
environmental policy. Moral hazard is likely to be more significant where risk 
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aversion is low.  However, modelling farm behaviour to take into account policy risk 
and production risk increases the complications.  For instance, a farmer can be risk 
averse in responding to a policy contract but at the same time be a risk taker in the 
production environment, willing to increase the input use that results in more 
pollution.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the challenges of implementing environmental policy and 
has suggested the ways of handling it. The implementation of environmental policy is 
facilitated by exclusive property rights, which are enforceable and transferable among 
individual farms. Developing scientifically and legally defensible data collection 
methods and design of surrogate measures for discharges are critical in defining 
property rights. Empirical applications show how to deter moral hazard arising from 
hidden actions. Model simulations illustrate that targeting leads to more efficient 
budget allocation and hence greater reduction in pollution.  
 
Using a production-nitrogen discharge function has the potential to reduce 
information asymmetry, thus the cost of monitoring. Targeting farms for monitoring 
improve the abatement and reduce transaction costs. Information about individual 
farms with high abatement costs is valuable as it helps to preclude high cost farms to 
reduces the potential problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore an 
environmental agency can chose a low level of monitoring and even higher level of 
financial and technological support. The analytical framework of this chapter can be 
useful for emission trading schemes to set permit prices based on right penalties 
determined through iterative process.  
 
This study assumes nitrogen discharges are deterministic. In most circumstances, 
discharge levels and consequent damages depend on stochastic environmental factors. 
In particular, variability in rainfall over time can have a profound effect on discharges 
as well as on the consequent pollution transport. However, the water quality 
consequences of increased nonpoint source discharges after high rainfall may be 
diluted by the very weather events that created the enhanced loads (Stephenson, 
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Norris, & Shabman, 1998).  Given this, it is justifiable to adopt a deterministic 
approach based on nitrogen discharges calculated on average rainfall.   
 
One alternative to targeting farms is to develop a menu of contracts with 
differentiated tax and abatement levels designed to elicit truthful responses from 
farmers. With a priori information on the profit pollution function for different 
farming systems and derived abatement costs, a social planner can devise contracts 
with varying levels of abatement, tax and penalty that would make polluters self 
select.  
 
It is technically possible to target farms according to their pollution potential, but in 
political terms the use of different penalties is a contentious issue. Since farming has 
several public benefits such as employment and income generation, it is desirable to 
investigate ways of compensating farmers who reduce farming intensity or refrain 
from expanding their activities.  It may be practicable to use financial incentives in 
conjunction with penalty schemes to offset production losses. Further compliance 
monitoring can be complemented through technological subsidies such as extended 
extension services to estimate nitrogen discharges through nutrient budgets.  
 
Given major institutional changes a probable analysis should carefully consider 
distributional issues as politicians will place considerable emphasis on distributional 
issues. The evolution of property rights is driven by an ongoing search for ways to 
internalise externalities. Institutional arrangements need to evolve to empower people 
to take abatement measures for nitrogen discharges. The diversity of risk preferences 
should not be ignored in designing environmental policy. 
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7. Environmental and economic efficiency of dairy farms  
 
7.1 Introduction 
Increasing agricultural productivity has been a policy objective in New Zealand, but 
higher productivity has been accompanied by higher input use, creating negative 
externalities are described in chapter 3. Therefore measuring the environmental 
performance of dairy farms and integrating this information into farm productivity 
calculations is important for informed policy decisions which promote sustainable 
development.  Incorporating farm nitrogen discharges into farm production measures 
helps to identify farms which are efficient both economically and environmentally. In 
this chapter such measures are described as environmental-economic efficiency 
measures. Efficient farms can be used to benchmark progress and help in the design 
of policy that promotes farm efficiency.  These measures can also be used for 
monitoring and evaluating farms.  To date, analysis of dairy farm performance in 
New Zealand has ignored undesirable effects on the environment, and it is difficult to 
source the data required to measure the environmental-economic efficiency of farms.  
Relevant data would need to cover farm management, economic information, spatial 
characteristics and nitrogen discharges. Given this, the spatially micro-simulated 
virtual population data generated in chapter 4 is used for analysis.  
 
This chapter focuses on the environmental and economic performance of farms in 
relation to the best performance in the industry. These measures are used to identify 
the reasons for differences in performance and to provide options for improvement. 
The methodology used in this study is a two stage process which first involves 
solving a data envelopment analysis (DEA) problem.  In the second stage, the 
efficiency scores from the first stage are regressed on other explanatory variables.  
 
Section 2 of this chapter describes the methods used to measure efficiency. Section 3 
looks at DEA.  Section 4 reviews conventional efficiency measures in the DEA 
framework. Section 5 reviews in detail ways to define environmental efficiency.  
Section 6 discusses the challenges in measuring environmental efficiency in the New 
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Zealand dairy farming context and proposes modifications needed for empirical 
application. Section 7 discusses the analysis of variations in environmental efficiency. 
Section 8 describes the data, and Section 9 presents a discussion of the results, along 
with a summary of the findings.  
 
7.2 Methods of efficiency measurement 
Efficiency measurement requires the construction of a frontier.  The two popular 
methods of doing this employ econometrics or mathematical programming. Generally 
used econometric and mathematical programming approaches are stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA) respectively. SFA requires the 
selection of an appropriate functional form and choice of a distribution for the 
inefficiency scores. It is time consuming and suited only for single-output 
technologies. A multi-output case can be studied only if the various outputs can be 
aggregated into a single output (Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). However, 
some environmental performance analysis involves the handling of multiple outputs. 
Asmild & Hougaard (2006) state that DEA’s ability to handle multiple inputs and 
outputs in different units, is ideal for measuring environmental performance.  The 
DEA approach does not require the assumption of functional form to specify the 
relationship between inputs and outputs and the distributional assumption of the 
inefficiency term. This avoids unnecessary restrictions about functional form, which 
are likely to distort efficiency measures  (Coelli, 1995; Fraser & Cordina, 1999).  
DEA also allows comparison of one farm with another in terms of a performance 
index. The DEA approach can, however, be criticised for not accounting for the 
possible influence of measurement error and other noise in the data (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). The main strength of the stochastic frontier approach is 
that it deals with stochastic noise.  Simar & Wilson (2000) also provided statistical 
foundations for DEA estimates using bootstrap methods. Since a virtual population of 
farms is used to construct the frontier in this study, it is not necessary to consider 
sampling variability -  the data can be considered to be noise free. In fact, in this 
study efficiency is measured rather than estimated. DEA is used in this chapter 
because of its flexibility and helpful features. 
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DEA has been used in many studies to analyse environment oriented efficiencies 
(Coelli, Lauwers, & Van Huylenbroeck, 2007; Fare, Grosskopf, & Pasurka Jr, 2007; 
Tyteca, 1996; Wossink & Denaux, 2006). It has also been used to analyse agricultural 
productivity in New Zealand (Jaforullah & Premachandra, 2003; Jaforullah & 
Whiteman, 1999; Neal, 2004). None of these studies, however, has attempted to 
measure environmental performance. Jaforullah & Whiteman (1999) used a sample of 
New Zealand-wide data to estimate efficiency, but given the large variations in 
weather and soil across the country, the reliability of their estimates is open to 
question (Fraser & Cordina, (1999).  The modelling approach of this chapter 
incorporates geophysical variables when measuring efficiencies.   
 
7.3 Data Envelopment Analysis  
DEA involves mathematical linear programming. It constructs a non parametric 
piecewise surface or frontier over the data, by enveloping the data points of the 
observed best practice activities. Efficiency measures are then derived from the 
distance of each individual observation to that frontier.  The measure provides a score 
for each farm from 0 (worst performance) to 1 (best performance). The DEA model 
developed by Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes  in (1978) was input oriented and assumed 
constant returns to scale (CRS). There have been numerous subsequent developments 
such as allowing for variable returns to scale (VRS) (Banker, Charnes, & Cooper, 
1984)  In the DEA literature individuals are often referred to as decision making units 
(DMU). In the context of this chapter, the farm is used to denote DMUs. The 
following subsection briefly discusses popular DEA models and specifications which 
have been widely employed in applied analysis. Details of DEA model specification 
are discussed in Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese (2005) and Cooper, Seiford, & 
Tone (2000). 
 
7.3.1 DEA specifications 
Solving DEA requires the specification of orientation, returns to scale and weights. 
Weights are endogenously determined by the algorithm. This section provides a 
specification of DEA for measuring efficiency. 
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Input and output orientations are adopted in DEA to measure efficiency. Input 
orientation focuses on the extent to which inputs can be reduced while maintaining 
the existing level of output. Output orientation focuses on the extent to which output 
can be increased with a given level of input. In an agricultural context either input or 
output orientation can be used, depending on the application. For instance, if output 
production is restricted through quotas, then input orientation is preferred. On the 
other hand, output orientation is applicable in situations where it is possible to 
enhance production using available resources. Output oriented models are very much 
in the spirit of neo-classical production functions defined as the maximum achievable 
output given input quantities (Fare, Grosskopf, & Lowell, 1994).  
 
Efficiency estimates are insensitive to orientation under CRS. However under VRS 
these estimates are not similar (Coeli et al, 2005), so it is important to choose the 
appropriate orientation. CRS assumes that all farms operate at an optimal scale, but 
financial, land and other constraints mean that in reality they will operate at different 
scales.  VRS specification allows a calculation of efficiency devoid of these scale 
effects. The VRS model may be more relevant for measuring environmental 
efficiency because CRS assumes that a doubling of all inputs would result in 
doubling of all outputs, which is obviously not the case with nitrogen discharge into 
water. Since the convexity assumption of VRS about production possibility set is  
weak, it results in very cautious estimates of improvement potential. A study by 
Jaforullah & Devlin (1996) states that dairy farms are characterised by constant 
returns to scale, and results from Neal (2004) suggest that the majority of farmers are 
operating in areas of increasing returns to scale or constant returns to scale.  Under 
CRS technology, the derived efficiency scores are either less than or equal to the VRS 
technology efficiency scores. The details of these returns to scale are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
7.4 Measuring efficiency 
The basic approach to measuring farm level efficiency is to estimate a frontier that 
envelops all the input and output data, with those observations lying on the frontier 
being described as efficient. Any farm that deviates from the frontier is considered to 
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be inefficient. Inefficient farms can either reduce their input use while maintaining 
output level, or use the same level of input to increase the output. The concept of 
technical efficiency is the basis for deriving other types of efficiencies.  
 
Figure 7.1 Technical and allocative efficiencies 
 
7.4.1 Technical efficiency (TE) 
Technical efficiency is defined as the ability of a farm to produce either the maximum 
possible output from a given bundle of inputs and a given technology, or to produce a 
given level of output from the minimum amount of inputs for a given technology. 
Technical inefficiency would require a farm to reduce inputs without reducing 
outputs or to increase output from same amount of input.  
 
Figure 7.1 explains the concept of TE of input orientation. SS’ is the frontier, which 
indicates an efficient combination of inputs for a certain amount of output. A farm 
which uses P amount of inputs is said to be inefficient, because all inputs could be 
reduced proportionally without any reduction in output. TE =0Q/0P. TE is equal to 
one for technically efficient farms. 
 
X2/q 
S 
P 
Q’ S’ 
O 
B 
R 
A 
X1/q 
Q 
 151
The constant returns to scale input orientation 
A constant return to scale input oriented model is used to explain the concept of 
technical efficiency. The following notations are used to describe the model. Each 
farm is assumed to have K inputs and M outputs. The total number of farms is N. 
Outputs of each (jth) farm are described by a column vector of outputs (qi). Inputs of 
each farm are described by column vector (xi). The entire data set consists of  K* N 
input matrix of  X and M * N output matrix of Q. The feasible production set is 
defined as  
 
MRq  , KRx  ,  
xRxqT KM |),{(   Produces q}       (1) 
 
where the production technology is assumed to be convex and non-increasing in 
input, non decreasing in outputs and exhibits strong disposability in inputs and 
outputs. If the observed input vector is not technically efficient (i.e. not on the 
isoquant), technical efficiency can be reached by proportionally shrinking the input 
combinations until it is projected onto the boundary of the technology set. The 
boundary of the technology set is denoted by the isoquant. The purpose of DEA is to 
obtain a measure of efficiency as a ratio of a weighted sum of outputs divided by a 
weighted sum of inputs. Using the above notation results in:  
 
i
i
xv
qu
'
'
          (2) 
 
where u is a M *  I vector of output weights and v is K * I vector of input weights. 
The optimal weights (u & v) are obtained by solving the mathematical programming 
model, which maximises the efficiency measure of the jth farm.  
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u and v are solved so that the measure of efficiency for the ith farm is maximized, 
subject to the constraint that all efficiency measures must be less than or equal to one. 
However, the above formulation yields infinite solutions, so the problem is 
reformulated as follows: 
 
)( ', iv qMax   
Subject to  
1' ix  
0''  jj xq   j =1,2,.....N     (4) 
0,   
 
Here the notation has been changed from u and v to   and   . 
Using duality theory, an envelopment form of the previous expression is derived.  
 
jMin  ,          
subject to  
0 Qqi          
0  Xxi  
0          (5) 
 
* Q  can be elaborated as 

N
j
jijq
1
   and X  can be elaborated as 

N
j
jijx
1
  
j , is a scalar and   is a N * 1 vector of constants.  The estimated value of   is the 
efficiency score for each of N farms. The estimate will satisfy the restriction  <=1 
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with the value j =1 indicating the efficient farms. In other words, it is possible to 
reduce the input use of farms by (1- j ). To derive a set of N efficiency scores, the 
problem needs to be solved N times, once for each farm. The problem specified above 
takes the jth farm and then seeks to radially contract input vector xi as much as 
possible, while still remaining within the feasible input set. The inner boundary of 
this set is a piecewise linear isoquant determined by observed data points. The radial 
contraction of the input vector xi produces a projected point (X, Q) on the surface 
of the technology. These projected points are a linear combination of the observed 
data points. The constraints ensure that the projected points cannot lie outside the 
feasible set. This envelopment form is often used in empirical estimation because 
fewer constraints are involved than in the multiplier form.  
 
The variable return to scale input orientation model 
 
The mathematical programming for VRS is as follows: 
jMin  ,          
subject to  
0 Qqi          
0  Xxi  
0  
11' N          (6) 
 
The convexity constraint introduced in equation 11' N  ensures that farms are 
benchmarked against farms of similar size. This approach forms a convex hull of 
intersecting planes that envelop the data points more tightly than with the CRS 
conical hull. Therefore efficiency scores derived under VRS formulation are greater 
than or equal to those obtained under CRS. By allowing for VRS, the measure of 
technical efficiency can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency (SE) (Fare, Grosskopf , & Lovell, 1985). 
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VRSCRS TETESE /         (7) 
SE = 1 indicates scale efficiency. SE <1 indicates scale inefficiency. Scale 
inefficiency can be due to increasing or decreasing returns to scale, and it can be 
determined by looking at the sum of weights. If the sum is less than 1 then returns to 
scale are increasing. A sum greater than 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale.  
 
The variable returns to scale output orientation model 
The output oriented model specification is very similar to the input specification. The 
formal mathematical representation is as follows.  
 
jMax  ,  
subject to  
0  Qqi  
0 Xxi  
0  
11' N         (8) 
 
where 11   and measures the proportional increase in outputs that can be 
achieved by the jth farm, with input held constant. The reciprocal of this measure 
( /1 ) yields an estimate that take values between 0 and 1 (technical efficiency). 
Significantly, the output and input orientations yield exactly the same set of efficient 
farms, although efficiency estimates differ. 
     
7.4.2 Economic efficiency and allocative efficiency 
The input or output orientation discussed above can easily be adopted to derive 
economic efficiency by using appropriate data (price and cost information). 
Economic efficiency can be interpreted in terms of cost or revenue or profit 
efficiency. In Figure 7.1, let ci represent a K * 1 vector of input prices for the jth farm 
and let x represent the observed vector of inputs used associated with point P. Let x’ 
and x* represent the input vector associated with the technically efficient point Q and 
cost minimizing input vector at Q’ respectively. Then the cost efficiency of jth farm 
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can be defined as the ratio of input costs associated with input vectors x and x*, 
associated with points, P and Q’. i.e CE=0R/0P. Thus cost efficiency is defined as the 
ratio of the minimum cost to observed cost. If iiiij xcxcCE
'*' /  If CEj = 1, then farm 
j is considered to be economically efficient. Economic efficiency comprises technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency on a farm is maximized 
when marginal value product equals cost. Allocative efficiency (AE) is computed as  
 
TECEAE /          (9) 
 
It is equal to 0R/0Q.  
 
TE is technical efficiency, calculated by the input oriented measure of DEA 
mentioned in Equation 6.  
 
The following mathematical formulation describes the concept of economic 
efficiency in terms of cost minimization:. 
 
 *
, * iix xcMin i   
subject to 
0 Qqi ;    
0*  Xxi  
0  
11' N         (10) 
 
The economic efficiency concept can be applied to calculate revenue efficiency and 
profit efficiency in the output oriented framework. To calculate revenue efficiency, 
revenue is maximized for given output prices and input levels. The total revenue 
efficiency (RE) of the jth farm is calculated as the observed revenue to maximum 
revenue.  
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Profit efficiency is calculated by maximizing the difference between revenue and cost 
(i.e minimum cost and maximum revenue). Profit efficiency (PE) is measured as the 
ratio of observed profit over maximum potential profit. All these efficiency measures 
(CE, RE and associated allocative and technical efficiencies) can take values ranging 
from 0 to 1, where the value of 1 indicates perfect efficiency. However, profit 
efficiency measures need not be bounded by 0 and 1.  These could be negative if 
profits are negative, or it could be undefined if maximum profit is 0.  Technical 
efficiency is usually measured with output orientation in order to derive allocative 
efficiency in profit maximization and revenue maximization scenarios.  
 
7.5 Measuring environmental performance 
The current emphasis on environmental issues has led dairy farms to consider 
improvements in environmental performance as well as in productivity, and policy 
makers are interested in any actions that can be taken to achieve this.  The process 
around measuring performance is consequently receiving greater attention.  
 
The incorporation of environmental impact information into production process  
analysis provides an opportunity to measure environmental performance and changes 
in performance under environmental constraints (Tyteca, 1997). A generally used 
technique is to look at one area of environmental efficiency, such as achieving the 
highest feasible ratio of milk solids to nitrogen discharge.  Different environmental 
performance measures which are used in DEA, are discussed at greater detail below. 
 
There are difficulties associated with incorporating environmental impacts into the 
analysis of environmental performance. In the literature environmental effects are 
brought into the model as either undesirable outputs or undesirable inputs. In recent 
literature two novel approaches have been adopted. One approach uses the concept of 
nutrient budgeting to derive environmental efficiency in agricultural applications. In 
the second approach, enhancing the nutrient content of the output is modelled as a 
means of minimizing nutrient into environment. These environmental efficiency 
measures are often reported along with the conventional efficiency measures 
discussed above. Like conventional efficiency measures, environmental efficiency 
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also has different orientations. Environmental efficiency is modelled as an input or 
output, or both input and output, or by using the concept of material balance. The 
following subsections review various environmental efficiency measures.  
 
7.5.1 Environmental impact as an input or output  
Some studies model environmental impact as an undesirable output. Tyteca (1996) 
claims that an environmental performance indicator can be calculated as the ratio 
between the overall productivity measure (using both desirable and undesirable 
outputs), and the gross productivity index where undesirable outputs are ignored. It 
involves comparison of technical efficiency measures, with and without 
environmental effects. Fare, Grosskopf, & Tyteca (1996) estimate environmental 
efficiency by running two input oriented DEA models for each decision making unit. 
In the first run, technical efficiency is estimated, allowing for the conventional 
proportional contraction of all inputs. In the second run the environmental impact is 
incorporated as a weakly disposable output1. The environmental efficiency is then 
estimated as the ratio of the efficiency score obtained with the first run over the score 
obtained in the second run. The indicator takes a value less than or equal to one. Fare, 
Grosskopf, & Pasurka  (2007) model environmental impact as a bad output in a joint 
production approach using DEA on U.S coal fired electric plants, in which good  and 
bad outputs are assumed to be jointly and weakly disposable. This study models 
traditional productivity, with and without regulating the production of bad outputs, to 
establish a relationship between traditional productivity and environmental 
regulation.  
 
Environmental impact has been modelled as an input in some studies (De Koeijer, 
Wossink, Struik, & Renkema, 2002; Ondersteijn, Lansink, Giesen, & Huirne, 2002; 
Reinhard, Lovell, & Thijssen, 1999; Wossink & Denaux, 2006). There are a number 
of ways to denote input oriented technical and environmental efficiency under 
                                                 
1  Strong disposability implies that there is no charge for disposing of unwanted input or output. 
Weak disposability concept means costly disposal of nitrogen surplus.  Further details are available in 
Coelli et al (2005) pages 195-197.   
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conditions of variable returns to scale.  Treating environmental impact as an input 
provides separate estimates of technical efficiency and environmental efficiency. In 
the agricultural context Reinhard, Lovell, & Thijssen (2000) take intensive farms in 
the Netherlands to model nitrogen surplus as an environmentally detrimental input to 
calculate technical efficiency and environmental efficiency using the DEA 
framework. They specify nitrogen surplus as a proxy for pollution and modelled as an 
additional input variable.  
 
Figure 7.2 presents the best practice production frontier f(.) with output  Q, 
conventional input X and nitrogen discharge Z, Q<=f(X, Z).  The frontier f(.) is 
assumed to be increasing and concave in surface. PQRS is a surface with identical 
quantities of output for various combinations of conventional inputs and nitrogen 
discharges.  
 
The output oriented measure is expressed as the ratio of maximum feasible output to 
the observed level of output, conditional on specific levels of conventional input and 
pollution variables. The output oriented technical efficiency in environmental models 
is illustrated on Figure 7.3. The output oriented model allows for radial expansion of 
the output while holding conventional and pollution inputs fixed. Output Q is 
measured on the vertical axis and the combination of conventional input (X) and 
pollution variable (Z) are shown on the horizontal axis. The production frontier 
shows the maximum feasible output achieved from a given level of combined input/ 
discharge.  Looking at point R, the frontier (point C) can be reached without any 
increase in input use or nitrogen discharge. The output oriented environmental 
efficiency EEo is measured by the equation 11. 
 
||/||)},(:max{ 1 CAAAR
o DQDQZXFQEE      (11) 
 
QR is the maximum feasible output given both conventional input and nitrogen 
discharge.  
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Figure 7.2 Environmental-production frontier surface 
 
 
Reinhard et al (2000) defined environmental efficiency with input orientation as “the 
ratio of minimum feasible to observed use of an environmentally detrimental input, 
conditional on observed levels of the desirable output and the conventional inputs”. 
Input oriented efficiency involves a radial contraction of inputs inclusive of pollution, 
while holding output constant. Figure 7.4 is used to illustrate an input oriented 
production frontier. Conventional input X is measured by the vertical axis. Nitrogen 
discharge (Z) is measured on the horizontal axis. The isoquant of the fixed level of 
production (QR) shows various combinations of conventional input and nitrogen 
discharge. Environmental efficiency is provided by the radial input oriented 
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measures. The point R is the observed combination of conventional (OXR) and 
nitrogen discharge (OZR). The optimal combination of conventional input and 
nitrogen discharge occurs at point B. The optimal adjustment occurs along the ray OR 
from R to O. The movement along the ray OR involves an equiproportionate 
reduction of conventional input and nitrogen discharge. The radial input oriented 
measure of environmental efficiency is defined in the equation 12: 
 
Figure 7.3 Output oriented production frontier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
||/||}),(:min{ OROBQZXFEE RRRR       (12) 
  
XB and ZB are the minimum feasible conventional input and nitrogen discharge, given 
the prevailing production technology and the observed value of the output YR. 
 
Ondersteijn, Lansink, Giesen, & Huirne (2002) model technical efficiency as an 
overall efficiency by incorporating nutrient surpluses as a weakly disposable input. 
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Weak disposability is incorporated by introducing an equality constraint and a scaling 
parameter δ (Equation 13).  
 
 ,Min          
subject to  
0 Qqi          
0  Xxi  
0  Zzi  
0  
11' N          (13) 
 
They define environmental efficiency in a similar way to Renihard et al (2000), but 
incorporate the weak disposability concept for nutrient surpluses.  
 
Wossink & Denaux (2006) estimate technical and environmental efficiencies using 
the conventional framework for input orientation (Equation 6). The model used to 
assess environmental efficiency is similar to the model for technical efficiency, the 
only difference being that the expected environmental impact of each input category 
is used instead of the amount of observed conventional inputs.  
 
It is important to make efficient use of inputs which cause nitrogen discharge.  When 
farms improve the technical efficiency of their use of polluting inputs, economic and 
environmental efficiency will also be achieved (De Koeijer, Wossink, Struik, & 
Renkema, 2002).  
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Figure 7.4 Input oriented production frontier 
 
 
 
7.5.2 Environmental impact as an input and output 
Asmild & Hougaard (2006) measure the environmental performance of Danish pig 
farms by modelling the estimated nutrient content of inputs and the nutrient content 
of outputs, together with a number of other economic variables. In this approach 
environmental efficiency is measured as the ability to minimize nutrient surplus by 
maximizing nutrient removal.  The nutrient surplus is always assumed to be positive, 
because a deficit leads to depletion of soil nutrient status over time. Asmild & 
Hougaard use a two step sub-vector DEA approach to quantify efficiency measures.   
First the combined economic and environmental improvement potential is calculated 
by incorporating the economic output variable along with the nutrient content of the 
output (the environmental variable) in the output matrix. Secondly, the economic 
improvement potential is determined by incorporating only the economic output 
variables in the output matrix. Thirdly, the environmental improvement potential is 
calculated by including only environmental variables (nitrogen content of the milk) in 
the output matrix. Fourthly, the efficiency of economic improvements followed by 
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environmental improvement is reckoned. Finally, the efficiency of environmental 
improvements followed by economic improvement is calculated. 
 
7.5.3 Material balance concept 
The concept of material balance has been applied to measure the environmental 
efficiency of Belgian pig finishing farms by Coelli, Lauwers, & Van Huylenbroeck 
(2007). This section discusses their framework in detail as it is both novel and 
versatile.  The authors quantify environmental efficiency by determining the 
combination of inputs that result in the lowest level of nutrient surplus to produce a 
specified amount of output. Nutrient surplus (z) is simply calculated as a linear 
function of input and output using the material balance concept (z=a`x-b`q). a and b 
are the nutrient content of inputs and outputs respectively. When output is fixed, 
nutrient surplus is minimized by decreasing the nutrient content in the inputs.  The 
input vector which involves minimum nutrient is denoted by xe. The minimum 
nutrient quantity is a` xe. The nutrient quantity of observed input is a`x. Figure 7.5 
illustrates the concept of nutrient and cost minimization.  
     
Figure 7.5 Cost and nutrient minimization 
 
Source : Coelli et al (2007) 
c
c
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The nutrient content of each input is reflected in the slopes of isonutrient lines 
denoted by Equation 14. N denotes the total nutrient content. 
 
2211 xaxaN         (14) 
 
The isonutrient line which passes through the nutrient minimizing points (x1e, x2e) has 
the lowest intercept, implying that it has the lowest amount of total nutrient (N). The 
environmental efficiency of a farm is defined as the ratio of minimum nutrients over 
observed nutrients.  
 
xaxaEE e `/`          (15)     
       
The environmental efficiency is decomposed into two components: technical 
efficiency (TE) and environmental allocative efficiency (EAE).  As noted previously, 
TE is measured as production of a given level of output from the minimum amount of 
inputs.  TE is indicated by the ratio of the minimum level of inputs to produce to 
observed levels of input to produce the same.  TE scores were calculated using either 
Equation 5 or 6, depending on the orientation.  
 
xaxaTE t `/`        (16) 
te xaxaEAE `/`        (17) 
 
All three efficiency measures take values between 0 and 1, with a value of 1 
indicating perfect efficiency. The equation 18 denotes the relationship between these 
three efficiency measures:  
 
EAETEEE *        (18) 
 
Cost efficiency can be found given the input prices (c). It can also be decomposed 
into technical and allocative efficiency. Using the price information, it is possible to 
establish the cost of the nutrient minimizing input combination (c`Xe) and the nutrient 
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content of the cost minimizing input combination (a`Xc).  These measures can be 
used to find the cost associated with moving from a cost minimizing point to a 
nutrient minimizing point. This could be interpreted as the shadow cost of nutrient 
reduction. A convergence of the cost and nutrient minimization points can be 
achieved by using appropriate policy incentives. Given the damage cost of nutrients, 
a new comprehensive social cost minimizing point can also be found.  
 
7.6 Challenges to measure dairy farm environmental efficiency  
The practical applications of environmental efficiency measures described above rely 
on simple input and output flow. However, the environmental impact of New Zealand 
dairy farms on water quality is a complex process which depends on climate 
variability, pasture and cow physiology and geophysical variability.  In addition to 
this, the outdoor, pastoral nature of New Zealand farming means that it is difficult to 
control input and output flows, particularly of nitrogen. 
 
The approach adopted by Coelli (2007) is elegant with regard to policy analysis, but 
its real world application would be a challenge for dairy farming in New Zealand. 
Coelli et al’s model was applied to an intensive pig farming system, which is an 
indoor production activity where nutrient inflows and outflows are highly 
manageable and there are no uncontrollable environmental effects. In an intensive 
farming system of monogastric animals like pigs, calculating nutrient surpluses is 
straightforward, determined by subtracting the nutrients removed with the harvested 
crops from nutrient input through manure and fertiliser. The nature of extensive dairy 
farming means that it is not possible to estimate nitrogen surpluses directly, as part of 
nitrogen input and removal can be attributed to natural processes such as atmospheric 
nitrogen fixation and denitrification.  
 
In New Zealand dairy farming the clover/atmospheric nitrogen contribution is 
difficult to control. The contribution of clover nitrogen is dependent on factors that 
affect the clover growth and persistence of dairy pastures, including climate, soil 
nitrogen levels, nitrogen fertilizer use, soil fertility, companion species, choice of 
cultivar, pasture establishment, grazing management, and pests and diseases. As a 
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result, the clover content of pasture changes on a cyclical pattern, and also a low level 
of nitrogen fertilizer application tends to boost clover nitrogen fixation. Biologically 
fixed nitrogen in clover plants is converted into various forms and excreted into the 
soil. Excreted nitrogen is converted to nitrates through ammonification and 
nitrification. According to reported farmlet trial results (Tillman, 2008) there is an 
inverse relationship between nitrogen fixation and the addition of nitrogen fertilizer.  
In addition to this, nutrient surpluses alone do not fully represent water quality 
damage from farming systems as there are other influences at work as well.  These 
include soil type, topography, animal productivity, climate and winter management 
(Thomas, Ledgard, & Francis, 2005). Coelli et al (2007) and Asmild & Hougaard 
(2006) modelled nutrient surpluses rather than environmental impact, and Asmild & 
Hougaard (2006) added constant atmospheric nitrogen deposit.  In Ashmild’s 
approach the combined economic and environmental efficiency likely to suffer due to 
the dimensionality problem due to additional variable.  
 
In this study farm nitrogen discharges are modelled with the following function: 
 
),,,,( TopographySoilFeedRateStockingNFertiliserfz   (19) 
where z- indicates the nitrogen discharge per ha. To estimate nitrogen discharges, the 
Overseer2 nutrient budget software is used. In calculating nitrogen discharges, winter 
management and effluent disposal practices are assumed to be on a par with industry 
recommendations, and an average rainfall of 1100 mm for the Waikato is used.  
 
The measurement of environmental efficiency in this chapter combines the merits of 
the efficiency measures described by Renihard et al (2000), Ashmild (2006) and 
Coelli (2007) relevant to the real world.  
 
Input oriented approaches are useful in situations where the environmental focus is on 
reducing pollution while maintaining production (Wossink & Denaux, 2006).  
                                                 
2 The Overseer used in this chapter is an improved version (5.3.1). Version 5.2.6 is 
used in previous chapters.  
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The mathematical formulation for input oriented technical efficiency under variable 
returns to scale is similar to Equation 8, except that z is the vector nitrogen discharge. 
This formulation computes input oriented technical efficiency as the ability of a 
producer to reduce input, including nitrogen discharges, for a given level of output.  
 
 ,Min          
subject to  
0 Qq j          
0  Xx j  
0  Zz j  
0          (20) 
 
Economic efficiency is formulated as the ability to minimize farm expenses ( x* ) for a 
given level of other variables. The mathematical formulation is similar to Equation 9. 
It is measured as the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost. 
 
*
, * iix xcMin i   
subject to 
0 Qq j ;    
0*  Xx j  
0 Zz j  
0          (21) 
    
Environmental efficiency is defined as the ratio of minimum nitrogen discharge to 
observed nitrogen discharge, conditional on observed levels of the desirable output 
and the conventional inputs. This is achieved by minimizing the nitrogen discharge 
for a given level of output and other conventional inputs.  
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 ,Min          
subject to  
0 Qq j          
0 Xx j  
0  Zz j  
0           (22) 
          
Environmental –economic efficiency is modelled as minimizing nitrogen discharge 
and farm expenses simultaneously, given output level and other inputs. This 
overcomes the dimensionality problem in Ashmild’s approach. Ashmild measured 
economic and environmental efficiency by incorporating economic output variables 
along with the nutrient content of the output (environmental variable) in the output 
matrix. Since the nutrient content of the output is an extra variable, it is likely to 
suffer from the dimensionality problem as increasing the number of variables inflates 
the efficiency.  
 
 ,Min          
subject to  
0 Qqi          
0  Xx  
0  Zz j  
0          (23) 
          
A two stage process is adopted to model economic improvements and then 
environmental improvement.  In the first stage, economic improvement potential is 
calculated by maximizing the farm income for a given level of other inputs including 
nitrogen discharges. Farm income is derived by multiplying milksolids produced by 
the payout received.  The output orientation is used as it is easy to get the estimates 
for the subsequent stage, where economic efficiency is followed by environmental 
efficiency. 
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Max          
subject to  
0)*(   Qqp i      
0 Xx  
0 Zzi  
0          (24) 
 
Farms are first made economically efficient through multiplying economic output 
(farm income) by economic efficiency scores. Then in the second step the 
environmental efficiency is derived using economically efficient output, similar to 
that specified in Equation 22.  Finally, two the step analysis carried out perform 
environmental improvements followed by economic improvement here farms are first 
made environmentally efficient by using the environmental efficiency scores. Then in 
the second step economic efficiency is derived using adjusted environmental output. 
 
The above DEA efficiency measures are calculated using an open source software 
package,  FEAR (Version 1.1) by Wilson (2008). It is implemented on R, which is a 
language and environment for statistical computing and graphics. The routines 
included in FEAR 1.1 allow computation of DEA estimates of technical, allocative 
and overall efficiency while assuming either variable, non increasing, or constant 
returns to scale. 
 
7.7 Analysis of environmental efficiency variation 
Environmental efficiency is affected by many factors such as management, input use, 
topography, and soil type.  Impacts can be captured by various techniques: dividing 
the farms into distinct groups in terms of natural factors and solving separate DEAs; 
incorporating variables directly into the DEA formulation as non discretionary 
variables; and the two stage approach, where the first stage determines the efficiency 
by DEA and the second stage tries to explain the differences in efficiency between 
farms by regressing environmental variables on the efficiency estimates (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). Direct incorporation of categorical variables into DEA 
is difficult  and requires more complicated mixed integer linear programming models 
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(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). The two stage approach was preferred for 
a number of reasons: its ability to accommodate multiple continuous and categorical 
variables; the requirement of no prior assumptions regarding the direction of 
influence of environmental variable and statistical inference on the influence upon 
efficiencies; computational convenience and transparency. This approach has been 
used in many studies (Dhungana, Nuthall, & Nartea, 2004; Hansson & Ohlmer, 2008; 
Reinhard, Lovell, & Thijssen, 2002; Wossink & Denaux, 2006).   
 
In order to investigate the factors that explain environmental efficiency, the  model 
for DEA efficicency results is calculated in a second stage using a regression. Since 
DEA efficiency scores are censored at 0 and 1.0,  OLS estimation yields inconsistent 
estimates. Instead of OLS, Tobit regression using the maximum likelihood approach 
is used. 
  
The explanatory model can then be written as Equation 25: 
 
  XY *        (25)  
 
where Y is a DEA efficiency score, rescaled between 0 and 100, and used as a 
dependent variable. X is a vector of independent variables related to farm specific 
attributes. β is the unknown parameter vector associated with the farm specific 
attributes, and i  is an independently distributed error term assumed to be normally 
distributed with 0 mean and constant variance, 2 . Tobit regression is implemented 
in Stata 10 (StataCorp., 2007).  Tobit regression results may be biased in the presence 
of high correlation between the variables used in the first stage and second stage 
(Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005; Simar & Wilson, 2007). Simar & Wilson 
(2007) proposed a bootstrapping technique to overcome this problem within the two 
stage DEA. However this is not a problem in this study as second stage explanatory 
variables are not highly correlated with the variables of the first stage analysis.  
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7.8 Data description 
The data used in this study was compiled from the virtual farm population created in 
chapter 4. It incorporates 210 farms, which represent homogeneous farm types in the 
whole catchment. Physical and financial farm variables and estimated nitrogen 
discharges are used for analysis. In the Waikato 90% of farm revenue on average is 
derived from the sale of milksolids, according to the DairyNZ’s Economic Farm 
Survey for 2003/04 and 2004/05, It is reasonable therefore to treat milksolids as the 
sole economic output of the farms.   
 
Given the virtual nature of the data, particular care was taken in the selection and 
definition of variables.  Land, building and plant and machinery variables were 
avoided as they may not be representative of the farms in the catchment.  Land prices 
in particular are influenced by location as well as economic productivity, and  
variations in plant and machinery are affected by the particular type in use.  The 
economic farm surplus variable was not used, as depreciation, labour, runoff and 
stock may not be applicable to the virtual population. 
 
The choice of variables has to be limited to avoid the problems of dimensionality that 
can affect DEA analysis. Due to the nature of the technique the number of model 
variables may affect DEA results. DEA efficiency rating depends on the number of 
farms and the number of inputs and outputs specified  (Ondersteijn, Lansink, Giesen, 
& Huirne, 2002). Adding more model variables for a given sample size can yield 
higher efficiency scores for units in the sample. Defining ten or more inputs result in 
almost all DMUs being efficient. In the same way, fewer units in a sample for a given 
number of model variables may lead to higher efficiency scores. Chambers et al 
(1998) suggested as a rule of thumb that the model specification should include at 
least three times as many data observations (farms) as variables.  However, omitting 
necessary input or output may lead to misspecification of the production model. 
Therefore various inputs belonging to the same category and measured in the same 
physical units have been aggregated. Major types of supplementary feeds were 
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aggregated using the energy content of the major ingredient in terms of Megajoules3. 
Farm expenses are specified by aggregating variable4 and fixed costs. Farm expenses 
defined here are on average less than 20 percent of the average farm expenses 
reported in the Economic Farm Survey of Dairy Farms. This is due to the exclusion 
of some variables5 which would have been difficult to assign to farms in a virtual 
population. For the same reason dairy farm income also excludes other dairy income 
and net stock income. 
 
The backward elimination procedure described by Chatterjee & Hadi (2006) was 
implemented in Stata 10 through step wise regression to select variables. Table 7.1 
presents summary statistics of the variables for farms used in the efficiency analysis. 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics of the data used in the efficiency analysis 
Variable Units Mean Stdev Minimum Maximum 
Milksolids Kg 97,870 52,699 30,891 350,957
Farm size ha 107 63 26 570
Milking cows No 284 167 99 1200
Nitrogen discharge* Kg 4133 2606 836 21090
Farm expenses $ 260,560 141,851 82,607 855,459
Farm income $ 434,541 233,982 137,155 1,558,249
* Nitrogen discharge was estimated using Overseer 
 
In estimating efficiency variation the stockingrate is used. However this takes no 
account of variations in the breed type6. Several variables are hypothesised to affect 
farm efficiency in the second stage tobit regression. Table 7.2 lists the variables used 
                                                 
3 Metabolisble energy content  of  average quality grass silage is 9.5 (MJ/Kg DM).  
   Maize silage 10.3 (MJ/Kg DM) 
4 Variable cost=animal health cost+ farm dairy+ electricity+ supplement costs + fertiliser costs +labour 
(paid & unpaid); Detail description of farm economic components are provided in Appendix 3.1. 
5 Grazingoff, crop regrassing, run off lease and standing charges of variable costs and other expenses 
& standing charges of fixed costs. 
6 Comparative stocking rate involves cow live weight as a right measure, which potentially    
   accounts for breed differences.  
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in the regression analysis.  Level of intensification is covered by incorporating 
information on stocking rate, quantity of maize silage feed per cow and nitrogen 
fertiliser per ha. Given the relatively small size of the catchment, weather variables 
across the farms are considered to be constant.   
 
The geophysical environment which is likely to affect the nitrogen discharges is 
represented by dummies for soil type and topography.  These dummy variables 
categories were merged into larger groups when there were only a small number of 
observations in a category, and they were similar in terms of nitrogen discharge 
potential. The market value of cows was used as a proxy for genetic merit and 
resultant feed conversion efficiency. It was assumed that the market value of stock 
included only the milking cows.  
 
Table 7.2 Explanatory variables used in Tobit regression 
Variable Units Mean Stdev Minimum Maximum
Production environment   
Maize silage/cow tones 0.21 0.29 0.00 1.33
Market value/cow $ 989.00 158.50 491.00 1224.49
Milksolids per cow No 351.07 45.46 246.37 464.49
Stocking rate Kg 2.72 0.48 1.80 4.51
Fertiliser nitrogen $ 135.22 64.00 20.00 290.00
   
Geo physical environment   
Major soil & topographic dummies 
Podzol- rolling   
Volcanic-easy   
Volcanic-rolling   
Pumice_rolling   
Pumice_easy   
 
 174
 
7.9 Results and discussion 
 
7.9.1 Efficiency measures 
Scale efficiency of farms was examined in terms of technical efficiency. The mean 
scale efficiency was 0.96, so farms are considered to face constant returns to scale. 
New Zealand dairy farms are characterised by constant returns to scale in other 
studies as well (Jaforullah & Devlin, 1996; Jaforullah & Whiteman, 1999; Neal, 
2004). Figure 7.6 shows the distribution of scale efficiency of individual farms, with 
more than 95% of farms being scale efficient. Since CRS measures are insensitive to 
orientation, it is used to measure subsequent efficiencies. The reciprocal of the 
output-oriented measure ( /1 ) yields an estimate that takes values between 0 and 1 
and equivalent to the input oriented measure.  Significantly, the output and input 
orientations yield exactly the same set of efficient farms, although the efficiency 
estimates differ. Therefore constant returns to scale are assumed in estimating the 
final model specification. 
 
Figure 7.6 Distribution of scale efficiency 
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The distribution of  efficiency scores for each specification is shown in Figure 7.7. 
With respect to technical efficiency, a larger number of farms are in the range of 0.7 
to 0.9.  In the case of economic efficiency, a larger number of farms are in the range 
of 0.6 to 0.7, and looking at environmental efficiency a larger number of farms is 
found to be in the range of 0.4 to 0.7. Figure 7.8 shows the cumulative frequency 
distributions of the different efficiency measures. Approximately 80 percent of farms 
achieved less than 80 percent environmental efficiency. In contrast, more than 60 
percent of farms achieved more than 80 percent technical efficiency. Environmental- 
economic efficiency seems to be similar to technical efficiency. Farms are performing 
better than environmental efficiency in terms of balancing environmental and 
economic objectives.  
 
Table 7.3 DEA efficiency scores 
Efficiency measure 
 
Efficient 
farms 
Mean  Stdev Min Max 
Technical efficiency 16 0.82 0.09 0.57 1.00 
Economic efficiency 13 0.72 0.13 0.49 1.00 
Environmental efficiency  3 0.64 0.12     0.42     1.00 
     
Environmental-economic 
efficiency 
12 0.80    0.11       0.55     1.00 
Economic efficiency followed by 
environmental efficiency 
19 0.75    0.10       0.57    1.00 
Environmental efficiency 
followed by economic efficiency 
10 0.78    0.08     0.67     1.00 
Allocative efficiency 5 0.89    0.19   0.41   1.00 
 
The distribution of  efficiency scores for each specification is shown in Figure 7.7. 
With respect to technical efficiency, a larger number of farms are in the range of 0.7 
to 0.9.  In the case of economic efficiency, a larger number of farms are in the range 
of 0.6 to 0.7, and looking at environmental efficiency a larger number of farms is 
found to be in the range of 0.4 to 0.7. Figure 7.8 shows the cumulative frequency 
distributions of the different efficiency measures. Approximately 80 percent of farms 
achieved less than 80 percent environmental efficiency. In contrast, more than 60 
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percent of farms achieved more than 80 percent technical efficiency. Environmental- 
economic efficiency seems to be similar to technical efficiency. Farms are performing 
better than environmental efficiency in terms of balancing environmental and 
economic objectives.  
 
Figure 7.7 Efficiency estimate histograms 
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Figure 7.8 Cumulative distribution of efficiency 
 
 
Efficiency measures are computed according to DEA models specified in Equations 
20 to 24.  The results are summarized in Table 7.3.  Substantial differences are found 
in efficiencies among farms. The average level of technical efficiency of 0.82 means 
that in principle the farms can reduce their input use by 1- 0.82 (18 percent) and still 
maintain the existing level of output.  In effect, the level of output can be enhanced 
by keeping the level of inputs constant. However, the perceptions of risk and the skill 
level of farmers might have an impact on their ability and desire to achieve this sort 
of efficiency. The measure of technical efficiency found here is similar to the 
technical efficiency of dairy farms (0.83) estimated by Jaforullah & Whiteman in 
1999.  
 
Mean economic efficiency of 0.72 suggests that the average farm could reduce costs 
by 28 percent and still produce the same output. This economic efficiency is largely 
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the result of technical inefficiency. The mean allocative efficiency is quite high, at 
0.89. This suggests that most farms are using an input mix that approximates the cost  
minimizing the input mix. The high mean allocative efficiency scores are most likely 
due to the production technology, which is well known and adopted by farms (Coelli 
et al, 2007). 
 
The mean environmental efficiency of 0.64 indicates that the average farm may be 
able to produce their current level of output with 36 percent less nitrogen discharge. 
Extrapolating from this across the catchment would suggest that 552, 962 kg of 
nitrogen discharged per year could be avoided if all farms achieve environmental 
efficiency. However, natural geophysical factors such as soil type and topography are 
likely to make this difficult to achieve.  Agri-environmental policies need to consider 
differences in the inherent efficiency of farms. Figure 7.9 compares the cumulative 
nitrogen discharge levels between the status quo and the environmentally efficient 
scenario. This indicates the potential for very significant nitrogen discharge reduction 
in dairy farming, without any need to find extra and expensive new technologies for 
pollution reduction. However, there is a cost associated with operating at the emission 
minimizing point. Table 7.4 shows average nitrogen discharge and expenditure in 
relation to economic and environmental efficiency.   Achieving environmental 
efficiency costs on average $757 per ha. Moving from an economically efficient 
nitrogen discharge level to an environmentally efficient discharge level reduces the 
mean nitrogen discharge by 38 percent.  This information can be used to determine 
the shadow cost, which is (2534-1777)/(39-24)= $50.50 per kg for this nitrogen 
discharge reduction.  Appropriate environmental policies may be required in order to 
move farms towards an environmentally efficient point.  Whether to do this or not 
depends on the relative costs of alternative best management practices. Some 
potential best management practices are illustrated in the Appendices 5.1 and 5.2. 
 
Farms are performing relatively well in achieving both economic and environmental 
goals, but there is room for improvement.  Caution should also be exercised in 
interpreting the combined environmental-economic efficiency scores as further 
testing with different datasets should be undertaken.  Reaching economic efficiency 
enables the enhancement of environmental efficiency to some extent as demonstrated 
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by the mean efficiency. This is true in case of environmental efficiency followed by 
economic efficiency as well. 
 
Table 7.4 Average nitrogen discharge and expenditure for economic and 
environmental efficiency 
 
 Economic efficiency Environmental efficiency 
Nitrogen discharge (kg/ha) 39 24
Farm expenses       ($/ha) 1777 25340
 
Figure 7.9 Comparison of nitrogen discharges 
 
 
7.9.2 Environmental efficiency variation 
Factors affecting environmental efficiency are shown in Table 7.5. The pseudo R2 of 
0.068 reported may not be the best measure of fit, so R2 is based on predicted and 
observed efficiency values. The calculated value is 0.44, which is similar to OLS R2. 
The model, therefore, explains 44 percent of the variation. Given the cross sectional 
nature of the data, the fit can be considered reasonable. As might be expected, 
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stocking rate has a negative and significant effect on environmental efficiency, 
indicating that lowering the stocking rate has the potential to significantly improve 
environmental efficiency. The effect of the production potential of each dairy cow is 
positive but not significant, which may simply reflect that there is little variation in 
production potential. However Ondersteijn et al (2002) found a higher milk 
production per cow is concomitant with fewer cows and increased efficiency in terms 
of conversion of feed into milk. The market value of cows has been used as a proxy 
for breed quality and seems to have a slight positive effect on efficiency. Reinhard, 
Lovell, & Thijssen (2002) also showed that a more productive breed of cows could 
contribute to environmental efficiency by reducing the stocking rate and increasing 
the feed conversion efficiency. Maize silage has a positive effect on efficiency but it 
is not significant, which may be due to low levels of usage (on average 0.2 tons per 
head). According to farm trials feeding maize silage tends to reduce nitrogen 
discharge by 10 percent  because of a higher conversion of nitrogen to milk in low 
protein supplementary feed (Ledgard, Penno, & Sporsen, 1999). There are concerns 
over feeding maize silage, however, because feed cost is higher and there are 
additional nitrogen discharges from growing the extra maize.  
 
The Podzol soil group is used as the base to interpret the coefficients on the dummy 
variables.  It is represented by the regression intercept. The estimates on the three 
dummy variables thus measure the proportionate difference in environmental 
efficiency in relation to Podzols. The effect of pumice soil on environmental 
efficiency is significant and negative, since pumice soils are prone to nitrogen 
leaching. However, the negative impact of volcanic and Podzol soils is less 
pronounced than with pumice soils, showing the importance of considering 
geophysical variations when designing policies for water quality improvement.  
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Table 7.5 Parameter estimates for environmental efficiency  
Variables Estimate Standard error t-value p-value 
Intercept 85.45 8.57 9.97 0.000
     
Production environment     
Maize silage/cow 0.61 2.74 0.22 0.82
Market value/cow 0.02 0.01 3.34 0.01
Milksolids per cow -0.01 0.01 -0.77 0.44
Stocking rate -4.39 1.51 -2.92 0.00
     
     
Physical environment     
Dummy variables     
Volcanic-easy*(0.24)+ -17.10 2.77 -6.18 0.00
Volcanic-rolling*(0.18) + -19.16 2.89 -6.63 0.00
Pumice_rolling*(0.33) + -25.39 2.69 -9.37 0.00
Pumice_easy* (0.14) + -25.19 2.97 -8.54 0.00
  
ó 10.05 0.50  
Pseudo R2 0.07  
Log-likelihood -772.12  
Number of observations 210  
 
* Podzol- rolling is used as a base and captured by the intercept term 
+ The values in parenthesis behind the dummy variables indicate the percentage of the total 
observations that are described by each dummy variable. 
 
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed an analytical framework to measure environmental and 
economic efficiency. The second stage parameter estimates reflect the impact of 
variables that can guide policy to improve environmental efficiency. 
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The farms studied are shown to be technically efficient producers, but there is still 
significant room for improvement in terms of environmental efficiency.   
 
In order to realize the environmental improvement potential, it would be useful to 
identify the characteristics of those farms that are environmentally efficient. While 
there is a natural incentive for improving economic efficiency, some reluctance can 
be expected with environmentally motivated changes in production practices. 
Economic efficiency can be viewed as a private good for farms. Environmental 
efficiency, on the other hand, is a public good, important from a social point of view. 
It may, therefore, be necessary to provide further incentives through regulatory 
initiatives (Asmild & Hougaard, 2006).  
 
There is an increasing need for objective measurement of farm environmental 
performance, and environmental efficiency scores can be good indicators of the stress 
farms place on the environment.  Environmental efficiency measures can also provide 
useful guidelines for policy makers (Tyteca, 1996). They enable impact analysis of 
various environmental policies such as use of pollution standards, taxes or tradable 
emission permits. Picazo-Tadeo & Reig-Martinez (2007), for instance, used DEA 
environmental efficiency scores to assess farm performance under nitrogen taxes and 
nitrogen use permits.  Given adequate data, this approach can be extended to analyse 
other environmental issues such as greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficiency. 
There is a potential to develop an environmental performance index by incorporating 
information on the damage costs of environmental impacts into DEA framework 
(Munksgaard, Christoffersen, Keiding, Pedersen, & Jensen, 2007). Once the damage 
costs of nitrogen discharges are determined, the social cost efficiency of farms can be 
established. DEA scores have been used to develop sustainability indicators as well 
(De Koeijer, Wossink, Struik, & Renkema, 2002).  
 
In the efficiency measurements, it is assumed that farms do not adopt any best 
management practices. A range of such options are proposed, such as limiting 
external nitrogen input, increasing nitrogen use efficiency via lower protein feed 
resources, reducing farm dairy effluent losses, avoiding direct deposition of excreta to 
land in autumn/winter by using grazing off or feed pad systems or herd homes and 
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nitrification inhibitors. However, these best management practices may need 
additional inputs such as extra capital for building feed pads or herd homes. In order 
to model the impact of best management practices in a mathematically feasible way, 
Coelli et al (2007) suggest including the amount of pollution abatement as an output 
variable. This enables the measurement of changes in various efficiency measures. 
For instance in the farming context, the amount of nitrogen abated as a result of herd 
homes can be included as a good output, while additional costs can be included with 
conventional inputs. 
 
Further research on the socio-economic characteristics of farms is needed to identify 
the reasons for variations in environmental efficiency. Farmer characteristics such as 
education, experience and ownership structure can play a major role in farm 
efficiency. For instance, the management ability of the farmer is affected by personal 
characteristics (Nuthall, 2001), and owner-operated farms are reported to be more 
efficient (Wossink & Denaux, 2006). The virtual population data used for the analysis 
does not include such information, and this is an area for further research. Given the 
virtual nature of the data, the efficiency measurements and associated results 
discussed in this study need to be treated cautiously. 
 
Finally, farm level environmental-economic efficiency scores should not be directly 
interpreted as representing the amount of environmental harm caused by farms, since 
the location of farms in relation to a water body may influence the damage to the 
water body. In addition, some farms could be taking measures to abate pollution 
through the adoption of best management practices such as using nitrification 
inhibitors and winter pads. Therefore an extension of the model to incorporate these 
could be of interest, given ready availability of data on abatement activity.  
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8. Modelling interception technology and potential land use 
changes with respect to nitrogen pollution 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Two major strategies used to manage nonpoint pollution are source reduction and 
interception (Ribaudo, Heimlich, Claassen, & Peters, 2001). Source reduction 
strategies induce changes in the way nutrients are managed on the farm. Interception 
strategies involve filtering out nutrient flow and transforming nutrients from surface 
and sub-surface farm discharges before they reach surface waters. Interception 
strategies are used for nitrogen abatement in many studies (Ribaudo, Heimlich, 
Claassen, & Peters, 2001; Tanner, Nguyen, & Sukias, 2005).  Common types of 
interception strategies described in the literature are wetlands, riparian buffers strips 
and the creation of forest land. Riparian buffers generally encompass vegetative strips 
of land  that extend alongside the streams, rivers and bank of lakes (Parkyn, 2004).  
 
Riparian buffers have become an important abatement tool in the recent past. The  use 
of it is widely promoted as a mitigation measure  for the effects  of sediment and 
nutrient runoff from land use intensification in New Zealand (Collier, Davies-Colley, 
Rutherford, Smith, & Williamson, 1995). The ‘Clean Streams’ project of the Ministry 
for the Environment (2003) encourages and supports farmers in their efforts to reduce 
the impacts of farming on waterways by rendering advice and financial assistance up 
to 35 percent of costs for fencing and planting waterway. The establishment of 
riparian buffers are costly and funding is limited. However not all land affect water 
quality goals in the same way. A social planner must therefore identify effective ways 
to allocate their scarce funds among heterogeneous farms. To facilitate the decision 
making process, a stylised model for a riparian buffer is developed for the Karapiro 
catchment, followed by an empirical analysis using a virtual population of farms 
derived in the chapter 4 to consider the impact of land use conversions on water 
quality. 
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Large-scale deforestation of planted forests (land use change from forest to 
principally grazing) has a major potential to increase nitrogen discharges. In 2005 the 
area deforested in New Zealand was estimated to have been approximately 18% of 
the area harvested (Smith & Horgan, 2006). A survey (Manley, 2005) indicated that, 
without policy intervention or a significant change to the projected profitability of 
various land uses around  170,000 ha of the existing plantation estate would be 
deforested over the period from 2005 to 2020. Forest area in the southern part of the 
catchment has been identified as one of the potential areas for deforestation. 
Therefore this chapter also looks into the implications of potential land use changes 
on nitrogen discharge. 
8.2 Farm nitrogen and riparian efficiency 
The estimation of farm nitrogen delivery to water bodies is a complicated issue for 
variety of reasons. First, it requires estimation of nitrogen discharge, which depends 
on land use and geophysical properties. The term nitrogen discharge reflects the 
nitrogen lost from the farm through leaching and runoff. In pastoral systems nitrogen 
discharge is calculated by the amount of nitrogen applied in fertiliser, farm dairy 
effluent, urine and dung by grazing animals depending on soil type and porosity, 
topography and rainfall. Disaggregating nitrogen discharge into runoff and leaching is 
problematic as very little information is available to distinguish surface and 
subsurface flows (Thomas, Ledgard, & Francis, 2005). Thus the Overseer model does 
not differentiate between leached nitrogen and runoff nitrogen. Nitrogen delivered 
into a water body requires estimation of nitrogen transport that depends on the 
distance, hydrology and terrain features of flow pathway.  
 
The effectiveness of a buffer will depend upon its ability to intercept nitrogen in its 
various forms travelling along surface and subsurface pathways. Riparian buffers 
contribute to nitrogen removal by stock exclusion; filtering the surface runoff; 
vegetative uptake and biological denitrification (Martin, Kaushik, Trevors, & 
Whitely, 1999). Biological denitrification was the main mechanism for nitrate 
removal. Figure 8.1 illustrates the riparian approach to nitrogen removal. 
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Figure 8.1 Nitrogen flow and riparian margin 
 
 
 
Adapted from: (Parkyn, 2004) 
 
 
According to the scientific literature nitrogen removal efficiency of riparian buffers 
can be quite variable. Philippe & Hill (2006) cited many US studies in which nitrate 
removal efficiency from sub surface flow varies from 90 to 44 percent. Gilliam, 
Parsons, & Mikkelsen (1997) reported that buffer zones are capable of removing 50-
90% sediment associated nitrogen from surface run off and subsurface flows 
depending on the hydrology. Parkyn (2004) cited Fennessy & Cronk (1997) and 
Gilliam (1994), who claimed greater than 90% reduction in sub surface nitrogen by 
B. Riparian buffer 
A. Nitrogen discharge into pasture streams 
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forested riparian buffers. This may be due to nitrogen uptake by deep tree roots and 
denitrification. A study by  Williamson, Smith, & Cooper (1996) revealed that the 
riparian margins were capable of reducing particulate nitrogen by 26 percent. A 
recent report prepared for the “Water programme of action” by Agribusiness group et 
al (2007) stated that buffer strips are capable of removing  7% of total nitrogen 
discharge (4% by filtering and 3% by stock exclusion). Bedard-Haughn, Tate, & 
Kessel (2004)  reported buffer effectiveness for nitrogen removal as follows; 8 meter 
buffer 28% and 16 meter  buffer by  42%.  
 
Lowrance et al (1997) reported that from surface flow 73% of nitrogen is removed by 
a 9.1 m buffer strip and 54% removed by a 4.6 m buffer strip of dense vegetation. In 
general, the steeper and longer the slope that feeds into the waterway, the wider the 
riparian buffer needs to be. Collier et al (1995) recommended 1-3 meters width for 
gently rolling slope and 5-10 meters width for steeper slopes. Stace & Fulton (2003) 
considered 5-10 meters width riparian margin along the lake margin for riparian 
protection works in the Rotorua catchment. Fencing of riparian margins reportedly 
has the potential of removing  90% of nitrogen from surface flow by means of 
enhancing the microbial action (Environment Waikato, 2004). Some claim lower 
efficiency as nitrate rich ground water tends to flow under the riparian zones and 
discharge directly to streams. For instance the key nitrate pathway with porous pumice 
soils in the central North Island of New Zealand is vertical, down to groundwater. So the 
nitrate predominantly bypasses riparian vegetation (Howard-Williams & Pickmere, 
1999). Wilcock et al (2006) reported that intercepting surface or subsurface nitrogen 
flow was inadequate as most of the nitrogen loss is through drainage. Therefore 
determining overall buffer effectiveness requires an understanding of the attenuation 
efficiency with respect to nutrients washed into the buffer and quantification of the 
nutrient load that bypasses the buffer (Parkyn, 2004). Generalisation of these cited 
performances are used later in empirical analysis.  
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8.3 The model  
Farm nitrogen discharge is assumed to depend on stocking rate, nitrogen fertiliser 
application, soil type, topography and length of riparian margin (equation 1). Where, 
Si is the vector of stocking rate, Ni is the vector of synthetic nitrogen application. i is 
the vector of geo physical parameters such as soil type and topography. 
 
),,( iiii NSfZ          (1) 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Hypothetical farm 
 
 
A hypothetical farm is divided into segments of one hectare (Figure 8.2) and a model 
is built for the segment. Let A be the share of that land in which riparian buffers have 
been established. The extent of riparian buffer depends on length of stream margins 
and topography of the land. It is assumed that buffers start at the stream or river’s 
border and extend continuously outward away from the banks symmetrically on both 
Water 
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D1 
D2 
  
Farm centroid 
l
b 
1 ha 
A 
1 ha 1 ha
1 ha 1 ha 1 ha
 189
sides of river or stream1. A riparian buffer of extent A is assumed to have constant 
width b throughout its length l. In the absence of consistent experimental findings on 
the surface/subsurface flow of nitrogen and filtering ability, the following 
assumptions are made. Surface and subsurface flow component of nitrogen discharge 
is denoted by i, which is assumed to be 25% of farm nitrogen discharged (Zi ) plus a 
maximum 25% of  Zi depending on the normalised2 value of riparian length per ha3 in 
each farm (equation 2). The remaining 50% is lost through leaching.  
 
  %25
0
25.0 iii
MaxL
l
i ZZL        (2) 
 
Riparian buffers are assumed to be capable of removing a maximum of 80% of the 
sub surface/surface flow nitrogen. Thus up to 40% of nitrogen discharged is 
intercepted. The intercepting ability of a riparian buffer has been modelled by 
adapting the functional form used by Lankoski & Ollikainen (2003)  and Lankoski, 
Lichtenberg, & Ollikainen (2008a). This functional form is modified by using 
parameters and specifications from New Zealand based experimental studies 
(equation 3).  
 
)*1.01(  ijii bq               (3) 
 
The maximum recommended buffer width for gently rolling landscape is 5 m and 
10m for steeper landscapes. Based on this recommendation, maximum buffer width is 
assumed to be 7m. Topographic differences are not explicitly considered in this 
analysis of nitrogen removal efficiency within the buffer strip.  However topographic 
differences are taken into account when estimating the nitrogen discharges entering 
the buffer strip. Further the predominant topography of all dairy farms in the 
                                                 
1 Width (b) of the riparian buffer is assumed to be constant for a particular farm type. Therefore the 
extent of buffer A translates into the width b of the buffer at that location. 
2 Riparian length is divided by maximum of riparian length per ha (404.6 km/ha) 
3 It is assumed that runoff and animal contribution are positively related to the riparian length per ha as 
it exposes more water to surface flow as well as increases  probability for stock crossing. 
 190
catchment is in the range of easy to rolling, except for 4 dairy farms with steep 
slopes. The maximum intercepting or filtering capacity is capped at the maximum 
buffer width. The marginal abatement rate of the buffer is assumed to be declining 
function of width of the buffer. The β coefficient for equation 4 is derived through 
non linear optimisation, based on the maximum buffering capacity and the width. 
Figure 8.3 shows filtering effectiveness as a function of width. 
 
Figure 8.3 Riparian buffer effectiveness 
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Quantifying the nitrogen contribution of direct livestock contact is a huge challenge 
as it is influenced by animal behaviour and the length of streams etc. Davies-Colley, 
Smith, Young, & Phillips (2004) estimated that herd crossing increased total nitrogen 
into water by 10% depending on the length of riparian margins. Therefore it is 
assumed that the farm with the highest length of riparian margin per ha, get its 
nitrogen contribution increased by 10% of nitrogen discharge per ha (Zi) as a result of 
direct livestock contact (Equation 5). 
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Riparian buffers are assumed to be capable of completely stopping the direct 
livestock nitrogen component. Therefore total abatement from riparian buffers can be 
modelled as follows (Equation 6) 
 
iiijiiji Szblb  )()*1.0( 63.0        (6) 
 
8.3.1 Nitrogen decay function 
In order to model the amount of nitrogen received from the farm to the water body  
with simplicity and no loss of generality, farms along the single tributary, draining 
into the water body are considered (Figure 8.2). The proportion of nitrogen removed 
or retained in the flow path to the main stem of the water body is assumed to be a 
function of distance. The functional form and parameters proposed for this decay 
function by Skop & Sorensen (1998) were adopted for this study (Equation 7). The 
rationale for adopting this functional form is that the longer the distance it takes to 
transport to the water body the more nitrate can be removed by denitrification or 
retained by accumulation in biomass or sediment. These parameters are constant per 
unit distance. The decay process (retention /removal) includes processes that occurred 
from the time when nitrogen is discharged until it appears in the main stem of the 
water body. It is assumed only leached nitrogen is subject to the decay process. This 
is consistent with empirical application of Skop and Sorensen (1998).  
 
iD
i PZ )1(5.0          (7) 
 
In equation 7, iDyp )1(  , denotes the fraction of nitrogen not retained or removed 
from each kg of nitrogen discharged through leaching. P indicates the probability of 
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nitrogen detention, which is equal to 0.00085 according to Skop and Sorensen (1998). 
Di is the distance from the main stem of the water body to the farm centroid4 in km.  
 
The total amount of nitrogen potentially delivered to the water body from each farm 
can be modelled as follows (Equation 8).  
 
)(])1(5.0[ iiiii
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vi    is nitrogen discharge averted as a result of converting land  into riparian buffers. It 
equates to the total area of the strip multiplied by the discharge rates. For 
computational convenience the nitrogen discharge from land converted into strip is 
assumed to be 0.  The total amount of nitrogen reaching the main stem of the water 
body can be defined as follows.  
 
 I
i
iT   i= 1, 2………I farms     (9) 
 
8.3.2 Damage function 
The environmental damage cost depends on biological and economic parameters such 
as habitat degradation and commercial and recreational interests. Water pollution may 
affect both local residents and the general public living outside the catchment as 
people derive utility from the amenities and services that the water ecosystem 
provides. These amenities and services may include good drinking water, scenic lake 
views, fishing and other recreational opportunities such as water sporting. Water 
pollution may also causes ecosystem damages that are not fully internalised by local 
residents. For instance time lags with gradual accumulation of pollutant, impair the 
ecosystem, but only generates tangible decline in amenities once it crosses a 
threshold.  
 
                                                 
4 Centroid is a polygon’s mean center which is based on the weighted average of its x and y 
coordinates. 
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Most of the bio-economic modeling studies relating to cost aspects of environmental 
change and account only for on-farm impacts. Typically these studies consider the 
costs of reduced production and additional expenditure to adopt abatement measures 
(Bennett, 2005).  Modelling the damage function is a complex task. The damage 
function of nitrogen discharges can be estimated by means of the value of averting 
expenditure and or non market valuation. The averting expenditure valuation method 
estimates the costs of corresponding nitrogen reduction such as at municipal water 
treatment facility. With the non market valuation method the value changes in the 
quality of water is assessed through estimated willingness to pay. The choice 
modelling approach is commonly used to elicit monetary values. For instance 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2001) used choice-modeling-derived estimates of the 
values of different types of remnant vegetation with farm profit estimates in bio-
economic modeling.  
 
Since there is little information available on damage costs of nitrogen discharges in 
the New Zealand context, parameter estimates used by Martinez & Albiac (2006) are 
adapted as a starting value to model damage function. They used a value equivalent to 
NZ $ 2.50 as a cost to remove kg of nitrogen from water using a discontinuous 
tertiary biological denitrification treatment.  In order to have an increasing function to 
reflect the cost of environmental damage, the damage function has been 
approximated by an exponential function of nitrogen delivered to the water body 
(Equation 10). Total economic damage E (DF) is a function of nitrogen delivered to 
the water body. D (0)=0, D’ (TR)=>0, D’’ (TR)=>0. The parameter lambda is the 
unit emission cost of nitrogen discharge and is set equal to the cost of removing a kg 
of nitrogen from water.  =2.5. However it does not account for economic damage 
resulted from nitrogen discharges from other dimensions other than the perspective of 
quality drinking water. k is assumed to be 1.2 . A similar functional form has been 
used by Suter, Vossler, Poe, & Segerson (2008) to model damage cost. They assumed  
k is equal to 1.5.  
 
k
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 194
8.3.3 Optimum buffer width 
Nitrogen received by the main stem of the river is assumed to be affected by land use 
intensity, land quality and distance, which together determine the effective width of 
riparian buffer (Figure 8.4). 
 
Figure 8.4 Social and private optimum 
 
 
 
The private optimum is based on profit maximising behaviour of producers. The 
social optimum is derived by incorporating negative externalities associated with 
environmental damage. The social optimum involves choosing the riparian buffer 
width (bij) and level of changes at intensive margin. The cost of riparian buffers 
equals forgone farm income due to land retirement plus the annualised cost of 
establishment and maintenance of the buffer.  
 
Nitrogen has been treated as an assimilative pollutant (Tietenberg, 2006). Therefore 
the social optimum of dairy farming is modelled in this chapter in a static context. 
Nitrogen discharge has previously been treated as a static problem (Lankoski, 
Lichtenberg, & Ollikainen, 2008a). The static approach is sufficient due to the 
assimilative nature of nitrogen. If nitrogen is treated as a stock pollutant similar to 
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phosphorus, the  optimum conditions could have been derived using  the Bellman 
equation and dynamic programming (Iho, 2007). 
 
The cost of achieving reductions in nitrogen delivered can vary because of 
differences in production and pollution potential resulting from variations in 
geophysical factors and other factors affecting productivity such as management.  
Dairy farm production can be modelled as a function of nitrogen discharge. 
Modelling in detail is described in Chapter 5. To estimate nitrogen discharges, farm 
choice of nitrogen fertiliser, stocking rate and feed are considered. Dairy profit 
function is assumed to be increasing and concave with  f `>0 and  f ``<0.  
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8.4 Empirical analysis 
 
8.4.1 Data 
A virtual population of farms and other land uses generated using spatial micro-
simulation in Chapter 4 is used for empirical analysis. Besides the soil and 
topographic features and intensity of production, the location of farm and farm 
exposure to the streams influence the delivery of nitrogen discharged to surface 
water. Stream length within each farm boundary is estimated using the River 
Environment Classification (REC) data base (detailed description is in Chapter 4). 
The minimum distance between each farm and the main stem of the river is 
calculated by estimating the distance between the Centeroid of each farm polygon to 
the main stem of the water body. This distance is used to calculate the decay function 
specified in the equation 7. Figure 8.5 displays the distribution of farm riparian 
margins and farm Centeroids.  
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Figure 8.5 Farm riparian margins and centeroids 
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Figure 8.6 Distribution of distance to river 
 
 
The length of riparian margins is in the range of 0-3 kilometres for more than 50% of 
farms. The distribution of farm distances from the main stem of the water body is 
tabulated in the Table 8.1 and displayed in Figure 8.6. More than 50% of dairy farms 
are located less than 4 kilometres from the main stem of the water body. 
 
Table 8.1 Distribution of riparian margin 
Riparian margin (Km) Frequency Percent Cumulative percent
0-<3 197 54.42 54.42
3-<6 123 33.98 88.4
6-<9 30 8.29 96.69
9-<14 10 2.76 99.45
 
Table 8.2 Distance to river 
Distance to river (Km) Frequency Percent Cumulative percent
0-<4 196 54.14 54.14
4-<10 53 14.64 68.78
10-<15 63 17.4 86.19
15-<25 35 9.67 95.86
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Since larger farms tends to have greater riparian margins, a riparian length to farm 
size index is calculated (Figure 8.7 ). This index ranges from 0 to 0.12 with a mean of 
0.03 and standard deviation of 0.02. A higher value indicates a greater proportion of 
riparian margins within farms. Smaller values indicate a lesser proportion of riparian 
margins. Since riparian buffers have the opportunity cost of setting aside land, it is  
estimated by annual returns forgone per ha, annualised establishment cost, annual 
maintenance cost and cost of accessories. The return forgone is the quasi rent from 
farming, defined as total revenues minus total variable cost. According to the “Clean 
streams” guide book of Environment Waikato (2004), a 3 wire  electric fence  with 
fixed posts is the best  option for riparian fencing on a dairy farm. Based on the per 
meter costs of fencing obtained from Environment Waikato, the following costs are 
estimated. Annualised cost of establishing fences is $10 per meter. Cost of 
establishing stock water supply and herd crossing structures is assumed to be 10% of 
the per meter cost. Annual maintenance cost is 10% of the per meter establishment 
cost5. The cost of riparian fencing is assumed to be constant through out the 
catchment. However in undulating and sloppy terrains it may cost more than on the 
flat terrain. Transaction costs such as negotiating and monitoring, involved with 
establishing riparian margins are not considered. 
 
Only fenced grass riparian buffers are considered in this chapter. Planting riparian 
buffers with native plants and production forest species may incur additional cost in 
terms of planting material and maintenance. However these plantings may bring 
additional benefits by absorbing percolating nitrogen by deeper root zones as we 
noted earlier. No benefits are considered, associated with riparian buffers such as 
harvest of grass for silage making, erosion and flood control, habitat, shade, 
decreased water temperatures and recreational opportunities.  
                                                 
5 Annualised cost is calculated as a sum of annual interest paid +cost of maintenance.  
Annual interest ($/year)=((Establishment cost+ Salvage value +Depreciation)/2)*interest rate 
Salvage value is assumed to be 0. Depreciation =Establishment cost/ lifespan of buffer 
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Figure 8.7 Riparian ratios 
 
 
8.4.2 Functions, parameters and solutions 
Numerical solutions for equation 11 require the functions and parameters to be 
specified. The parameters for the production function of different farming systems, 
were previously estimated in the Chapter 5 using a hybrid combination of WFM and 
meta modelling. As an alternative, here the function is estimated using the cross 
section data from the virtual population of farms in the catchment. Farm production 
functions can take different functional forms. Polynomial and the Mitscherlich-Baule 
are two of the specifications used in the literature related to agri-environmental 
policies (Goetz, Schmidt, & Lehmann, 2006; Hefland & House, 1995; Martinez & 
Albiac, 2006; Sumelius, Grgic, Mesic, & Franic, 2005). The Mitscherlich- Baule 
functional form has an attractive biological property of growth plateau beyond the 
input threshold. The parameters of this function are estimated using the nonlinear 
regression procedure in Stata version 10 (StataCorp., 2007). However, this 
specification quite frequently presents convergence problems in optimisation 
(Martinez & Albiac, 2006).  In order to avoid potential difficulties in obtaining 
numerical solutions, particularly for the policies emphasizing changes at the intensive 
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margin, the quadratic function is also estimated. A quadratic functional form presents 
a maximum yield level, although it lacks the property of a growth plateau. The 
empirical functional form derived here differs distinctly from the approaches of 
Martinez et al and Goetz et al, as it is in terms of nitrogen discharge rather than 
nitrogen fertiliser use.  Table 8.3 presents the functional forms and estimation results 
for the Mitscherlich- Baule and quadratic response functions in terms of nitrogen 
discharge per ha (Z). Y is milksolids produced per ha 
 
Table 8.3 Functional form and parameters 
Functional form Mitscherlich- Baule Quadratic
Parameters )1( iZeY   2ZZY  
α 2696 (1.96) 258.39 (2.38)
β 0.923 (39.35) 20.91 (4.02)
δ 0.010 (1.21) -0.058
Adj R2 0.95 0.42
*Statistics in parentheses are t statistics. 
 
Average farm profit derived from catchment farms is 1.65 dollars per kg of 
milksolids6. Livestock contribution is a binary choice variable because in the 
presence of fencing, the animal contribution is 0 regardless of the buffer width. 
However in order to avoid the complexities in modelling it is treated as a part of 
runoff.   
 
The maximisation problem stated in the equation 11 is solved by optimizing each 
farm individually to derive maximum farm returns and optimum riparian buffer 
width. It resulted in 3,620 serial optimisations for 10 scenarios. Figure 8.8 shows the 
problem formulation. This serial optimisation process was automated by developing a 
macro using visual basic applications, which activated Excel’s built in solver (8.9). In 
another scenario the optimisation is implemented for varying nitrogen delivery levels 
without the riparian buffers to quantify the economic impact of changes at intensive 
                                                 
6 Farm profit per kg of milksolids is similar to the farm profit defined in the Chapter 7. 
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margin. Optimisation of each scenario took about 10 minutes computing time on a 
Pentium IV 2GB RAM PC.   
 
Figure 8.8 Spreadsheet formulation 
 
 
Figure 8.9 Serial optimisation 
 
Serial 
optimisation 
Visual basic 
applications 
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8.5 Land use change  
Land-use change is arguably the most pervasive socioeconomic force driving the 
change and degradation of watershed ecosystems (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 1997). Recently in the Waikato there has been a significant area of 
production forest converted to pasture dairying and large scale conversions are 
anticipated in future. In the Waikato, 67,023 ha forestry land was identified by MAF 
as at risk of profitable conversion from forestry to pastoral use. This chapter 
quantifies the extent of land which could potentially be converted and consequent 
economic and environmental effects using geographic information system and simple 
analytical techniques. 
 
According to Smith & Horgan (2006) Land Use Capability (LUC) classes 1-5 have 
the potential for pastoral intensification. LUC is a hierarchical classification 
identifying: the land’s general versatility for productive use; the factor most limiting 
to production; and a general association of characteristics relevant to productive use 
e.g., landform, soil, erosion potential, etc (Newsome, Wilde, & Willoughby, 2000). 
Land use capability classes are intersected with land use boundaries to quantify 
potential land use conversions.  
 
Smith and Horgan (2006) estimated that expected maximum annualised net income 
as $800 per ha per year from forestry to dairying, given the cost of conversion, which 
is reportedly $4000 per ha. This results in net increase in the annual income by $559 
per ha7. 
 
8.6 Results and discussion 
Without any agri environmental policy, profit maximising farms will ignore the 
damages from ambient pollution and maximise profits. Farms undertake no 
abatement effort, because expected damage is not considered. It results in no riparian 
buffers. Figure 8.10 illustrates the pattern of changes in farm profit, optimum riparian 
                                                 
7 Annualised net income per ha of forestry is $241. This has been calculated based on 8% discount rate 
and a $27,300 /ha lump sum in year 30. 
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width and nitrogen delivered into the water body for every dairy farm in the 
catchment.  
 
Figure 8.11 shows the pattern of increase in the optimum width of riparian buffer, 
when the damage cost is varied. Higher environmental damage results in greater 
width, maximum specified width of buffer become optimum for more farms. Results 
indicate that the farm returns vary between 7-10% depending on the level of nitrogen 
reduction required to achieve the social optimum, which is determined by the damage 
cost. Simulation results for different scenarios are displayed in Table 8.4. 
  
Table 8.4 Simulation results 
Scenarios Average 
buffer 
size/farm (m2)
Average 
returns /farm 
($)
Nitrogen 
delivered 
(kg) 
Average 
nitrogen 
discharge 
/farm(kg)
  
Private optimum 0 179,370 1,185,169 4,272
Social optimum at a 
damage cost of   
    
$2.50 KgN 14,287 165,244 888,421 4,272
$2.75 KgN 16,022 164,121 871,728 4,272
$3.00 KgN 17,555 163,014 858,283 4,272
Reduction of 
nitrogen delivery by 
    
                        5 %  1,429 178,787 1,125,356 4,272
                     10 %  4,155 178,360 1,066,487 4,272
                     15 %  7,713 177,802 1,006,992 4,272
                     20 %  11,926 177,140 926,529 4,272
                     25 %  16,692 176,393 888,803 4,272
                     30 %  21,720 174,803 829,618 4,242
                     35 %  23,498 168,039 770,360 3,998
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Figure 8.10 Farm returns, nitrogen delivered and optimum riparian buffer 
width for varying nitrogen delivery levels 
 
 
Farms in ascending order of returns 
Farms in ascending order of returns 
Nitrogen delivery reduction
Farms in ascending order of returns 
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Figure 8.11 Socially optimum buffer widths at different damage costs 
 
 
Figure 8.12 Cost effectiveness of riparian buffers8 
 
When nitrogen delivered to the water body is parametrically restricted the farming 
intensity remained unchanged until a 30% reduction (no changes at intensive margin). 
Given the assumption of nitrogen retention ability it indicates, riparian buffers are 
capable of reducing nitrogen discharges up to 30%. Beyond 30%, the reduction 
requires changes at the intensive margin. However riparian buffers are very cost 
                                                 
8 Average farm returns indicate mean of  all farm income under respective nitrogen reduction scenarios 
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effective when compared to changes at the intensive margin as the impact on average 
farm returns are less (Figure 8.12). Therefore it is rational to use riparian buffers 
complementary to changes at the intensive margin, when higher levels of reduction 
are required. In addition the cost of compliance monitoring associated with the 
riparian margin is reportedly less because of its visibility and difficulties associated 
with reversibility (Lankoski, Lichtenberg, & Ollikainen, 2008a). 
 
The marginal cost of nitrogen pollution reduction equals forgone rent due to 
removing land from production, buffer costs and changes at intensive margin, divided 
by total reduction in nitrogen discharge. It is interesting to see up to 30% of 
reduction, the marginal cost of abatement seems to be an increasing and concave 
function (Figure 8.13). This is as result of dwindling marginal intercepting ability of 
the buffer and fixed fencing cost. Generally marginal abatement cost tremendously 
increases when abatement is achieved by changes at the intensive margin. Variations 
in marginal abatement cost draws attention towards possible implementation of 
emission trading schemes, which may be politically palatable as it includes potential 
compensation to farms. However the potential for successful trading partly depends 
on the initial allocation of permits as well as inherent farm heterogeneity. Socially 
optimum nitrogen reduction levels can be a basis to determine target levels of 
nitrogen reduction in potential trading programmes. The total number of discharge 
permits can be equal to the social optimum measured in terms of nitrogen delivered to 
the main water body.  
Figure 8.13 Marginal cost of abatement 
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The relationship between riparian ratios shown in Figure 8.7 (higher ratios indicate 
greater the length of riparian margins per unit area) and the marginal cost of 
abatement at 5 % reduction in nitrogen delivery is explored (Figure 8.14). It seems 
that the cost of abatement is lesser in farms with a lower ratio. It is some what 
consistent with the findings of Bontems, Rotillon, & Turpin (2005), who stated that in 
France large farms had better ability to adopt land conservation practices.  Perhaps 
farms with a lower ratio can adopt higher buffer widths. 
 
Figure 8.14 Relationship between riparian margin density and abatement cost  
 
 
 
Figure 8.15 displays the distribution of land use classes across the catchment. Table 
8.5 shows the extent of land use classes under non dairy land uses. Based on Smith 
and Horgan’s assumption on potential land use capability classes for conversion,  
29% of forestry land and 43% of Sheep and Beef land can be categorised as at risk of 
being converted as they belong to land use classes 1-5. This is equal to 30% of non 
dairying land use. Unlike existing dairy land uses, in quantifying future land 
conversion impacts, topographic and soil are differences are not considered. Instead 
the upper quartile mean nitrogen discharge of 53 KgN/ha of existing dairy farms is 
assumed to be the potential nitrogen discharge of converted land as pine to pasture  
conversions are reportedly profitable only for intensive dairying (Smith and Horgan, 
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2006).  Undistributed exotic forestry discharges 3 kgN ha/yr (Menneer, Ledgard, & 
Gillingham, 2004). Nitrogen export rates from Sheep and Beef farms are in the range 
of 10 to 16 kg N /ha/Year (Hamilton, 2005). Based on these assumptions potential 
environmental and economic impact of forestry to dairy conversions are estimated 
(Table 8.6).  
 
Figure 8.15 Land use classes 
 
 
 
Conversion of forest land from 5 to 20% increases the returns by 6 to 27%. But the 
nitrogen discharge is quadrupled. Programmes, which provide financial incentives to 
remain in forestry like carbon credits can be a useful tool to avert conversion. For 
example a $110 million dollar Green-cover Canada programme, provides  financial 
incentives  to farmers for converting up to four million acres of  economically 
marginal farm land into vegetative cover for achieving water quality, air quality and 
wildlife  benefits (Yang & Weersink, 2004). 
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Table 8.5 Land use capability (LUC) classes across major non-dairy land uses 
Land use capability Plantation forestry (ha) Sheep and Beef* (ha)
LUC 1-3 4316.17 2738
LUC 4-5 17056.40 3253
LUC 6 41060.22 7343
LUC 7-8 12278.21 663
* Sheep and beef farms include sheep farms and beef farms as well, besides sheep 
and beef farms 
 
Table 8.6 Impact of forestry to pasture conversions 
Scenarios Returns ($) Nitrogen discharged (KgN)
Status _quo 5,150,789 64,118
     Forest to pasture conversion
5% 5,510,917 117,549
10% 5,849,672 170,981
15% 6,188,428 224,412
20% 6,527,183 277,843
 
8.7 Conclusion 
The main contribution of this chapter is to suggest a stylised model that accounts 
more precisely for interception technology to abate nitrogen discharge in New 
Zealand dairy farms. Given the filtering ability of buffers, they are very useful tool 
for improve environmental outcomes up to a certain level. To achieve higher levels of 
abatement riparian buffers must be complemented by changes at intensive margin 
such as stocking rate and fertiliser application. Goetz, Schmidt, & Lehmann (2006) 
showed  regulating  the intensive  margin has to be complemented  by regulating  the 
extensive margin. 
 
Since riparian buffers cause a relatively modest economic impact on farms, they can 
be more socially acceptable. Buffers are relatively easy to enforce as they are readily 
observable and costly to remove.  
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In this study the nitrogen sink function of riparian buffers is considered and the 
additional benefits they yield such as recreational amenities and biodiversity 
conservation are ignored.  
 
The absolute results of the analysis presented here should be treated with caution as it 
is based on simplified assumptions on the process of nitrogen transportation and 
filtering.  Transportation of nitrogen is a complex process, impacted by ongoing in 
stream process such as deposition and assimilation along the way. There are 
hydrologic simulation models such as AGNPS designed to capture such complex 
hydrogeologic and pollutant transport processes. Vegetative Filter Strip Models can 
also be used to determine the accurate width of buffer strips (Dosskey, Helmers, & 
Eisenhauer, 2008). However these require use of more detailed spatial information 
about location and other characteristics of land parcels and higher level of expertise to 
perform successful model calibration. Further this chapter has not considered the intra 
farm variability in soil type and topography and not accounted for sub surface 
drainage9 on farm land due to lack of information on the distribution of drainage 
systems. 
 
The stylised model would also be improved by input of better primary data, more 
detail on hydrology, and reliable region specific estimates of buffering capacity.  
Nitrogen decay and damage cost parameters were extracted from the literature and 
better localised estimates might change the results. Therefore research aimed at 
producing reliable, location specific estimates of parameters need to be carried out. 
The framework is easily modified to apply for land retirement schemes or 
conservation reserve programmes or establishing wetlands. The natural extension of 
this model is to incorporate forest buffers and capture the carbon sequestration 
capacity, which likely to enhance nutrient abatement efficiency and economic 
viability.  An alternative interception technology known as Denitrification trenches 
(Schipper, Barkle, & Vojvodic-Vukovic, 2005) can also be explored using the 
                                                 
9 Petrolia & Gowda (2006) firstly recognised the importance of considering tile drained farmland  in 
modelling nitrogen abatement policies.  
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stylised model developed. This study implemented buffers throughout the stream 
network in the catchment for each farm.  Selectively targeting the areas along the 
surface runoff pathways for community buffer strip establishment may be a 
worthwhile extension of this study by engaging an integrated framework that 
combines economic, hydrologic and geographic information system. 
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9. Summary and conclusions 
 
9.1 Overview and policy implications 
In the Waikato intensification of pastoral farming caused increases in nitrogen 
discharge into water. It has been estimated that Waikato dairy farms contribute 68 
percent of nitrogen entering the water bodies and 35 percent of national dairy 
production. It is clear that actions to mitigate the problem are necessary if water 
quality is to be maintained or improved. Therefore it can be expected that dairy 
farms be targeted as a source of nitrogen discharge reduction to water. This 
necessitates analyzing the environmental and economic impact of abating the 
nitrogen discharges.  
 
This study has developed and applied an integrated analytical framework to 
evaluate the potential economic and environmental effects of various policies. 
Application of this framework has been demonstrated on a sub-catchment of the 
Waikato River. This catchment of many dairy farms has experienced increasing 
nitrogen levels in the surface water as a result of intensification of dairy farming 
over recent decades. Water quality in the catchment is likely to deteriorate even 
faster, if large areas of pine continue to be converted to dairy farming.   
 
Variability in the production and geographic characteristics of farms across the 
catchment affect both economic returns and nitrogen discharges. Consideration of 
variability at the level of individual decision making units is helpful in designing 
cost effective environmental policies. This suggests that spatially variable 
characteristics should be considered when designing policies to manage nitrogen 
sources of water pollution.  However, such spatial information can be expensive 
to collect and time consuming. Historically, studies used a single representative 
farm to model a whole catchment. This thesis describes the development of a 
novel approach using micro-simulation and farm survey data to create a virtual 
population of farms for catchment scale modeling and policy analysis. The 
approach provides a solid basis for analysing issues underlying nitrogen 
discharges involving tradeoffs. The method can be employed with a modest 
amount of information to analyse environmental policy in a spatial context and so 
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will be extremely valuable to regional councils and other policy making 
organisations that want to minimise the adverse economic impact of 
environmental policies. In particular, this study provided policy makers and 
planners with a decision support tool for designing and implementing policies 
related to water quality enhancement.  
 
The DairyNZ WFM is used to simulate changes to different farming systems, 
which are established using the virtual farm population. The utility of the WFM 
has been extended as a tool for environmental policy analysis by integrating a 
Metamodel for nitrogen discharges, which are estimated using the Overseer 
software. The differential evolution optimisation algorithm of WFM is modified 
by incorporating nitrogen discharge constraints to identify optimum farming 
activities under different nitrogen discharge restrictions. The result is used to build 
a profit pollution frontier for each farming system. The profit pollution frontier is 
versatile. Firstly it is used to derive abatement cost functions for different farming 
systems. Secondly it is subject to a non linear optimisation in the mathematical 
programming model to analyse the responses of different farming systems to 
alternative policies. The metamodel and combinatorial use of differential 
evolution and nonlinear optimisation techniques saved resources and time.  
 
The differences in abatement costs between farming systems are significant. This 
can be attributed to differences in production systems, soil type and topography. 
The average nitrogen abatement cost for the first 10 kilograms of reduction is 
$10.80 for a moderate farm; $ 2.70 for as an intensive farm and $31.50 for as an 
extensive farm. Information about abatement cost heterogeneity between 
catchment farm systems assists good environmental policy making as it helps to 
identify low cost farms. Targeted policies for taxing or restricting nitrogen 
discharges on certain production systems may be more cost effective than uniform 
policies.  
 
Knowledge of abatement costs should enable social planners to design effective 
policies and reduce the information asymmetry problem. Further, knowledge of 
differences in abatement costs are likely to encourage farms to engage in trading 
of nitrogen discharge permits, with low abatement cost farms opting to abate more 
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and sell some of their permits, while high abatement cost farms may prefer to buy 
more permits and maintain their emission levels.  
 
Challenges to implementing environmental policy are largely related to property 
rights and information asymmetry. Redefining property rights requires 
development of scientifically and legally defensible proxies for nitrogen 
discharges. The profit pollution frontier developed in this thesis reduces 
information asymmetry by helping to identify a farm’s likely emission profile 
based on easily observable data. Empirical application showed how to deter moral 
hazard arising from hidden action by targeting farms through differentiated 
incentives. Targeting farms with lower abatement costs tends to reduce the moral 
hazard problem as they have smaller payoff for renegade behaviour. This will 
reduce monitoring efforts and thus cost less. Given this approach may be 
contentious and face political resistance, it may be appropriate to enforce 
differentiated compensation plus penalty schemes for the forgone production 
losses. Compliance can be encouraged through technological subsidies such as 
extended extension services. Further, the profit pollution frontier facilitates the 
process of developing a menu of contracts with differential tax, abatement levels 
and penalties that would make polluters self select an appropriate contract.  
 
Innovative institutions can both improve outcomes and reduce the transaction 
costs associated with policy implementation. Institutional structures must rely on 
more than voluntary governance and voluntary compliance and need to evolve to 
empower social planners to manage nitrogen discharges. There is potential for the 
Resource Management Act to be refined to enable the development and 
application of best management practices to improve water quality. The Vittel 
case in the USA (Depres, Grolleau, & Mzoughi, 2007) shows how rules for 
achieving desirable water quality can be set by a competent research authority, 
which can also play a mediating role in ensuring a mutual understanding of the 
varying interests of the social planner and the farmer. 
 
Various efficiency measures were developed using the flexibility of DEA. These 
efficiency measures are useful for tracking the potential for environmental and 
economic improvements. Farms in the catchment have high technical and 
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economic efficiency with mean values of 82 % and 72 % respectively. However 
environmental efficiency is only 64 % on average. Catchment level consideration 
of estimated environmental efficiency suggests that 553 tonnes of nitrogen 
discharge per year could have been avoided if all farms achieved environmental 
efficiency. However natural geophysical factors such as soil type and topography 
are likely to limit the extent to which this is feasible. Economic efficiency can be 
viewed as a private good for farms. Environmental efficiency, on the other hand, 
has the characteristics of a public good. Therefore it may be necessary to create 
further incentives  through regulatory initiatives (Asmild & Hougaard, 2006). For 
example DEA environmental efficiency scores can be used to assess farm 
performance under nitrogen taxes and nitrogen use permits (Picazo-Tadeo & 
Reig-Martinez, 2007).  
 
Analysis of efficiency variation reveals that lowering animal stocking rates has 
great potential to improve environmental efficiency. Per cow production potential 
is positive but has no significant effect. It may be due to the lack of variation in 
production potential per cow. The market value of cows has been used as a proxy 
for breed quality and seems to have a slight positive effect on efficiency. 
Reinhard, Lovell, & Thijssen (2002) also revealed that more productive cow 
genetics  could contribute to environmental efficiency by reducing the stocking 
rate and increasing feed conversion efficiency. Maize silage has a positive effect 
on efficiency but it is not significant. This may be due to low levels of usage. The 
effect on environmental efficiency of having pumice soil is significantly negative, 
since pumice soils are prone to nitrogen leaching. The negative impact of 
Volcanic and Podzol soils are found to be less compared to pumice soils. This 
shows the importance of considering geo physical variations in designing policies 
for water quality.  
 
A stylised model to facilitate policy making that accounts more precisely the 
nitrogen abatement by riparian buffers in a New Zealand pastoral farming context 
has been developed. The model predicts optimum buffer width for every farm 
under different policy scenarios. Given relatively low adverse economic impact 
and relatively easy enforcement, buffers can complement policies at the intensive 
margin to bring cost effective solutions. This model enables a social planner to 
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identify effective ways to allocate their scarce funds among heterogeneous farms.  
Based on Smith and Horgan’s assumption on potential land use capability classes 
for conversion, 29% of forestry and 43% of Sheep and Beef farm land can be 
categorised as at risk of being converted as they are on land use classes 1-5. This 
is equal to 30% of non dairying land use in the catchment.  
 
 
9.2 Limitations and potentials for future studies 
Best management practices are considered in the preliminary analysis based on 
hypothetical farms, but have not been subject to catchment wide analysis due to 
data constraints. Some best management practices are not modelled due to lack of 
local research. For instance Nitrification inhibitor response rates for Waikato 
farms have not been established yet (Ritchie, 2007). Adoption of best 
management practices is likely to increase farm environmental efficiency. 
It may be of interest to extend the analytical framework by incorporating best 
management practices.  
 
There is very little information  on the extent of nitrogen that is lost in runoff  
from farms and there  has generally been no differentiation between surface and 
subsurface  flows (Thomas, Ledgard, & Francis, 2005). The Overseer model does 
not differentiate between leached nitrogen and runoff nitrogen. Estimation of the 
amount of nitrogen delivered into a water body requires estimation of nitrogen 
transport that depends on the distance, hydrology and terrain features of flow 
pathways. Complex nitrogen transportation process depends on the hydrogeology 
of land parcels. This must be considered in future modelling. 
 
This study assumes that each farm has homogeneous soil type and topography for 
computational convenience and does not consider intra farm variability of them. 
However considering intra farm variability of soil and topography may be 
unrealistic due to the difficulties in restricting mobility of animals within certain 
soil and topography and further it makes policy implementation more 
complicated. 
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The present study could be extended in a number of ways, but assessing the 
impact of price variations would be the highest priority, particularly in view of the 
recent upsurge in world dairy product prices. Also the diversity of risk preferences 
should not be ignored in designing environmental policy given the stochastic 
nature of farming. 
 
The natural extension of the riparian buffer model is to incorporate forest buffers 
and capture the carbon assimilative capacity, which is likely to enhance nutrient 
abatement efficiency and economic viability of buffers.   
 
A further useful extension would be the construction of dynamic spatial micro-
simulation model using the time tagged population variables. This work could 
make use of remote sensing and satellite imagery to produce time tagged 
population variables.  
 
The model omits important influences on decision making such as farmer attitude, 
intrinsic knowledge base, experience and risk aversion etc. Direct data collection 
from farms is clearly optimal given no cost, time and effort constraints. However, 
given such constraints the approach taken substantially overcomes data 
limitations. The choice of appropriate policy requires estimates of marginal 
benefits of policy apart from marginal costs of implementation.  Hence, the bio-
economic modelling approach of this thesis needs to be complemented with farm 
surveys and non market valuation studies. 
 
The analysis is exploratory rather than a comprehensive assessment of a particular 
policy. It should be emphasied that given the complexities of the real world and 
assumptions  made in developing  the model and asembling the data, the reported 
results are no more than best estimates However, the results are reasonable, and 
offer  a useful means  for comparing alternative scenarios and for reaching general 
conclusions about alternative policies.   
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Effective policy implementation requires political acceptability. Gunningham & 
Sinclair (2005) stated that 
 
 “Political acceptability will be crucial to the credibility, legitimacy and success 
of most policy instruments and unless we take account of it, policy prescriptions 
are likely to gather dust rather than to be implemented”.  
 
The challenge is to devise options that are politically palatable by minimising the 
tradeoffs between environmental improvement and economic prosperity.  
 
Techniques for the measurement of policies have been successfully developed in 
order to add significantly to our knowledge of the underlying relationships. The 
method can be applied elsewhere and for other issues such as greenhouse gases.  
This thesis provides useful tools for policy makers seeking to develop empirically 
informed agri environmental policy. 
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Appendix 1.1 New Zealand Soil Classification subgroups 
Source: Hewitt (1998) 
 
NZSC 
code 
Description NZSC 
code 
Description 
Anthropic Soils 
AFA Artifact Fill Anthropic Soils AFC Compacted Fill Anthropic  
AFE Earthy Fill Anthropic Soils AFST Stony-tailings Fill Anthropic  
AFW Wet Fill Anthropic Soils ARB Buried Refuse Anthropic  
ART Typic Refuse Anthropic Soils AT Rocky Truncated Anthropic  
ATT Typic Truncated Anthropic Soils   
Brown Soils
BAM Mottled Acid Brown Soils BAMP Mottled-placic Acid Brown 
BAO Peaty Acid Brown Soils BAP Placic Acid Brown  
BAT Typic Acid Brown Soils BAX Pan Acid Brown Soils 
BFA Acidic Firm Brown Soils BFAL Acidic-allophanic Firm Brown 
BFC Cemented Firm Brown Soils BFL Allophanic Firm Brown Soils
BFM Mottled Firm Brown Soils BFMA Mottled-acidic Firm Brown 
Soils
BFMC Mottled-Cemented Firm Brown Soils BFP Pallic Firm Brown Soils 
BFT Typic Firm Brown Soils BLA Acidic Allophanic Brown Soils
BLAD Acidic-pedal Allophanic Brown Soils BLAM Acidic-mafic Allophanic 
Brown 
BLD Pedal Allophanic Brown Soils BLM Mottled Allophanic Brown 
Soils
BLT Typic Allophanic Brown Soils BLX Fragic Allophanic Brown Soils
BMA Acidic Mafic Brown Soils BMG Magnesic Mafic Brown Soils
BMM Mottled Mafic Brown Soils BMMG Mottled-magnesic Mafic 
Brown 
BMT Typic Mafic Brown Soils BOA Acidic Orthic Brown Soils
BOC Calcareous Orthic Brown Soils BOH Humose Orthic Brown Soils
BOI Immature Orthic Brown Soils BOM Mottled Orthic Brown Soils
BOMA Mottled-acidic Orthic Brown Soils BOP Pallic Orthic Brown Soils 
BOT Typic Orthic Brown Soils BSA Acidic Sandy Brown Soils
BSM Mottled Sandy Brown Soils BSP Pallic Sandy Brown Soils 
BST Typic Sandy Brown Soils BXT Typic Oxidic Brown Soils
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NZSC 
code 
Description NZSC 
code 
Description 
Gley Soils
GAG  Granular Acid Gley Soils GAH Humose Acid Gley Soils 
GAO Peaty Acid Gley Soils GAPH Placic-humose Acid Gley Soils
GAT Typic Acid Gley Soils GAY Ultic Acid Gley Soils 
GOA Acidic Orthic Gley Soils GOC Calcareous Orthic Gley Soils
GOE Melanic Orthic Gley Soils GOI Ironstone Orthic Gley Soils
GOJ Argillic Orthic Gley Soils GOO Peaty Orthic Gley Soils 
GOQ Saline Orthic Gley Soils GOT Typic Orthic Gley Soils 
GRA Acidic Recent Gley Soils GRC Calcareous Recent Gley Soils
GRO Peaty Recent Gley Soils GRQ Saline Recent Gley Soils 
GRT Typic Recent Gley Soils GSC Concretionary Sandy Gley 
Soils
GSO Peaty Sandy Gley Soils GST Typic Sandy Gley Soils 
GUF Fluid Sulphuric Gley Soils GUFQ Fluid-saline Sulphuric Gley 
Soils
GUO Peaty Sulphuric Gley Soils GUSQ Sandy-saline Sulphuric Gley 
Soil
GXN Nodular Oxidic Gley Soils GXT Typic Oxidic Gley Soils 
Allophanic Soils
LGO Peaty Gley Allophanic Soils LGT Typic Gley Allophanic Soils
LIM Mottled Impeded Allophanic Soils LIMI Mottled-ironstone Impeded 
Allophanic Soils 
LIT Typic Impeded Allophanic Soils LOA Acidic Orthic Allophanic Soils
LOM Mottled Orthic Allophanic Soils LOT Typic Orthic Allophanic Soils
LOV Vitric Orthic Allophanic Soils LOVA Vitric-acidic Orthic Allophanic 
Soils
LPI Ironstone Perch-gley Allophanic LPT Typic Perch-gley Allophanic 
Soil
Granular Soils
NEL Allophanic Melanic Granular Soils NEM Mottled Melanic Granular Soils
NET Typic Melanic Granular Soils NOA Acidic Orthic Granular Soils
NOL Allophanic Orthic Granular Soils NOM Mottled Orthic Granular Soils
NOMA Mottled-acidic Orthic Granular Soils NOT Typic Orthic Granular Soils
NPA Acidic Perch-gley Granular Soils NPT Typic Perch-gley Granular 
Soils
NPX Oxidic Perch-gley Granular Soils NXA Acidic Oxidic Granular Soils
NXL Allophanic Oxidic Granular Soils NXM Mottled Oxidic Granular Soils
NXMA Mottled-acidic Oxidic Granular Soils NXT Typic Oxidic Granular Soils
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NZSC 
code 
Description NZSC 
code 
Description 
Melanic Soils
EMG Magnesic Mafic Melanic Soils EMM Mottled Mafic Melanic Soils
EMT Typic Mafic Melanic Soils EOC Calcareous Orthic Melanic Soils
EODC Pedal-calcareous Orthic Melanic EOJ Argillic Orthic Melanic Soils
EOJC Argillic-calcareous Orthic Melanic EOM Mottled Orthic Melanic Soils
EOMC Mottled-calcareous Orthic Melanic 
Soils
EOT Typic Orthic Melanic Soils
EPJ Argillic Perch-gley Melanic Soils EPT Typic Perch-gley Melanic Soils
EPV Vertic Perch-gley Melanic Soils ERO Peaty Rendzic Melanic Soils
ERT Typic Rendzic Melanic Soils ERW Weathered Rendzic Melanic 
Soil
EVC Calcareous Vertic Melanic Soils EVM Mottled Vertic Melanic Soils
EVT Typic Vertic Melanic Soils   
Organic Soils
OFA Acid Fibric Organic Soils OFM Mellow Fibric Organic Soils
OFS Sphagnic Fibric Organic Soils OHA Acid Humic Organic Soils
OHM Mellow Humic Organic Soils OLBG Burried-gley Litter Organic 
Soils
OLBZ Burried-podzol Litter Organic Soils OLO Orthic Litter Organic Soils
OMA Acid Mesic Organic Soils OMM Mellow Mesic Organic Soils
Oxidic Soils
XNT Typic Nodular Oxidic Soils XOB Brown Orthic Oxidic Soils
XOM Mottled Orthic Oxidic Soils XOT Typic Orthic Oxidic Soils 
XPN Nodular Perch-gley Oxidic Soils XPT Typic Perch-gley Oxidic Soils
Pallic Soils
PIC Calcareous Immature Pallic Soils PID Pedal Immature Pallic Soils
PIM Mottled Immature Pallic Soils PIMD Mottled-pedal Immature Pallic 
PIT Typic Immature Pallic Soils PJA Aged Argillic Pallic Soils
PJC Calcareous Argillic Pallic Soils PJM Mottled Argillic Pallic Soils
PJN Sodic Argillic Pallic Soils PJT Typic Argillic Pallic Soils
PLC Calcareous Laminar Pallic Soils PLM Mottled Laminar Pallic Soils
PLT Typic Laminar Pallic Soils PPC Cemented Perch-gley Pallic 
Soils
PPJ Argillic Perch-gley Pallic Soils PPJX Argillic-fragic Perch-gley 
Pallic 
PPT Typic Perch-gley Pallic Soils PPU Duric Perch-gley Pallic Soils
PPX Fragic Perch-gley Pallic Soils PUJ Argillic Duric Pallic Soils
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NZSC 
code 
Description NZSC 
code 
Description 
Pallic Soils 
PUT Typic Duric Pallic Soils PXC Calcareous Fragic Pallic Soils
PXCN Calcareous-sodic Fragic Pallic Soils PXJ Argillic Fragic Pallic Soils
PXJM Argillic-mottled Fragic Pallic Soils PXJN Argillic-sodic Fragic Pallic 
Soils
PXM Mottled Fragic Pallic Soils PXMC Mottled-calcareous Fragic 
Pallic 
PXT Typic Fragic Pallic Soils   
Podzols
ZDH Humose Densipan Podzols ZDQ Ortstein Densipan Podzols
ZDT Typic Densipan Podzols ZDU Humus-pan Densipan Podzols
ZDYH Ultic-humose Densipan Podzols ZGH Humose Groundwater-gley 
Podzols
ZGT Typic Groundwater-gley Podzols ZOH Humose Orthic Podzols 
ZOT Typic Orthic Podzols ZPF Fluid Perch-gley Podzols
ZPH Humose Perch-gley Podzols ZPHP Humose-placic Perch-gley 
Podzols
ZPHQ Humose-ortstein Perch-gley Podzols ZPOZ Peaty-silt-mantled Perch-gley 
Podzols
ZPP Placic Perch-gley Podzols ZPQ Ortstein Perch-gley Podzols
ZPT Typic Perch-gley Podzols ZPU Humus-pan Perch-gley Podzols
ZPZ Silt-mantled Perch-gley Podzols ZXF Firm Pan Podzols 
ZXH Humose Pan Podzols ZXP Placic Pan Podzols 
ZXQ Ortstein Pan Podzols ZXU Humus-pan Pan Podzols 
ZXX Fragic Pan Podzols   
Pumice Soils
MIM Mottled Impeded Pumice Soils MIMW Mottled-welded Impeded 
Pumice Soils 
MIT Typic Impeded Pumice Soils MIW Welded Impeded Pumice Soils
MOBL Buried-allophanic Orthic Pumice 
Soils
MOI Immature Orthic Pumice Soils
MOL Allophanic Orthic Pumice Soils MOM Mottled Orthic Pumice Soils
MOT Typic Orthic Pumice Soils MOZ Podzolic Orthic Pumice Soils
MPT Typic Perch-gley Pumice Soils MPU Duric Perch-gley Pumice Soils
Raw Soils
WF Fluvial Raw Soils WGF Fluid Gley Raw Soils 
WGFQ Fluid-saline Gley Raw Soils WGFU Fluid-sulphidic Gley Raw Soils
WGQ Saline Gley Raw Soils WGS Sandy Gley Raw Soils 
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NZSC 
code 
Description NZSC 
code 
Description 
Raw Soils 
WGT Typic Gley Raw Soils WGU Sulphidic Gley Raw Soils
WHA Active Hydrothermal Raw Soils WO Orthic Raw Soils 
WS Sandy Raw Soils WT Tephric Raw Soils 
WX Rocky Raw Soils   
Recent Soils
RFA Acidic Fluvial Recent Soils RFAW Acid-weathered Fluvial Recent 
Soils
RFMA Mottled-acidic Fluvial Recent Soils RFMQ Mottled-saline Fluvial Recent 
Soils
RFMW Mottled-weathered Fluvial Recent 
Soils
RFQ Mottled Fluvial Recent Soils
RFQ Saline Fluvial Recent Soils RFT Typic Fluvial Recent Soils
RFW Weathered Fluvial Recent Soils RHI Inactive Hydrothermal Recent 
Soils
ROA Acidic Orthic Recent Soils ROAW Acid-weathered Orthic Recent 
Soils
ROM Mottled Orthic Recent Soils ROMP Mottled-pallic Orthic Recent 
Soils
ROT Typic Orthic Recent Soils ROW Weathered Orthic Recent Soils
RSA Acidic Sandy Recent Soils RSM Mottled Sandy Recent Soils
RST Typic Sandy Recent Soils RTBL Buried-allophanic Tephric 
Recent Soils 
RTBP Buried-pumice Tephric Recent Soils RTM Mottled Tephric Recent Soils
RTT Typic Tephric Recent Soils RXA Acidic Rocky Recent Soils
RXOA Peaty-acidic Rocky Recent Soils RXT Typic Rocky Recent Soils
Semiarid Soils
SAH Thick Aged-argillic Semiarid Soils SAK Alkaline Aged-argillic 
Semiarid Soils 
SAT Typic Aged-argillic Semiarid Soils SAW Weathered Aged-argillic 
Semiarid Soils 
SIK Alkaline Immature Semiarid Soils SIM Mottled Immature Semiarid 
Soils
SIQ Saline Immature Semiarid Soils SIT Typic Immature Semiarid Soils
SJK Alkaline Argillic Semiarid Soils SJL Laminar Argillic Semiarid 
Soils
SJM Mottled Argillic Semiarid Soils SJQ Saline Argillic Semiarid Soils
SJT Typic Argillic Semiarid Soils SZQ Saline Solonetzic Semiarid 
Soils
SZT Typic Solonetzic Semiarid Soils   
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NZSC 
code 
Description NZSC 
code 
Description 
Ultic Soils
UDM Mottled Densipan Ultic Soils UDP Perch-gleyed Densipan Ultic 
Soils
UEM Mottled Albic Ultic Soils UEP Perch-gleyed Albic Ultic Soils
UEY Yellow Albic Ultic Soils UPS Sandy Perch-gley Ultic Soils
UPT Typic Perch-gley Ultic Soils USE Albic Sandy Ultic Soils 
USM Mottled Sandy Ultic Soils UST Typic Sandy Ultic Soils 
UYG Magnesic Yellow Ultic Soils UYM Mottled Yellow Ultic Soils
UYMZ Mottled-podzolic Yellow Ultic Soils UYT Typic Yellow Ultic Soils 
UYZ Podzolic Yellow Ultic Soils   
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Appendix 1.2 Slope classes 
 Source: Newsome, Wilde, & Willoughby (2000) 
 
Description:  Polygon layer delineating physiographic areas of relatively 
homogeneous average slope class. 
 
Origin:   Derived from stereo aerial photograph interpretation, field 
verification and measurement as part of the 1:63 360/1:50 000 
scale New Zealand Land Resource Inventory survey. 
 
 
Item code Class description Class range 
A Flat to gently undulating 0–3° 
B Undulating 4–7° 
C Rolling 8–15° 
D Strongly rolling 16–20° 
E Moderately steep 21–25° 
F Steep 26–35° 
G Very steep >35°  
(36–42°)1 
H Precipitous (>42°)1 
estu estuary
ice icefield
lake lake
quar quarry, mine, other earthworks
rive river
town urban area, airport, oxidation pond
The ArcInfo ‘world polygon’ has a null value, otherwise all 
records contain values from the list above. 
 
  
Interpretation:  Examples: C denotes an area of dominantly rolling 
slopes between 8 and 15° 
E    +F denotes an area of compound slope, 
dominantly 21–25° but with some 
significant slopes of 26–35° 
D /E denotes an area where average slope is 
intermediate between strongly rolling 
and moderately steep 
A’ denotes virtually flat land dissected by gullies or terrace edges 
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Appendix 2.1 Composition of nitrogen discharge  
 
Following graph illustrates the effect of rate of nitrogen application on nitrate 
leaching in dairy pasture stocked at 3.3 cows per ha 
 
 
Source: Ledgard, Penno, & Sporsen (1999)  
 
Appendix 2.2 Effect of nitrogen input on nitrate leaching 
 
Source: Menneer, Ledgard, & Gillingham (2004) 
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Appendix 3.1 Dairy Operating Profit  
 
Dairy Operating Profit (formerly known as Economic Farm Surplus (EFS)) is a 
simple benchmarking tool used to indicate dairy farm profitability. In order to 
compare your level of profitability with other dairy farms it is important to 
include non-cash items as well as cash. The guidelines described in this FarmFact 
are based on the industry standard as set by DairyBase.  
 
Operating Profit is the Operating Surplus from cash (Dairy GFR – Operating 
Expenses) after adjustments have been made for:  
 The value change in livestock numbers  
 Unpaid labour and management (Labour adjustment)  
 The ownership of run-offs (Run-off adjustment)  
 Depreciation  
 The value change in supplementary feed inventory  
Operating profit 
 
50% Sharemilkers - use your own set of accounts to calculate Operating Profit. 
This can be compared with other 50% sharemilkers, but not farm owners. 
Variable Order Sharemilkers - Combine the accounts of the farm owner and the 
sharemilker to calculate Operating Profit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 228
This can be compared with other owner-operator farms. The following diagram 
shows the adjustments made to the cash income and expense to calculate 
Operating Profit. 
  
Source: DairyNZ (2008) 
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Appendix 4.1 Overseer validation in Dairy farm systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Agresearch (2009) 
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Appendix 5.1 Overview of best management practices 
 
 
 
Source: Menneer, Ledgard, & Gillingham (2004) 
 
Appendix 5.2 Effectiveness of feed pad 
  
 
 
Source: Chadwick, Ledgard, & Brown (2002)- a farmlet study in Taranaki 
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